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This thesis examines the philosophical notion of selfhood in visual representation. I 
introduce the self as a modern and postmodern concept and argue that there is a loss of 
selfhood in contemporary culture. Via Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, Gerhard 
Richter and the method of deconstruction of language, I theorise selfhood through the 
figurative and literal analysis of duration, the frame, and the mirror. In this approach, 
selfhood is understood as aesthetic-ontological relation and construction based on 
specific techniques of the self. In the first part of the study, I argue for a presentational 
rather than representational perspective concerning selfhood by translating the 
photograph Self in the Mirror (1964), the painting Las Meninas (1656), and the video 
Cornered (1988), into my conception of a cinematic theory of selfhood. Based on the 
presentation of selfhood in those works, the viewer establishes a cinematic relation to the 
visual self that extends and transgresses the boundaries of inside and outside, presence 
and absence, and here and there. In the second part, I interpret epistemic scenes of 
cinematic works as durational scenes in which selfhood is exposed with respect to the 
forces of time and space. My close readings of epistemic scenes of the films The Congress 
(2013), and Boyhood (2014) propose that cinema is a philosophical mirror collecting loss 
of selfhood over time for the viewer. Further, the cinematic concert A Trip to Japan, 
Revisited (2013), and the hyper-film Cool World (1992) disperse a spatial sense of selfhood 
for the viewer. In the third part, I examine moments of selfhood and the forces of death, 
survival, and love in the practice of contemporary cinematic portraiture in Joshua 
Oppenheimer’s, Michael Glawogger’s, and Yorgos Lanthimos’ work. While the force of 
death is interpreted in the portrait of perpetrators in The Act of Killing (2013), and The 
Look of Silence (2014), the force of survival in the longing for life is analysed in Megacities 
(1998), Workingman’s death (2005), and Whores’ Glory (2011). Lastly, Dogtooth (2009), Alps 
(2011), and The Lobster (2015) present the contemporary human condition as a lost 
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A sign we are, without meaning                        Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos 
Without pain we are and have nearly                  Schmerzlos sind wir und haben fast 
Lost our language in foreign lands                   Die Sprache in der Fremde verloren 
 
Friedrich Hölderlin, ‘Mnemosyne’ approx. 1803, in Hölderlin 1990: 272-3  
 
 
Who am I? Sooner or later, this question pops up in one’s mind as the blessing or curse of 
consciousness. Scandalously broad, the thought occupies every thinking body, every 
thinking self. Throughout humanity the investigation of the meaning of the “I” proved to 
be an interest of all kinds of thinkers. Friedrich Hölderlin, in the excerpt of the poem 
‘Mnemosyne’ above, traces the “I” through a “we” as a sign. I understand ‘without 
meaning’ as an invitation to look for the sign we are, and also the signatures we are. ‘A sign 
we are, without meaning’ inspired me to think and write this study to articulate the 
meanings “we” can have and the ways these significations come about.   
 There is no answer to the above question that will ever satisfactorily represent the 
depth of human experience, so I might as well try to provide a limited account thereof. In 
this study, I am interested in the possibilities of understanding contemporary selfhood and 
its construction. The question of “Who am I” here translates into “how”, “what”, and 
“why” “I” is. Selfhood as I understand it in this study is a concept that has transformed 
throughout intellectual history into the aesthetic-ontological condition it is today. By using 
the terminology of “aesthetic-ontological condition” I make a claim about understanding 
selfhood in philosophical terms. This means that I am interested on the one hand in the 
basis of the construction of selfhood, in terms of its appearance and representation, and on 
the other hand simultaneously in its nature of being, and understand my methodology as 
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interlinked inquiry. In other words, my interest in this project is an analysis of the 
construction of selfhood in terms of its manifestation as language and grammar: the self as 
sign as much as syntax.  
 In this dissertation I argue for the encounter with art as a form of negotiation of 
selfhood. My primary concern is how the concept of selfhood is produced and articulated 
through the exposition and presentation of itself within art, and how this creates a form of 
contact as encounter with the viewer. Throughout this study, I examine the philosophical 
notion of selfhood in representation. I argue that there is a loss of selfhood in the 
construction and presentation thereof within the encounter with the viewer. The encounter 
of selfhood through the act of recognition and negotiation with the work of art is at the 
core of the aesthetic experience. I am thus interpreting the aesthetic experience through the 
experience of selfhood and the experience of loss for the viewer as a form of renegotiation 
of selfhood through the production of a cycle of representation. In other words, I am 
drawn to the discourse of the self in contemporary culture within which I advance to the 
concept of selfhood through three main focal points: the concept of an image of selfhood, 
the concept of duration, and the concept of engagement with a self through another self.  
 According to the OED the term ‘self’ is rather vague. The dictionary offers ‘a 
person’s essential being that distinguishes them from others, especially considered as the 
object of introspection or reflexive action’ as a definition. However, interestingly the 
common definition thereby already positions the self around the link between ontology and 
aesthetics. By locating the self on the one hand between the distinguishing features found in 
being or ontology, and on the other hand in the introspection or reflexive action as a form 
of aesthetics or consciousness it becomes clear: any conception of self evolves both around 
ontology and aesthetics. In my understanding, the notion of the self is a discursive concept 
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interlinking being with the world, and giving subjectivity to consciousness. The notion of 
the self thereby links conceptions of singularity and identity to all other attributive 
conceptions of personhood, the self is a tissue in which and through which subjectivity is 
enacted and related to. Traditionally the self is found through self-reflexive accounts thereof 
in writing or portraiture, in which a self or author expresses an “I” and through that creates 
a “me”.  
 I understand the history of ideas of the self to be profoundly shaped by the medium 
of writing, and the practice of confession as exposure of and access to the self. This 
practice is so evident that it gave some of the most notable examples of the form its title, 
such as St Augustine’s Confessions (around the year 400/1961), or Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
Confessions (1782/1903).  In this canonical understanding of writing the self through the 
confession, the concept of “me” within this performative use of language is a construction 
of a self towards an other. As a form of action, the confession of the “author as me” also 
points to the performance of othering the experience of existence towards a figurative 
authority, such as God, a catalogue of norms, or a conception of the good life. Written 
language here in the form of the autobiography or memoir à la Montaigne transforms 
interiority into exteriority, and exposes the experience of being alive within an interiorized 
normativity. The role of the self within the practice of presentation of selfhood can be thus 
seen on a spectrum ranging from solipsism as the ultimate affirmation yet limitation of 
selfhood to the extrapolation of self-experience historically attributed to Descartes’s cogito.  
 In writing, the exposition of selfhood is characterized by its nature as a project and 
attempt, and its motivation of liberation within the confessional as a mode of presentation. 
Through the act of revelatory exposition of the inner soul through the text, the author 
stabilizes experience within recording and promotes a possibility of self-understanding for 
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themselves and the reader. Roy Porter asserts in Rewriting the Self that ‘the secret of selfhood 
is commonly seen to lie in authenticity and individuality’ (1997: 1) meaning that 
differentiation and personalisation are key in the effective enactment, performance, and 
recording of selfhood. However, I contend that there is no secret to the self, and in my 
conceptualisation the self is bare, transparent, true to itself, and as I will show in my 
argument it is an exposition and presentation within means of representation. I am 
interested in selfhood as a representational issue, rather than as an attribute of authorship, 
as it is commonly understood within the realm of writing. The subject of my analysis is the 
articulation of selfhood, the act of enacting a self that exposes itself within the discourse 
and nexus of self and other, and inside and outside.   
 Recently, the rise and popularisation of self-photography in the 21st century through 
camera phones brought culture the term selfie and a renegotiation of the meaning of visual 
representation of oneself. The primacy and dominance of the visual as an aesthetic, 
epistemic, and ontological axiom of relating towards the self and specifically towards 
oneself has overtaken the relationship of the writerly as the primary medium of self-
expression in mainstream society. In common sense of the early 21st century, it appears that 
something like a representation of oneself can be found in photographs taken of oneself. 
There is huge cultural momentum away from distinguishing the photographable self from 
the unphotographable self. The representation is the self. The movement and distribution 
of these images, more than just creating a recording of oneself contribute through its 
presentation in the production of selfhood in platforms such as Instagram. Further to that, 
a billion or two of the world’s population feeds each other with data in a platform 
programmatically called Facebook financed and mined by the latest capitalism, and valued 
as one of the most valuable enterprises in the world. It is in this eerie climate of tectonic 
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cultural shifts that the concepts of freedom and autonomy are explored both intrinsically 
within the self as constituent of the psyche and body, and as extrapolations thereof in its 
representation – whether as art or real life. In this neoliberalised environment the self 
mediates and is mediated through various cultural changes fuelled by rapid techno-cultural 
developments, while reality itself is a mixed media assemblage of worlds, mirrors, 
temporalities, and spatial relationships.  
 The interest in this project comes from an engagement with both philosophy and 
visual culture. I seek to deliver an original contribution to the exploration of ideas of the 
self through the combination of readings in philosophy, aesthetics, critical theory, and film 
studies. Although in this way my study falls into the field of academic research known as 
film philosophy, it seeks also to extend the canonical relationship towards the medium of 
the cinematic. By thinking through, with, about, and with film through philosophical 
methodology, I aspire to transgress the boundaries of criticism, theory, and interpretation, 
and make an original contribution to knowledge. The research question that thus drives and 
motivates this project within this field is how contemporary selfhood is constructed and 
what the meanings of its constructions are. Although research in philosophy and media 
studies discusses positions on the self, there are no positions, particularly in film studies 
more specifically that propose a relational investigation of the self as aesthetic-ontological 
phenomenon. 
 In this project I aim to develop an interpretation that consists of combining media 
archaeology and the study of the portrait as a form and practice. Inspired by the 
popularisation of self-photography through the rise of the photographic self-portrait, my 
interest in this form is related to the character of the integration of the viewer into the 
dynamics of meaning making, rather than because of the self-referential nature of 
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authorship thereof.  The self-portrait has a long lasting history in visual and pictorial 
culture, commonly associated in the Western canon, with for instance Albrecht Dürer and 
paintings in the 15th century, or Leonardo da Vinci’s drawings in the 16th century. This form 
of the portrait has found its way into society together with the earliest manufacturing of 
glass mirrors in Europe. The front-facing camera, turning the smartphone into a mirror that 
can fixate a moment, thus provoked the mass cultural popularisation of this form. As so 
often with a fashion or a cultural tendency, the photographic selfie is in fact a return to an 































Figure 0. Revolving Self-Portrait, by Nadar, Bibliothèque Nationale de France. c. 1865.  
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 Figure 0 is a shot and it is not a shot. Immediately reminiscent of Eadweard 
Muybridge’s later studies of motion, the shot is a confrontation of a face in multiplicity. 
Gaspard-Félix Tournachon, better known under the pseudonym Nadar made the 
photograph Revolving Self-Portrait as seen in Figure 0 as an original photographic account of 
himself. In the photographic series the subject is seen to revolve around himself on a 
vertical axis, thereby presenting a panorama of positions and representing himself while 
coming full circle. The photograph thus is not a singular photograph, but already plural as it 
comes as a dozen photographs, yet in unison and closure while eternally spiralling and 
looping: revolving around itself clockwise and thus establishing. Confusing as the gesture of 
spinning may appear, it captures what interests me in the construction of a portrait of 
selfhood. There is one image, there is a series or a grid, and taken together there is a 
sequence, a scene, or what today one might call a gif or even meme. This photograph (to 
keep the term for the sake of convention) is interesting for me as it displays the act of 
portraiture and the act of representation: photography and self-display are a performance to 
record a moment and the making of a moment. The viewer here on the other hand does 
the assemblage of time, following intuition of Western writing by crafting a linear series 
from left to right, a collage in the mind produces a spiralling image, a temporal loop.  
 Nadar’s Revolving Self-Portrait illustrates, exemplifies and introduces my focal point of 
inquiry: the still image and the series of images otherwise known or projected as cinema. 
However, it also demonstrates the difficulty in speaking of and with this medium, which we 
look at when it is not moving although it is, and when it is moving although it is not. The 
cut, editing and the construction of the movement across different times of photographing 
further complicate understanding of its construction. Plus there is another layer of 
sensation with the audio track or sound. With the movement to digital photography and 
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filmmaking everything has changed to remain the same, when thinking of cinematic realism. 
Needless to say, it is not all just an illusion, even though it is. Within these and other 
fundamental relations of the cinematic, I am interested in the role of the encounter of the 
self of others through the artistic medium and object, and its effect in the negotiation of the 
selfhood of the viewer. The portrait, whether a self-portrait or portrait is a work of 
mirroring, of othering, of presentation of selfhood. My analysis shows that ultimately the 
authorship of the work matters less than conventionally ascribed. What matters more is the 
configuration of presence and absence, death and aliveness within the phenomenon of 
representation of a self. It is this conception of presentation of selfhood as a discourse that 
I intent to explore in moving images and moving selves, in multiple sensuous forms and 
media. The viewer is confronting and producing a relationality through which their sense of 
time and space is negotiated and moved – an idea that has not found much resonance in 
academic scholarship yet.  
 I will very briefly review the current state of research in philosophy and media 
studies before presenting my path of reasoning.  Contemporary scholarship in French 
philosophy and intellectual thought has delivered a wealth of accounts of the constructions 
of selfhood in post-structural and post-modern terms. To name but a few, Alain Badiou’s 
Theory of the Subject (2009) and Julia Kristeva’s Strangers to Ourselves (1991) work from a 
psychoanalytic and marxist tradition, while Paul Ricœur’s Oneself as Another (1992) presents a 
hermeneutic theory of selfhood. Comparative studies of selfhood such as Dan Zahavi’s 
Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective (2008) provide a 
phenomenological reading, while Amy Allen’s The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and 
Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory (2013) and Nick Mansfield’s Subjectivity: Theories of the Self 
from Freud to Haraway both read selfhood from a critical theory and feminist perspective. 
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Other critical theorists work such as Adriana Cavarero’s Relating Narratives: Storytelling and 
Selfhood (2002), Bryan Reynolds’ Transversal Subjects: From Montaigne to Deleuze after Derrida 
(2009), Katerina Kolozova’s Cut of the Real: Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy (2014), and 
Maurizio Lazzarato’s Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity (2014) 
position ideas of the self through narrativity, subjectivity, and the formation of identity as 
much as the landscape of reality structured by capitalism.  
 In the current discourse in media studies, visual studies and film studies the self is 
discussed within the concepts of authorship and subjectivity. Most prominently, Laura 
Rascaroli’s The Personal Camera: Subjective Cinema and the Essay Film (2011) and Alisa Lebow’s 
The Cinema of Me: The Self and Subjectivity in First Person Documentary (2012) discuss questions 
of authorship with respect to subjectivity within essayistic and documentary cinematic 
works, while Jenny Chamarette’s Phenomenology and the Future of Film: Rethinking Subjectivity 
Beyond French Cinema (2012) proposes phenomenological paths of subjectivity in 
contemporary fiction. Sarah Cooper, on the other hand, in The Soul of Film Theory (2013) 
turns to the soul in film and film theory and traces its relevance as a constituent of 
subjectivity. Other philosophical considerations of the medium with respect to subjectivity 
are raised in Daniel Frampton’s Filmosophy (2006), and Richard Rushton’s The Reality of Film: 
Theories of Filmic Reality (2013) with Deleuzian approaches to renegotiating the power of the 
cinematic experience as aesthetic phenomenon, and cinema as immediate philosophy, 
ontology, and reality in its own right.  
 The notion of the self is thematised more closely as a central phenomenon within 
the nature of the cinematic medium and its role in narrativity in a few comparative studies. 
Edward Branigan’s Point of View in the Cinema: A Theory of Narration and Subjectivity in Classical 
Film (1984) indexes a taxonomy of variations on spectatorial forms of identification. Marie-
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Françoise Grange’s L’Autoportrait en Cinéma (2008) and Stephen Mulhall’s The Self & Its 
Shadows: A Book of Essays on Individuality as Negation in Philosophy & the Arts (2013) analyse the 
presence of selfhood within self-portraiture in film and as a figure of redemption in 
narrative cinema and philosophy. Nevertheless, besides these few examples the general 
scholarly discourse in cinema and visual studies is characterised by a lack of discussion of 
the notion of the self as a notion of comparable importance to discussions of the face or 
character. Moreover, none of these texts attend to the multifaceted nature of film and 
interpret the cinematic medium across demarcations of genre. Stephen Snyder’s The 
Transparent I: Self/Subject in European Cinema (1994) is one of the few studies that raise 
significant and central attention to the role of the self in post-war European cinema such as 
Antonioni, Bergman, Buñuel, Fellini, and Godard. However, this study works outside the 
context of a relational discourse of viewer to film, and without a perspective that goes 
beyond the scope of cinema and the ‘motherland’, to use Francesco Casetti’s (2001) term of 
the filmic theatre as primary space of cinematic encounter.  
 Thinking of a relational perspective concerning ideas of the self both within cinema, 
literature, and art, my study aims to extend and connect certain focal points of scholarly 
inquiry. Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics (1998) paved the way of understanding the 
viewer’s relationship to the aesthetic experience and encounter within institutional contexts 
such as the museum, which I would extend to environments such as the filmic theatre. 
Asking representational questions with respect to the involvement of the self in aesthetic 
practice, Thomas Hilgers’s Aesthetic Disinterestedness: Art, Experience, and the Self (2017) 
proposes the viewer’s self as place of aesthetic experience and encounter of art – however 
not cinema. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s (2003) Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot 
Convey centralises the encounter of the moment as main practice of aesthetic experience of 
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the reader in literature and viewer in art, however without attending to dynamics thereof in 
cinematic medium. Likewise, Amelia Jones’s Self/Image: Technology, Representation, and the 
Contemporary Subject (2006) works through the role of the body and subjectivity within 
various forms of art, but not cinema specifically. In this project I thus aspire to extend both 
the aspect of media archeology found in Jones (2006), the encounter of selfhood within the 
aesthetic experience of Hilgers (2017), and multidimensional understanding of sensual 
engagement with artistic forms of expression.  
 Throughout this study, I relate the developed theoretical conceptions to the wider 
field of cultural analysis and critique of the neoliberal societal order. Emerging together 
with postmodernism in the late 20th century, the neoliberal economic order capitalises on 
self-realisation as human form of productivity within Western society. While self-realisation 
in this tradition traces back to John Stuart Mill’s (1859) On Liberty, the discourse on 
individualism and the self-centered culture of capitalism are popularised in the 20th century 
cultural discourse through Christopher Lasch’s The Culture Of Narcissism: American Life in an 
Age of Diminishing Expectations (1978). Media and technology, the state and the global 
economic and financial order, and their influence on the existential understanding of reality 
on the other hand are subjects of Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation (1994), David 
Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (1991) and 
A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), and Frederic Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, The Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism (1997) – works that I draw on as points of reference and influence. 
My cultural understanding of the self and reality is influenced by these 20th century thinkers 
as much as more recent 21st century critiques of the economy and society such as the 
Invisible Committee’s To Our Friends (2015) or Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism: Is There No 
Alternative? (2010).  
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 The methodology for this study is constructed through a reading and interpretation 
of philosophy. Aspiring to diverge from these common trajectories tackling contemporary 
selfhood, my contribution to the discourse on the ideas of the self brings various recent and 
modern French and continental thought in contact with one another. I build my argument 
on the presentation of selfhood within and through the aesthetic-ontological contact via a 
methodology of combining ideas concerning the nature of representation and the artworks 
that inherently question the frame of their own representation. One of the main thinkers 
with whom I am interested in working through my argument is Jean-Luc Nancy, whose 
work on representation, the body, cinema, and more broadly philosophy and aesthetics has 
found large resonance within the scholarly community in critical theory and film studies. As 
I have already pointed to in Rosinski (2015), I am particularly drawn to discussing the 
question of representation of selfhood through the presentational paradigm of Nancy 
established through my reading of Corpus (2008) and The Ground of the Image (2005), while art 
and the concept and the aesthetics of the moving image are thematised through L’Évidence 
du Film: Abbas Kiarostami (2001) and The Muses (1996). While excerpts of Nancy’s thought 
are a vital part of my analysis and understanding of how I confront the status of the self, his 
influence reaches beyond the textual exegesis to an overarching style of thought and 
argument, and also subtly influences my usage of language more broadly.  
 Besides the representational influence of Nancy on my project, I make use and 
reference to philosophical deconstruction more specifically. The questions of presentation 
of selfhood are brought into contact with various aspects of the thought of Jacques 
Derrida, most notably the late work on aesthetics and photography Copy, Archive, Signature: 
A Conversation on Photography (2010). The questions of the nature of representation found in 
photography is for me profoundly influenced by Roland Barthes, whose Camera Lucida: 
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Reflections on Photography (1981) and ideas of subjectivity, loss, and collection offer 
punctuating points of interaction with the self. Duration and time in the context of the 
(moving) image are explored through the thought of the scholar Gerhard Richter, whose 
Afterness: figures of following in modern thought and aesthetics (2011) offers crucial ideas concerning 
the nature of the passage of time. Lastly, Michel Foucault provides focal inspiration and 
influence for my understanding of selfhood within the field of representation. In this study 
I draw on the notion of the episteme, and his work concerning perspective in 
representation developed in The Order of Things (2005), and the unfinished project of 
comprehending the possibilities of understanding selfhood developed in Technologies Of The 
Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault (1988b) and About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: 
Lectures at Dartmouth College, 1980 (2015).  
 In this study I move away from writing, written language and literature as a 
privileged site of the encounter of selfhood. My interest in the “I” is deeply linked to the 
“we”, and thus this dissertation aspires to be a broader reflection concerning the 
construction of selfhood through an interpretation of the relationship of self and other.  
The self does not exist in isolation, but it exists in relation. I am thus understanding the 
interpretation of selfhood as an analysis of perspective and representation: the self is 
located within the encounter between “I” and “we”, it is a relational notion and condition. 
Conceived of as aesthetic-ontological, the self that I speak of as “cinematic self” is a 
relational configuration that configures itself within the encounter of art. My argument is 
thus built around this construction of selfhood to advance a novel conceptualisation 
thereof. For that purpose I analyse the self in artworks that provide an environment of 
encounter for the viewer, and works that allow for an enactment of mirroring so that a self 
can come into being.  
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 The title of this dissertation ‘cinema of the self’ pays tribute to understanding the 
self as focal point and nexus of film analysis and cultural studies. Across the boundaries of 
what is traditionally conceived of as documentary and fiction in cinema, I aspire to provide 
a point of intersection between questions of genre by interpreting the construction of 
subjectivity and personhood through my notion of the cinematic self. The approach that I 
take to construct a fruitful analysis of selfhood is thus shaped through an emphasis on the 
relationship of self and other that I analyse in depth and through my understanding of art: a 
radical intervention in the understanding of the cinematic situation and aesthetic encounter 
– the viewer facing another self. This situation that occurs I term “the cinematic self”, 
which thus does not only refer to the self on screen or self as seen, but also to the function 
of mirroring, and the viewer’s self, a triangulation in unison that the term describes. 
Emerging in tandem with the technique and the medium of cinema, the term cinematic self 
expresses the continuous development of building a relationship of the viewer and the 
cinematic medium as it evolves.  
 The notion of the cinematic self is developed throughout this dissertation and the 
methodology of interpretation of the artworks. Each individual artwork that I interpret 
offers an enactment of a technique of the self, a term that I develop after Foucault and 
produces a cycle of representation. This is what I then, also after Foucault, term an 
epistemic scene, in which the construction of a cinematic self is produced through and with 
the viewer as partaker in its construction. The individual works accumulatively build my 
argument through the movement through different forms of engagement with the senses. 
In my multi-sensual approach, I thus move away from understanding the self solely within 
the particular artistic form, and approach representation more holistically as aesthetic 
experience. Through this multimedia methodology I aspire to move towards a 
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comprehensive representational perspective that simultaneously allows for a discussion of 
the nature of artistic recording and reproducibility in time and space.  
 In the first part of the dissertation Towards a Theory of the Cinematic Self, I establish my 
methodology of a presentational perspective through an interpretation of three artworks. In 
this section I establish my understanding of technique of the self as an exposition of 
selfhood found within epistemic scenes through a reading of Stefan Moses’s Self in the Mirror 
(1964), and Diego Velázquez’s painting Las Meninas (1656). Moving from from still 
photography and painting to video to introduce duration into my methodology and 
argument I interpret Adrian Piper’s video Cornered (1988) as a work of othering selfhood. 
Selfhood as a set of relations in these works is established through a presentation towards 
the viewer, and the viewer closes the cycle of representation and through that enacts a form 
of contact and brings the cinematic self into being. Based on the presentation of selfhood 
in those works, the viewer establishes a cinematic relation to the self that extends and 
transgresses the boundaries of self and other, inside and outside, presence and absence, and 
here and there.  
 I proceed by incorporating feature-length filmic material into my study in the 
second part of the dissertation The Cinematic Self: Selfhood as Collection and Dispersion. In this 
section I pay extended attention to the forces of time and space in the construction of the 
cinematic self and develop my notion of collection in time and dispersion in space. I 
interpret epistemic scenes of cinematic works as durational scenes in which selfhood is 
exposed with respect to the forces of time and space in four different cinematic works at 
the margins of cinematic realism. My close readings of epistemic scenes of the films The 
Congress (2013), and Boyhood (2014) advance my notion of selfhood as collection in time, 
through which I exemplify cinema as a philosophical mirror collecting loss of selfhood over 
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time for the viewer. Further, through an interpretation of epistemic scenes in the cinematic 
concert A Trip to Japan, Revisited (2013), and the hyper-film Cool World (1992) I argue that 
these works create a cinematic self in which a spatial sense of selfhood is dispersed for the 
viewer. 
 In the third part of the dissertation Moments of Selfhood: Neoliberal Practices of  
Portraiture of Selves I turn to three filmmakers who are preoccupied with the domain of 
selfhood in their corpus. In this third section I examine moments of selfhood and the 
forces of death, survival, and love in the practice of contemporary cinematic portraiture of 
selves in Joshua Oppenheimer’s, Michael Glawogger’s, and Yorgos Lanthimos’ work. From 
the theoretical construction of selfhood in space and time in the second part, I here move 
to the application of the cinematic self in the practice of current cinema within the cultural 
paradigm of neoliberal society. While the force of death is interpreted in the portrait of 
perpetrators in Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing (2013), and The Look of Silence (2014), the 
force of survival in the longing for life is analysed in Glawogger’s Megacities (1998), 
Workingman’s death (2005), and Whores’ Glory (2011). Lastly, Lanthimos’s Dogtooth (2009), Alps 
(2011), and The Lobster (2015) present the contemporary human condition as a lost intuition 
of relationality epitomised in love. Concluding my study, these films offer portraits of selves 
and the world of the early 21st century within highly innovative practices of filmmaking 
testifying to the power of selfhood within representation.  
 In this dissertation, I am interested in providing an innovative and original account 
of how both thinking about selfhood and the cinematic form are intertwined. This means 
that I understand the cinematic experience as an encounter between the viewer and the 
medium, through which the viewer experiences something. The aesthetic experience of the 
cinematic in my understanding thereby creates an exchange and impression onto the viewer, 
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who in and through the encounter re-organises and re-orientates their own sense of self. 
The cinematic self is thus a bridge of intimacy and communication, a form of contact of the 
senses and the self. Far from a sense of passivity, the enactment of presence constructs a 
performance of selfhood for the viewer as partaker of the artwork. My approach of 
contributing to the ideas of the self in this way comes from the intersections and margins of 
aesthetics, philosophy, visual studies and critical theory. I argue for the construction of the 
self as a conceptual invention of meaning for the human experience in excess of its 
presence. Who am I? I am in movement, in construction, I am in exchange of myself, 
















SECTION I. Towards a Theory of the Cinematic Self  
 
‘When one looks at oneself in a mirror, one sees oneself either as seen or as seeing but never as both at the 
same time.’ (Derrida 2010: 31)  
      
‘The philosopher should start by meditating on photography, that is to say the writing of light before setting 
out towards a reflection on an impossible self-portrait.’ (Derrida in Pyke 2011: np)  
 
 
The two fragmentary excerpts of Jacques Derrida’s thought form a looped contemplation 
of selfhood, photography, and philosophy. It is the relation between those terms that I aim 
to illuminate in this first part of the dissertation. Thinking of the mirror and Derrida’s 
‘paradox of selfhood’ – the ostensibly impossible moment of simultaneously seeing oneself 
as oneself (in the mirror), and seeing the mirror and oneself in it (as another) – inspires my 
inquiry of understanding selfhood. Where is selfhood located, when it cannot be seen while 
seeing? What is the contact that informs the constitution of selfhood in the act of mirroring 
through the loop of referential identity? In conjunction with the idea of constructing a self-
portrait present in the second quotation, I follow the assumption that the paradox might be 
resolved by looking at another mirror: photography.  
 Every photograph of a human subject is a fixation of a self, which is looked at, and 
looked into. The surface of physical photographs has an ingrained mirror structure that 
invites one not to overlook the reflection of the print’s surface. This double looking into 
the mirroring of photographs, the impossible image of ‘seen as seeing’ is the paradox that 
informs my discussion of the self (Derrida 2010: 31). Stilling observation into an image 
produces a fixation of reality that the practice of viewership confronts. The contemplation 
of the photographic image is thus accordingly both an interpretation of the seen and the 
confrontation of the act of seeing. Additionally, in photographs depicting subjects - the 
photographs of my interest here - the subject’s body confronts the viewer. The thought 
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concerning both sides of this process, first the subject of the seeing, and second the subject 
of the fixation, constitutes my reflection on selfhood.  
 The introduction established the self as plateau of subjectivity and traced the notion 
of the self back from romanticism to the contemporary neoliberal moment. Now I am 
turning from an abstract understanding of the concept as such within contemporary 
culture, critical theory, and philosophy to techniques of the self that are laid bare through 
films – itself introduced through photography. While the introduction has also discussed 
the notion of the self, or the lack thereof, in the writing on cinema, this section establishes 
conceptions of the self in cinema by virtue of discussing concrete techniques of the self. 
These techniques are informed by an analysis of scenes taken from individual films. Before, 
however, coming to the distinct techniques of the self, I raise a couple of intermediary 
questions, which are answered throughout the five chapters of this section: What is 
subjectivity? What is interiority? What is exteriority? What is the relation between the image 
of oneself and the self? What is the relationship between the body and the self? What is the 
relation of the inside to the outside, and the outside to the inside? What is presentation and 
what is representation?  
 The questions concerning the relationality of the self to its bearer and to the viewer, 
and the status of the self in an image and in images - whether photographic, painterly or 
animated - will be the guiding questions throughout this and the other two sections. In a 
nutshell, this first section thus provides one angle on answering the question: what is the 
self within contemporary cultural and critical theory – as well as in the lived reality – and 
how does film present the self and simultaneously present the forms in which its 
presentation is constructed? The self here is thus analysed in its potential as a concept of 
relation, a connecting tissue of the ontologies of the photographic image, cinematic image, 
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painterly image and animated image and the viewer. The self here is approached as a 
frontier of philosophical understanding, and the focus on the theory of representation of 
the self provokes a rethinking of the relationship of a fixed self and viewer. How can a self 
be constructed through the visual? What does it denote and is this meaning stable? How do 
time and space produce a self? The discussion of stilled images helps to concentrate on 
these crucial questions, preceding the introduction of mobility in time and space through 
the duration of film.  
 
 




Photographic images provide a means to analyse stilled images that are brought from reality 
and a sense of flow into a sense of fixation. I understand photography according to 
philosopher Gerhard Richter’s exposition of photography as a means to address relational 
questions. In the introduction to Derrida’s Copy, Archive, Signature Richter considers 
photography as ‘operational network and a metalanguage through which larger 
philosophical, historical, aesthetic, and political questions can be brought into focus’ (2010: 
xxiii). As noted earlier, I focus on all those questions with an emphasis on the aesthetic 
relationality through my reading of the self as ‘plateau of subjectivity’ based on Foucault’s 
Technologies of the Self (1988b: 25). This also foregrounds the role of photography as a 
representational device and the role of technology in producing opportunities for difference 
and thus for techniques of the self. Thinking again about the relationship of the self, the 
mirror, and the viewer, either imagined in the act of photographing, or real in the act of 
viewing a photograph a posteriori of its construction, the ‘operational network’ after 
Richter is a network of relations that operates towards communicating with each other (in 
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Derrida 2010: xxiii). This communication is the basis of the establishment of relationality, 
whether there is an other that is looked at in a photograph (of another), or the own self that 
is confronted through the photograph. 
 Looking at an image of one’s own self is looking at an image of an other. By the 
way seeing oneself ‘as someone else’ in the photographs of others influences seeing oneself 
‘as oneself’, the ellipsis of selfhood is perceived from a distance. The other helps to 
understand the bridging act that photography constructs as a space of mirroring. Even 
when looking a photograph of oneself, is it not manufactured from the perspective of the 
other? The self as an image is perceived from the point of elliptical construction, a point of 
looped referentiality of selfhood. In contrast to Derrida’s linguistic employment, I use the 
term ellipsis here as a geometrical figure and form of looped referentiality, rather than as an 
omission. The construction of the self goes via the intermediary route of othering to find 
the way back to the self as an image. However, my use of ellipsis points to the lack of 
ontological congruency and identity between the image of self and selfhood. There is 
temporality inserted in this observation of a mirror. This well known image of self-
consciousness as popularised by Jacques Lacan’s essay ’Le stade du miroir’ thus with 
temporality turns the relationality of the I through time and space – understood as a form 
of spacing – into an observation of the self (1966: 93-100). The omission of the lack of 
ontological identity in the understanding of the self arises from the temporal spacing in 
between the time the photograph has been taken and the time the photograph is being 
looked at. This act of mirroring, although a relooking, and regarding of the self nevertheless 
is of the same self and foreshadows the need of an analysis of techniques of selfhood. The 
main question is thus: is not photography the tacit technology that makes an observation of 
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oneself via the position of the other visible? Is not the other the interrupting aperture yet 
reflective interstice for a constitution of selfhood? 
 A photograph of oneself is a photograph of an other. The necessity of a relationality 
between self and other makes a presentation of selfhood, such as through photography, 
always at the same time a presentation of otherhood. Even a photograph of oneself taken 
by oneself inhabits the perspective of the other. There is no such thing as a self-
photographed self, the self is constituted by the act of mirroring from the point of view of 
the other. The representation of the self is possible in the first place through this 
relationship, and informed by this epistemic process and ellipsis. The reproduction of self 
as an image is the closure of this loop. The vantage point of the other is inescapable, the 
other presents and doubles selfhood. The dislocation of the self into the perspective of the 
other is the opportunity for its presentation in an image. Without the other there is no self. 
Without the other there is no perspective on the own self. The other acts as the harbour 
and caller into presence of selfhood. However, there is more than just positionality and 
perspective at play in the constitution of selfhood, as much as there is more to 
photography. For Derrida photography has to do with time and differences, with the 
difference between presence and absence, and the difference between life and death. 
Besides being of identitarian nature, those differences have to do with time and space, and 
their function in representation and the constitution of subjectivity therein. As Gerhard 
Richter further notes ‘[l]ike photography, deconstruction is concerned, among other things, 
with questions of presentation, translation, techné, substitution, deferral, dissemination, 
repetition, iteration, memory, inscription, death, and mourning’ (Richter in Derrida 2010: 
xx, original emphasis). The significance of deconstruction is the establishment of these 
differences in thought and as a form of philosophy. These terms and the links between 
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their nature and the nature of photography – as much as the other forms of representation 
analysed here – are of importance with respect to the interpretation of the self within and 
through representation.   
 A photograph of a self is of a self that passed, from the past, as much as it is a self 
now, there in this moment of observation, of looking at it. My reading of photography 
differs with respect to the understanding that a photograph, qua its existence as artifice is 
“of” the past, but the looking at it, and the mirroring of selves it can produce, is of the now. 
The recording of photography produces memory and remembrance, but at the same time, it 
unfolds within the momentary blink of an eye now, literally the Augenblick in German, and 
by privileging the mirroring function of photography as an embracing of the moment, it is 
possible to foreground processes of relationality at work in that moment. This is not to say 
that the past is discharged as a producer of meaning, on the contrary, the temporality of the 
production of selfhood is of vital importance in the presentation of the self in the now. 
However, whereas Derrida is mainly concerned with the ‘effacement’ of traces (2010: xxix), 
the possible disappearance of the trace of selfhood and its possibility of remembrance with 
technology such as photography, my interest here does not focus on the thanatographical 
reflection of the photograph as such, the archival forces of preservation of the “what-has-
been”, but on the forces of construction of presence of the “what-is-there” in the image. 
This means that I am thus interested in the ‘disallowed and marginalised, even repressed, 
modes of knowing’, the relations of the terms of deconstruction introduced above and their 
structural relation to one another (Richter in Derrida: xxviii). Within this construction of 
relationality, the focal point of attention is the body as the medium of the self. 
 The body as the subject in photography relates to questions of portraiture. The 
questions of portraiture are framing, composition, light, and other specificities of the 
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presentation that is in the representation. The purpose of the representation is the 
presentation of the body. The presentation in photography is the recollection or the 
recording of its trace of the past. Photography, however, as noted above, in my reading 
inhabits the possibility of presenting the body in the here-and-now of the moment of 
viewership, thus constructing a relation in the present moment in which the viewer enacts 
the relation. I find Jean-Luc Nancy’s understanding of the body helpful here. In 
Corpus (2008) Nancy provides a reading of the body as medium of immediacy, or of 
unrepresentable nature, merely presentable. This framework of thinking the body through, 
however, is not reductionist or essentialist, but attempts to see the nature of the body as 
truly individual, and overwhelming, and overspilling in its nature of existence as excess. 
This means that the body is ontologically – within or inside the forms of the arts and 
literature in which it is encountered – outside of the discourse of representational theory as 
a form of aboutness, and outside the relations of semiotics. The body is primarily and 
exclusively itself. How to approach the body then, for instance, in the case of photography 
of the body? Again, thinking outside the thanatological dimension of photography as a 
recorder of death, or a death to come, here, Nancy suggests that ‘a body is an image offered 
to other bodies’ (2008: 121). This offering of the body is the invitation of an establishment 
of a relationality, in which the body as image of itself in all its itselfness or ipséité 
is approached as a harbour of meaning that is exposed to the outside. I follow Nancy here, 
who suggests some technicalities of bridging the relationship of the inside of the body to 
the outside.  
 The body relates a self in its embodiment to others. Nancy advocates that ‘[t]he 
body is neither a “signifier” nor a “signified”. It’s exposing/exposed: ausgedehnt, an 
extension of the breakthrough that existence is’ (2008: 24). This point is made by Nancy 
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using terminology that is inspired by his reading of Freud. I see his use of the terms 
exposition and extension not as a reference to the inner life of the body that stretches 
towards death, but rather as the inner life of the body that stretches to the outside, to the 
world, and to the other. Rather than in its etymological retracing of psychoanalytic 
processes of interiority, outstretching, in its English meaning refers to the unfolding of the 
body, while the German ausgedehnt proposes a temporal dimension of duration as stretching, 
and the original French exposé denotes the aspects of visibility, emphasising the visual 
dimension of the encounter with the corporeal. Further to this, however, there is a 
compelling use of the slash or stroke “/” in the excerpt above. Underlining the temporal 
technicalities of the now I have outlined above, the body for Nancy is both 
‘exposing/exposed’ or ‘exposant/exposé’ (2008: 24). I understand the slash or stroke sign 
here as a figurative sign of mirroring, proposing a sense of unison in difference through the 
interlocked nature, simultaneity and atemporality of the proposed system of a togetherness 
of ‘now/then’. This temporal or grammatical double use of time, or inconsistency of 
“exposing” in the gerund as being in the moment and of the moment, an act of being in its 
exposition (without the objectifying connotation this might entail), while also being in 
passive mode “exposed”, or denoting some past tense in that use is underlying the sense of 
breakthrough that Nancy links to existence. For me, it is a form of understanding the 
complications of the situation of the body, which is both itself, a breakthrough of existence, 
while also a carrier of meaning and offering for the other. In addition to all this, it is in 
excessive meaning. Also it underlines the temporality of being and having-been that I 
introduced above within the communication of the body and the viewer of the body.    
 The role of the body as exposition in photography is in line with the direct 
technicalities of observation of the body in reality. However, in order for the tracing of the 
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body to be these expository values, the photograph as a form of recording or writing has to 
accord to a certain set of principles. In Corpus (2008) Nancy terms those principles of 
presentation as follows, ‘[l]et there be writing, not about the body, but the body itself. Not 
bodihood, but the actual body. Not signs, images, or ciphers of the body, but still the 
body’ (2008: 9, original emphasis). I relate his appeal to the body [corps] as opposed to 
bodihood [corporéité] to the functions of photography as the writing of light that can 
produce some ontology of and for the body that relates it to the world in its exposition as 
an exscription. The account of an ontology of the body and the possibility for an 
articulation of a self comes through an exscription (2008: 19). This form of exscription is 
what links the body to the self. I consider the self, as what Nancy terms exscription, 
‘language as body’ (2008: 71). The self exscribes a form of inner life, and the body as a form 
of self is the exscription of the introspection that the self is, as much as an outward 
orientated exscription of appearance, an unfolding of a confession of the body as it is. This 
exscription of the self can be achieved with photography, at least photography is able to 
present the body and establish visual communication that relates and relates back, via the 
viewer.    
 The role of photography is the recording of reality, and the role of viewership is the 
establishment of a relation towards photography. This creates a form of unison between the 
viewed and the viewer. The body is able to be within this relation and to be its vital carrier. 
The ontology of the photographic and cinematic image is established through and with the 
look as a mechanism of opening and access – as a form of opposition to the overly 
connoted term of gaze – or other forms of voyeurism that Nancy neglects or rather 
opposes with their denotation of social meaning outside the sensual function itself. The 
ontology of the photographic medium is defined by its force of mirroring, of being in an act 
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of looking and being looked at: the viewer as much as the photograph is looking back while 
being looked at, and through this an establishment of a relation takes place. In L’Évidence du 
Film Nancy argues that: 
 
 [t]he reality of images is the access to the real itself, with the consistency and the resistance 
 of death, for instance, or life, for instance. [...] We are not dealing with sight – seeing or 
 voyeuristic, fantasizing or hallucinating, ideative or intuitive – but solely with looking: it is 
 the matter of opening the seeing to something real, toward which the look carries itself and 
 which, in turn, the look allows to be carried back to itself (2001: 16–18, original emphasis). 
 
This passage is of importance to my argument, as it links the temporality of looking 
introduced in the previous paragraphs in between looking, looked, and being looked at, 
with the function of the relationality as a form of access. ‘[A]ccess to the real itself’ denotes 
the ability of photography to exscribe the real which I link to the conception of the self as 
the exscription of the body (2001: 16). The image of the body as self is thus the relationality 
of the body as access to itself. This relationality is established by the act of looking, and the 
vehicle that the look becomes by virtue of the ability to access a form of selfhood exposed. 
The importance of looking brings my discussion back to the beginning of this chapter and 
towards the notion of the mirror. The mirror as a site of image-production and self-
production via an image of the body links the conception a relation to a self, whether it is 
an own self or another self with the conception of collecting a self. However, the forces at 
work in the constitution of an image of oneself function both through the mirror as a space 
of othering, as well as through the mirror as an access to the self that otherwise would be 
veiled from this perspective of the other. I will argue that the self can be seen through the 
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function of mirroring as an image of relation and an image of collection. This analysis will 
be brought forward by a discussion of the photograph Self in the Mirror (1964) by 
photographer Stefan Moses. During my discussion of Self in the Mirror and its process of 
construction as an image I further develop an understanding of the temporality at work in 
the act of viewership and the construction of the self based on afterness and collection.   
 
































Figure 1. The making of Self in the Mirror, Stefan Moses. 1964.  
 
 
 Looking at Figure 1 grounds my argument with respect to the constitution of 
selfhood. We see a making-of photograph of Self in the Mirror (1964) in which philosopher 
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Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno photographs himself. Adorno – as photographer – sits in 
the centre-right of the frame and observes his mirror image, while he holds onto a cable 
connecting him to the camera positioned towards our left. We spot this scene from a 
distance behind the mirror and the table, being literally mise en scène off-frame the actual 
photo from an omnipresent and omniscient panorama. Even though Adorno looks towards 
the front of the image into our direction, we are conscious that our eyes do not meet, that 
he looks at himself in the mirror. His image of himself is constituted by the act of mirroring 
from the point of view of the other – via the mirror. For us, the black and white image we 
“look at” here is an illustration of the ellipsis of selfhood, while we simultaneously witness 
in the image itself how Adorno performs the elliptical composition of selfhood. This 
performance, or as I suggest to term it, epistemic scene, elegantly enacts the relations 
between selfhood, photography and the mirror. Adorno sits between two images and their 
axes: the one in the mirror he sees, and the one he shoots through his shutter release in his 
hands. Both axes cross through him, and through the mirror. Literally holding onto the 
umbilical cord of the camera with his hands while seeing himself in the mirror, the 
photographer and subject of the photograph establishes through the sense of touch a 
photographic construction of their self as an image. 
 The use of the physical umbilical cord as shutter release in the photograph 
allegorises the relationship between photographer and photographed. It reminds me of the 
Nancean conception of a photographic image as ‘access to the real itself’ made earlier, while 
at the same time being an image of this relation for the viewer through the physical mirror 
in the image (2001: 16). The access to the real is expressed for me through the image being 
of physical nature by expressing a physical relationship, while simultaneously serving as a 
metaphysical image: an image – or a figure – of relationality itself. The looped relation 
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between the image-bearing photographic camera, and the image-taking, yet image-of-
oneself producing photographer is palpable here through the physical cord bending on the 
carpet of the floor. The cord is the connection between the hand of the photographer and 
the camera, and an expression or figuration of time through a representational arrangement 
within an image. Witnessing the image of this epistemic scene here excavates the 
technology at work and at hand in the act of giving birth to the self as a photograph: the 
power of the transformation of the umbilical cord into an image, and thus the access to the 
production of an image of oneself. As Roland Barthes comments in Camera Lucida on the 
relation between photograph and viewer ‘[a] sort of umbilical cord links the body of the 
photographed thing to my gaze: light, though impalpable, is here a carnal medium, a skin I 
share with anyone who has been photographed’ (1981: 81). The use of ‘body of the 
photographed thing’ and the ‘gaze’, a translation of regard – here used like Nancy’s looking 
[regard] – points towards the relationality of the exposition, and the fixation of an image 
(1981: 81, 1980: 126-27). In the case of the ‘thing’ photographed being a body, I argue that 
the photograph creates as a ‘carnal medium’ the relation to a body, and more concretely the 
self of the body exposed (Barthes 1981: 81).   
 In Figure 1 the body of the photographer and the immediate viewer of the 
photograph within the photograph are identical bodies. The body of the photographed 
subject and the look of the subject photographing are in an act of connection with one 
another, via the mirror. Since the photograph is a photograph of oneself, it is indeed the 
formation of the umbilical cord into an image of oneself that we witness from the 
exterior. The image as skin of oneself, to come back to Barthes’s point, is the creation of 
intimacy towards oneself, via the process and the act of mirroring. However, the distancing 
look into the reflection provides at the same time a fixation of a momentary production of 
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an intimacy with oneself as an image. The photograph in its moment of becoming, in the 
moment of its creation, fabricates a tissue, a web interweaving the arrested matter of light 
into a form of skin [peau]. The transformation of matter of light into the process of writing 
of light manufactures the tissue of the self as an image, what is in more common 
terms referred to as self-photograph. The self-photograph as ‘milieu charnel’ 
(carnal medium) forms a skin [peau] of oneself, the skin that is understood to be the image 
that constitutes selfhood (Barthes 1980: 127). Rather than as a formation of relationality 
between the viewer and the image, the Barthesian umbilical cord here is the bearer of 
materiality of selfhood in the creation of an image of oneself. The ritual character of the 
epistemic scene that we witness is emphasised by our distance: our proximity to the scene 
and its carnal nature, yet our inability to be included in it. The actual self-photograph that is 
being carnally created is left in blindness for the viewer, as much as the viewer is not part of 
the skin.  
 Our parallax position and cultural knowledge of shooting photographs allows us to 
form a precise image of Adorno’s self-photograph in our mind. As in every other 
photograph, the photographer needs the mirror, either imagined, or physically present, to 
perceive an image of himself or herself as an other. The visual self is the production of 
othering. The visual self is the production of a double. Being able in Figure 1 to navigate 
between (imagining) seeing Adorno in the mirror, and seeing him as we see him in the blink 
of an eye moment (Augenblick), we do not face the ‘paradox of selfhood’ introduced in the 
opening of the section the photographer is confronted with. In our distance outside the 
frame we yet form an intimate relation to the unfolding scene, a scene of the production of 
an image of oneself. In a way, we are performatively positioned together with Adorno in 
the room and empathically enact a pursuit for the decisive moment of pressing 
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the umbilical cord, fixating a singular yet fleeting moment in time and shooting the 
photograph. Nevertheless, it is ambiguous whether the photograph of the photographer has 
already been taken, or whether it will be taken in time to come. Our imagined differences 
and alterations of the photograph are independent and outside of time occurring in the 
































Figure 2. Portrait of Adorno’s self-portait, 1964.  
 
 Looking at Figure 2, a second photograph that documents the process of 
creating Self in the Mirror, we can see a reflection of Adorno in the mirror. We do not see the 
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actual photograph Self in the Mirror Adorno has taken himself (of himself), but we have “one 
of him” nonetheless in the mirror by virtue of the mirror’s physical function of reflection. 
Our capacity to actively imagine the image of Adorno in the mirror in the previous 
photograph, where only the grey backside of the mirror was visible likely resembles the 
mirror image we see here. Our familiarity with the reflective capacity of the mirror produces 
the image in our mind. Whether Self in the Mirror has been taken already, or will be taken in a 
point in time in the future becomes a moot point. We imagine an image facing the absence 
of the image here: the image we look at approximates the self-photograph in construction. 
Even though, in this photograph, we tangentially contact the Barthesian ‘carnal 
medium/milieu charnel’ of the photographic self-production, we assemble in time – rather 
than see – the self-photograph that is taken by Adorno (1981: 81, 1980: 127).  
 As a still life in both photographs, the desk influences our judgment of when Self in 
the Mirror was taken. The desk displays a calendar with a date in time, an empty ashtray, a 
reproduction of a flower painting, and some books on top of a newspaper, which, under 
closer examination, are revealed to be sheets of music. There is also the plant in the 
foreground (or background), as decor of the room, and other living and transitory thing 
present. This hollow examination, this studium – to use the formulation of Barthes – reveals 
nothing that changes the substantial punctum of the image (1980, 1981). The two 
photographs of Self in the Mirror, the making-of of the photograph, and Self in the Mirror 
itself, reveal differences between presence and absence, and life and death, here and now, 
and before and after, rather than expose a timely difference and fixate a point in time. 
Through the photographs untimeliness duration is excavated as a force of presence, and the 
force of photography as such. Thinking again of the deconstructive power of the analysis of 
photography outlined in the introduction of this section, Self in the Mirror displays 
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the ‘operational network’ of here and now, and before and after in relation to one another 
(Richter in Derrida 2010: xxiii). The photograph also displays the way in which this form of 
‘metalanguage’ is constructed and held together through and with the body and the object 





























Figure 3. Self in the Mirror. 1964.  
 
 
 The self in the mirror is visible in Self in the Mirror, the proper or final arrangement 
Stefan Moses chooses for the photograph of Adorno as seen in Figure 3.1 The sitting 
                                            
1 For Adorno’s ‘Selbst im Spiegel’ see Stefan Moses, Ulrich Pohlmann and Marion Ackermann, Stefan Moses, 
Die Monographie (München: Schirmer/Mosel, 2002). For the two photographs documenting Adorno’s ‘Selbst 
im Spiegel’ see Willem van Reijen and Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, Grand Hotel Abgrund (Hamburg: Junius Verlag,  
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arrangement and gesture of the hand is almost identical, or even identical to the previous 
two photographs. Noteworthy is the differentiation of the position of the camera, the slight 
vertical panoramic adjustment, and the perspective change adjusted by tilting the mirror 
horizontally. Also, the viewer, or the image, or the mirror image – or all of those positions – 
have changed and determined the final composition of Self in the Mirror. The mirror in all 
the three photographs does not only queer the understanding of left and right, as those 
spatial, commonly perceived anchors of orientation in space can shift, exchange, dislocate 
and vanish, by virtue of shifting perspective, mirroring, or the ejection of the mirror. 
Additionally, one of the ways in which all three images share a characteristic that punctuates 
the photographs is the use, placement, and function of the mirror as mirroring object. All 
of the photographs above excavate a ‘Zeit-raum’ [time-space], to use the term of Gerhard 
Richter (2011: 125). In Afterness, Richter both translates and summarises this notion in his 
discussion of the making of Self in the Mirror, as a ‘temporal space’ that brings forward a 
collision with a conceptual perspective (Ibid). Time, conceptually speaking, becomes a 
figure of space, time spatialises. The concept of time-space will receive continuous attention 
and elaboration throughout this section in the analysis of the images to follow, and 
in particular the films to come. Here, the conceptual space is an opening to an 
understanding of composition, the technology of photography, the exposition of Adorno’s 
body, and as I will argue, to an image of his self. The mirror as the central object and agent 
of othering creates this conceptual space: both for us, and for Adorno, in between here and 
there, present and absent, seeing and waiting to be seen.  
 The use of the mirror in Self in the Mirror opens a time-space, a conceptual frame of 
representation. The mirror as territory, as a space of projection and recording provides a 
                                                                                                                                
1990), p.18-30.  
 36 
non-temporal space that enables a thinking of layered time, an injection of time into its 
representation. Thinking again about the dispute of when Self in the Mirror has been taken in 
time, or shot in time, with respect to Figure 1 and Figure 2, the particularity of time in this 
photographic scene and arrangement becomes foregrounded. Time is not a function of the 
photograph, or the capacity of the camera, but an inserted concept into an account of the 
image. The layered shadowing and future tracing of time enabled through the production of 
presence of the mirror reminds me of Gerhard Richter’s employment of the term 
‘suspension’ in relation to the non-reproductive nature of photography when analysing 
Stefan Moses’s Self in the Mirror (2011: 121). Attending to the relations of identity and non-
identity of the Adorno portraits of self-portraiture, Richter allegorises photography in its 
plurality as ‘a force field of relations that erratically thematise, always one more time, their 
own status as a relation, a relation that differs from and with itself even while suspending 
itself’ (2011: 121). This notion of suspension relates to the concept of time-space 
introduced in the last paragraph. The use of suspension denotes fixation and arrestation, 
while suspension also offers the contact and erosion that comes with deference and delay, 
an effect Richter embraces privileging the temporal effect as afterness. In my understanding 
of the effects of afterness, it is selfhood of the subject (of time) that is negotiated in the 
erratic field of relations, rather than time.  
 The function of photography, as explored in Self in the Mirror is the arrestation and 
simultaneous suspension of time. This double function might inhabit a paradox at first 
glance, however, I clarify this thinking of the grammatical double use of time in the act of 
viewership via Nancy. The alterity that the afterness produces as an effect of difference 
goes beyond the scope of the temporal, as this alterity is about being and the lack 
thereof. Afterness touches here the ontological characteristics of self as selfhood, in its 
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existence in time outside the photographic composition of a photograph in time, rather 
than as variation of time in self-in-time in the time-space of the particular photograph. The 
temporal space of photography allows for selfhood to present itself, a form of composition 
of a self both in time, and outside the properties of time. Fixation and arrestation are at play 
or at odds with suspension and delay, and a field of erosion and dissolvance. Ultimately, the 
point that Richter makes is important in that if allows us to think of photography in the 
double function of collection of time, and dispersion of time, two key terms that I will 
explore further on in the chapters of Section II. While time is collected in a photograph, it 
is simultaneously dispersed, and selfhood as pictured punctuates the images as a field of 
relations, rather than a point of relation or identification. Thinking again of Self in the 
Mirror however, the exposition of temporal difference reminds me of the point Nancy 
makes concerning exposing and exposed at the same time: that selfhood via photography 
presents itself or “is”. Shifting between two modes of ontological being within its nature as 
representation, the role of the viewer shifts via and with the mirror as reflecting the status 
of the body and self, the mirror, and the reflection of their own status as viewer via the 
mirror. My reading of Richter’s notion of afterness is as an access to the subjection it 
depicts, rather than as a means to an end to access time as a figure of following. However, 
the after or other in time, is also just one of the two categories in which suspension 
is achieved in this photograph of Adorno’s self, as well as in photography overall, as the 
other force of space, is also in afterness or in the play of fixation and suspension, primarily 
through the mirror. What space, however, is the mirror ontologically?   
 The mirror serves as the space in which selfhood via the perspective and reflection 
of the other finds itself projected back as an image of selfhood. Already Walter Benjamin 
notes in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction the alienation, or the othering 
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the mirror – Benjamin uses ‘Spiegelbild’ [mirror-image] as an allegory for photographs –
produces in the wake of photographic technology (2003: 27). However, Benjamin 
underlines that in this function of realism as the defining naturalist or objective 
representational quality of photography, mirroring is a double function. The mirror image 
can be peeled off, suspended from the physicality of the real mirror, and is transportable. 
Spatio-temporal infidelity to its own proper construction positions the mirror image in the 
field time-space, and any self in the field of selfhood. This point concerning the mobility of 
the image (of the “I”) has consequences on the peeling-off of selfhood. The mirror here as 
a glossy figure of substance of mobility of selfhood as an image is thus making photography 
a technology of un-belonging. Nevertheless, this un-belonging, or othering is 
simultaneously, the opening for any meaning, as the self can be transported via the force of 
othering into and out of ‘erratic fields of relation’ (Richter, 2011: 121). Roland Barthes 
describes this function of the photographic image as follows, ‘[f]or the photograph is the 
advent of myself as other: a cunning dissociation of consciousness from identity’ (1981: 12). 
The temporal as dimension of the ontological in photography gives presence ‘to the advent 
of myself as other’, to use Barthes’s words: selfhood disassociates itself from 
the singular self-in-time (Ibid). It is important to note what the photograph peels off here, 
according to Barthes. Whereas in the lived self there is consciousness and identity, the 
photograph displays identity minus consciousness ['retorse de la conscience d’identité’ 
(1980: 28)]. This difference the photograph creates, in terms of subjectivity in its breathing 
aliveness, and its unconscious objectifying depiction as photograph, however, is not to be 
seen in a field of false sentimentality or loss. On the contrary, as Susan Sontag explains, for 
Barthes ‘impersonality [is] the highest achievement of the personal’, and selfhood is the 
advent of othering (1983: xxiv).   
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 Photography as a mirror and fixation of time and space serves to collect 
selfhood. The photograph of a self is the collection of selfhood, exposed and exposing, 
here and there, fixed and unstable. Through the nature of the photograph as dislocating, as 
in Self in the Mirror via the mirror as a field of relation, selfhood is collected. The collection 
of selfhood that is produced in this image, however, nevertheless is not a stilled life, but a 
stilled aliveness. Barthes writes on this presentational capacity of the image, when he notes, 
‘[p]ainting can feign reality without having seen it…in Photography [sic] I can never deny 
that the thing has been there. There is a superimposition here: of reality and of the past’ (1981: 
76, original emphasis). The reality of viewing the photograph of a self is its confrontation in 
the here and now, and thus a collection of selfhood. The relationship that this collection of 
selfhood advocates arises from an understanding of the ontology of the images as a vehicle 
for collection. Photographability, in my reading of Barthes, is the ability to collect, and the 
ability to superimpose, to recollect that collection. Superimposition, however, is the 
reconfiguration and renegotiation of an impossible temporality, simultaneous absence and 
presence. It is thus more accurate and useful to note presentation as the principal 
characteristic of a photograph, instead of representation, as the photograph is of time and 
in time, and presents always again its presence in time. Nevertheless, the superimposition 
comes to its relational limits in interpersonal terms, when ontological finitude as 
death overshadows the image. Whereas Camera Lucida is a meditation on the collection of 
loss, an epistolary take on photography via the remembrance for the loss of a part of 
oneself, or one’s relation and history towards the world via Barthes’s mother, interpersonal 
relationality to selfhood can be seen in further expository terms. Nancy proposes the term 
‘nous autres’, potentially translatable as we others or us others, as a noun, or personal pronoun 
in which the mirroring of the substance and ontology of photography – introduced as 
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reflective surface tension in the introduction of this section – can be understood (2005: 
105).   
 In The Ground of the Image (2005) Nancy evokes the act of viewership as an 
interpersonal experience. In my reading and interpretation regarding Self in the Mirror “nous 
autres” is the othering, while keeping the sameness within the other that has 
adverted/found advent as the self. Nancy writes:  
 
 Each photograph forms a nous autres in which, for a moment, the eternal instant that 
 trembles in the photo unites photographer and photographed who are now one – a single 
 identity assumed, and presumed, for which the photograph is only the supposition and the 
 support. Consequently, although every photograph articulates this ‘‘nous autres’’, it also 
 ends up pronouncing and performing a tacit I that it itself immediately and improbably 
 is. (2005: 105, original emphasis) 
 
This important passage brings me back to the questions of unity or unison of exposed 
selfhood, as much as to the question of photographing and photographed. The relationship 
between self and self, and self and viewer, it seems, can be seen along the lines of a 
momentary establishment of connection. Perhaps, this can indeed be seen as a form of 
‘silent nous autres’ (2005: 105, original emphasis). However, this form of superimposition or 
“over-seeing” and “coming-upon” is only happening to one another when there is a 
concrete exposition of a self achieved, across time and space. Immediateness occurs as the 
superimposition of an assumed eternity via the oneness of perspective, through the 
momentary unison of photographer and photographed, as a play on and with perspective, 
self and other, identity and alterity. A collection and a formation of a nous autres is an 
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arrangement in space and time, possible only through the collection of selfhood in which 
the viewer takes a part, as bystander or superimposing creator of the image.    
 The advancement, suspension, and alterity of the image of oneself as an other is 
experienced through the mirror space. With the mirror space, as much as with photography 
as such – as a mirror – there is no “still life”. There is always an image of oneself which 
becomes an image of an other. In contrast to a fracture of the I – which Lacan recognises 
in the act of recognition of the owned self in a mirror (in what is termed the mirror stage) – 
in the afterness of photography the fragmentation of selfhood is primarily of spatio-
temporal relationality. Photography as a marker, delay, and extension of time, produces a 
shock of the now through the presentation of selfhood. The mirror establishes a space 
of confrontation of the I, not as identification of a self now with a self now, but with a self 
here/now, and a self elsewhere/then. Michel Foucault elaborates on the mirror as a space 
of relationality and the self in the 1986 essay ‘Of Other Spaces’. He notes that,  
 
 I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens up behind the 
 surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility 
 to myself, that enables me to see myself where I am absent (1986a: 24).  
 
This passage opens the spatial questions of belonging as a matter of and in space. For 
Foucault the mirror serves as a privileged space of othering and shadowing, while at the 
same time, giving, or to come back to the Barthesian formulation, advancing an image of 
oneself. The tension of the mirror in Foucault’s analysis of space is the dual identity of the 
mirror as power of reflection (of here into an elsewhere) and epistemic access (to an 
elsewhere of here via the here). The mechanics of visibility of the mirror make it possible 
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for the viewer that, as Foucault further observes, ‘I begin again to direct my eyes toward 
myself and reconstitute myself there where I am’ (1986a: 24). This means that the mirror is 
a space of direction and redirection and a form of technology through which selfhood can 
be advanced: from and towards the self.   
 Foucault here, like Barthes, is not discussing the body and face as constituents of 
selfhood, but the territorial relation of mirror and space in abstract terms as form of 
advancement of self. The mirror is a space of difference between utopia and heterotopia, 
paradoxically both elsewhere and real, both othering and propre. In its property, the mirror 
emerges as a space of destination and origin, to simultaneously also emerge as a space of 
departure and advancement. In Self in the Mirror, the position of Adorno in the space of the 
photograph exposes this bidirectional and transitory property. Presumably for the benefit in 
lighting, as it collects front and back light, Adorno positioned himself at the threshold of 
the Durchgangszimmer, the “walk-through room”, a corridor-esque space. This particular 
space in which the writing of light traces an image provides the oscillation between meaning 
and materiality. The walk-through room is opened on both sides, and the space of this 
image is an opening for understanding selfhood as materiality. It offers a surface of a 
ground, a space of an image, while at the same time incorporating its own groundlessness: it 
dissolves through its own constitution. More than just constituting a position in the space 
of the photograph, there is an allegorical meaning beyond the singularity of the 
photographic scene to the transitoriness of the space. Like Barthes’s Winter Garden 
Photograph of his mother, which we envisage seeing, but never encounter in Camera Lucida, 
Adorno’s room is a liminal place of in-betweens, of circulation and passage. The 
intersecting room conserves an image and serves as an allegory for passing of spaces and 
times, and the mirror returns the image departing from the self back to the self. Like the 
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transitory winter garden, the “walk-through room” here is an allegory for the passing in 
space between outside and inside, and the passing in time, between life and death, and light 
and darkness.  
 The three photographs of Adorno at are not merely self-portraits, but testimonies 
of an epistemic scene. We observe an episteme: the enactment of a representation of the act 
of self-representation in the presentation thereof. In other words, the scene both is and tells 
of what it is, it is simultaneously medium and mediating, technological and technique. The 
representation inhabits its own making-of as part of its presentational construction. I 
understand epistemic here together with the conception of collection outlined earlier as a 
form of image production through a scene, an arrangement of forces. Analogously to the 
garden that Foucault takes as example of spatial arrangement, framing an epistemic scene 
enables the foregrounding of the forces at work in the constitution of a photograph, and 
particularly the forces of space and time at work in the operational network and 
metalanguage of photography (cf. 1986a: 24-7). Space is primarily, a “set of relations”, and a 
photograph as an epistemic scene exposes abstract relationality in embodiment. The 
abstract here and there, now and then, are materialised and collected through the self of the 
exposer, exposing, and exposed, in which the mirror serves as a force of exposition of 
temporal and spatial difference. The epistemic scene in Self in the Mirror thus takes afterness 
and othering, and presents this as a way in which the self is framed as episteme.  
 Crucial to my argument in this first section is how the presentation of selfhood 
is achieved through the use of what I term a technique of the self. As argued in the 
introduction of this thesis, the term technique of the self is borrowed from Foucault’s 
seminar entitled Technologies of the Self and the study of the self as a production of writing 
therein, analysed from the Greco-Roman culture onwards (1988b: 22). Here, I take the term 
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or inquiry of the writerly production of a self to a visual dimension as the collection of a 
self. In line with Foucault, I am interested in the ways in which a ‘human being turns him- 
or herself into a subject’, or the articulations of subjectivity forming the techniques in which 
selfhood is legible (1988b: 3). In the seminar Foucault is interested in  
 
 technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the 
 help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
 conduct, and way[s] of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state 
 of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (18). 
 
Recalling operational network as metalanguage of photography, I understand ‘operations of 
their own bodies…so as to transform themselves’ as transformation of the body 
enabling arrangement, projection, and reflection of selfhood (1988b: 18). However, rather 
than understanding the production of an image as the production of ‘immortality’, in this 
first section I understand it as a means in which relationality is enacted to the self and world 
outside aliveness and death in the moment of the now (1988b: 18). 
 My reading of Foucault’s Technologies of the Self interprets the fixation of a self as a 
technique in its own right. Written after the completion of the third volume of The History of 
Sexuality entitled The Care of the Self, the American seminar and English text bridges the 
historical occupation of understanding human relations via sex to the self as the 
holistic term through which subjectivity is understood, enacted, and regulated 
through others. For me, a technique of the self implies that the visual image collects a self 
and lays bare at the same time characteristics of selfhood and the nature of space and time, 
or other ‘operations’ of representation (1988b: 19). Whereas in the second and third section 
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of the dissertation I will be focusing extensively on the differences within selfhood, in the 
following I continue to limit observation on the treatment of space and time. The epistemic 
scene is a disciplinatory framing, through which the presentation of selfhood is enabled to 
present itself. The visual collection of selfhood as the technique of the self takes the writerly 
aspects of confession and introspection and turns them inside out, where selfhood exposes 
itself through a visual fixation as an image. This process is paired with Nancy’s notion of 
presentation, exscription, and the presentation of the body. What does this mean for the 
first example at hand, Self in the Mirror? 
 Self in the Mirror lays bare the elements of a photograph of a self in its arrangement 
as an epistemic scene. This means that the viewer as a Nancean nous autres confronts a 
presentation of selfhood. Rather than constituting a recording or a representation, the 
distinctive presentation of the epistemic scene displays a technique of self. The technique of 
the self that Self in the Mirror presents is the photographic production of a self. This is 
subject to the broader implications of the way in which time and space are framed, and the 
self collected across the forces of representation, which are at the same time self-reflexively 
exposed. On the one hand, it is the arrangement of exposition of forces of fixation through 
the mirrors and the physicality of the photographic arrangement that it displays. As noted 
earlier this includes the fixation of an in-between space, and arrestation of a moment in 
time. More interpretatively, I see an imaginative function of ephemerality in Self in the 
Mirror's technique of the self, and the exposition of Adorno’s selfhood as philosopher 
standing in-between ideas, compositions and the mirroring function of thought and 
articulation, and the viewer. The imaginative dimension here arises through the chosen 
space of projection the photograph offers, a true Foucauldian ‘plateau’ of subjectivity 
(1988b: 24). Within this plateau, the viewer is consciously implicated.    
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 Self in the Mirror constructs a technique of the self in which there is a looped 
relationship of the selfhood presented with the self of the viewer. Through this act of 
looking and understanding the presentation of self-representation, the power of this 
epistemic scene consists in its force of the viewer becoming aware of their own self, as the 
look towards the other reminds the viewer of the look towards themselves (to use the 
grammatical portmanteau devoid of gender), and additionally of its power to be 
represented. By sharing the look with the hidden and invisible spectral spectator – the 
photographer Stefan Moses that provides the scene for us – our self-consciousness 
articulates itself in the position outside the photograph, off-frame hidden in invisibility. The 
omission of the viewer in the cycle of representation enables the ellipsis to close and 
thus simultaneously to be completed through the contact with the viewer. We understand, 
by looking at all three photographs, the ellipsis of representation of selfhood in its 
completed cycle, with us, the viewer, as a partaking bystander, experiencing a passage in 
which we understand how self-consciousness is enacted. However, we also look at a self-
portrait of representation itself as an epistemic scene: a Las Meninas of photography. Like in 
the 1656 painting Las Meninas, where Diego Velázquez includes and impositions the viewer 
into the relations of the scene in the painting, the epistemic forces of photography unfold 
through Stefan Moses’s testimonial vantage points of the two making-of photographs of 
Adorno’s Self in the Mirror.  
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Figure 4. Las Meninas by Diego Velázquez. 1656.  
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 Diego Velázquez’s 1656 painting Las Meninas testifies to the power of a 
representational image to present and excavate the viewer’s sense of selfhood. The painting 
displays the powers of representation in the creation of a looped relationship between the 
image viewed, and the viewer’s position outside and inside the image. Like Self in the Mirror, 
the painting presents a double-image, an image of making a painting, while simultaneously 
engaging in an act of mirroring, inside of it, and outside to the viewer. However, the subject 
of the materiality of viewership in visual and pictorial representation more broadly, such as 
photography is addressed here, and fundamental questions of viewership and 
representation are self-reflexively posed by the work through the gaze of the painter within 
the painting looking at the viewer. The painting engages in the excavation of viewership 
that leads to a form of passage of the viewer during the confrontation of the painting. The 
viewer closes the representational cycle through the imaginative projection of their image in 
the making onto the canvas within the painting, and through this mirror gesture also closes 
the presentation of Las Meninas. The viewer places themselves into the inside of the image, 
and from inside of the image to the outside, from here to there, from now to then, back to 
now. For me, Las Meninas thus is an image of the relationality of the viewer and power of 
image-production to expose while exposing, to cross time-space, and to create a looped 
relationship in-between viewer and image.    
 In the discussion of Las Meninas in Les mots et les choses (1966) Michael Foucault does 
not address the double passage of the “representation in the image” – itself located in a 
space of passage – and the viewer. The cycle of representation transforms from an 
observation of an elliptical loop into a representational episteme. The power of the regard 
of the viewer presents the representation, enacts that re-presentation through what 
becomes an epitome in its own right. While observing the painting, the viewer becomes 
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self-conscious of their own self as being integrated into the image, through the projection 
onto the canvas the self-consciousness of the viewer produces an imaginative self-portrait 
that is integrated into the representational mechanics of the exposition of the image. The 
viewer looks, exposes, and is exposing, while being simultaneously exposed by the 
image. Thinking again of Barthes’s argument concerning the nature of photography, the 
fact that consciousness is split from identity and then retroactively enacted again, 
Las Meninas foreshadows this photographic quality already in a seventeenth-century 
painting. The viewer is engaging in an act of orientation within the boundaries of the 
painting and the mirror-producing qualities of the observation of this image of themselves. 
The image, from the writerly quality of introspection moves as visual episteme here into the 
unfolding of the viewer as witness of their own viewerly as readerly self. It is the language 
of representation that speaks, performs, presents this episteme, not the image.  
 The location of the viewer’s self in the observation of Las Meninas underlines the 
enactment and process of viewership of being located both within and outside the 
image. Foucault supposes an integration of the viewer into the ‘entire cycle of 
representation’ in the painting’s painting scene (2005: 12). For Foucault the viewer is both 
looked at by the male painter in the painting, and by virtue of this gaze, apparent ‘subject’ 
[sujet] of the painting – and thus ultimately – observing the painting of this ellipsis in 
entirety (2005: 12 & 5 [1966: 21]). Even though this integration as a subject, marks, as 
Foucault recognises correctly, the constitution of a ‘spiral shell’ [coquille en hélice] subject to a 
‘never-ending flicker’ in the reciprocal relation between the male painter in the painting and 
the viewer, the epistemic scene of Las Meninas is not considered by Foucault in its force as a 
transformative, ritual-like, observation of the architecture of visibility (2005: 12 [1966: 27] & 
335). Whereas in the making-of photographs of Self in the Mirror (Figure 1 and Figure 2), the 
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photograph as blind spot of the two photographs is filled by our imagination of the self-
photograph of Adorno as the other, we are not a bystander in Las Meninas. Our imagination 
of ourselves composes our self-portrait in Las Meninas: we transform our sense of self into 
an object of painting. The androgynous viewer’s subjectivity is the subject of this epistemic 
scene, and the possibility to advance their self as an other.   
 As a viewer of Las Meninas, we are outside the image while simultaneously being 
able to influence a movement within the pictorial space of the image. The viewer's 
understanding of selfhood is negotiated both by the other as the visitor in the staircase and 
a symbolic self as the king and queen in the mirror. We, as the viewer, are not only the 
subject of a painting-in-construction, in which we are the subject and thus sovereign of, 
which we in fact enact, but we are clandestinely in passing of its creation. The articulation 
of self-consciousness and the viewer’s constitution or enactment of a self in the ‘spiral shell’ 
comes through the architecture of representation as a passage (Foucault 2005: 12). This is 
supplementarily, also embodied in Las Meninas by the visitor in the background, in the 
liminal place on the threshold of the staircase and the room (cf. Foucault 2005: 12). Here, 
the staircase serves as allegory of the passage of time through space, and vice versa, time-
space is presented as interlocked paradoxical hybrid travelling, traversing, and transitional 
figure. Foucault states that the ambiguous visitor is coming in and going out at the same 
time, like a pendulum caught at the bottom of its swing (cf. 2005: 12), seen in stillness as it 
is in physical motion. The image of the still-yet-moving pendulum serves as a metaphor for 
the opaque fixation of selfhood, as if it were not actually in movement. Through the 
observation of the other-in-passing on the staircase of time and space – a Kafkaesque 
Odradek-like figure in a space of passage, this telling threshold of durational force-relations 
in which a moment is encapsulated is embodied by the other, as the mirror-image of one’s 
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own selfhood. The look and the position of the other, in the background, behind, yet, in 
the scene, rather than opposing our perspective, “surveils” and confirms it: the other here is 
not an object but the figure of a passerby and spy. However, the recognition of the 
temporal and spatial fixation of the other, is also a passage of a cognition of the viewer’s 
sense of selfhood. The other serves to present how we are necessarily fixated in our 
imagination as one image of ourselves in Las Meninas’ painting-in-painting of the 
recognition of our self as viewer.  
 The epistemic scene of Las Meninas is the production of an image of a cycle of 
representation. Our selfhood as viewer is, in the force of the passage that the 
representational ensemble creates, negotiated between the differences of our temporal 
being, i.e. here/there, and life/death, and our ontological and existential being as self in our 
self-consciousness, as “sovereign” of our selves. These differences materialise in Las 
Meninas, like in The Winter Garden Photograph of Barthes’s Camera Lucida, and Self in the 
Mirror, in a transitional space. The viewer is in a transitional situation of watching this 
ensemble, while at the same time the viewer is conscious and self-conscious of this to take 
place. It is not only that Las Meninas provides, as Foucault argues, an ‘oscillation between 
the interior and the exterior’ (2005: 12), through the placement of the mirror in the back. 
Las Meninas also extends the realm of the interior and exterior difference into an 
ensemble that enables a sense of self to be enacted for the viewer. It enacts relationality to 
the self via this ensemble, rather than just being, as Gilles Deleuze notes, a ‘poem of 
receptivity’ that presents itself (1988: 81). Las Meninas thus constructs a four-dimensional 
ensemble of representational forces through the other as the passerby and spy, the painter 
as the architect of visibility, the mirror as object of conceptual identification as sovereign 
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self yet other, and the life-sized frame of the painting as visual space in which the 
viewer projects themselves.  
 The tension between the viewer of the scene of representation, and the viewer as 
the subject of representation is the passage of a recognition of selfhood for the viewer, the 
oscillating and cutting moment in which we are able to understand the construction of our 
self as a collection of those forces. The technique of the self that is of Las Meninas is the 
production of a self of the viewer as subject, in contrast to the reproduction of a self for the 
viewer as subject. In other words, the presentational power of the painting is the enactment 
of a production of our self. Las Meninas uses the self of the viewer as the subject “of” the 
painting and as subject “in” the painting. The self is negotiated in the realm of temporal 
difference through the traversal of pictorial space in and outside its proper construction. 
Like in Self in the Mirror, where the production process is in its own presentation as 
being enacted, we as the viewer have no clue whether the canvas that is inside the painting 
of Las Meninas or is blank, or whether the painting is in the process of being painted, or if 
the painting has been painted already. Our alterations of our own appearance, like in the 
self-photograph of Adorno, are not by virtue of the punctuations of a fixed point in time: 
our pendulum of self-appearance is comprised of forces of mimicry, gesture, and age. 
Temporality as an image materialises through its meaningful figure, as the embodiment of a 
sense of moment and afterness, rather than the measurability of differentiality. The 
temporal alternations are expressed in corporeal difference in the viewer’s self-embodiment: 
they are an expression of time, rather than accounting for its moment of coming into being. 
However, in contrast to Adorno’s photograph of photographing himself, in which the 
portrait is a technological product of the time-released apparatus of the camera, in Las 
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Meninas we are able to find the embodiment of the power of representation in the 
embodied figure of the male painter.  
 Foucault considers that,  
 
 just as we are about to apprehend ourselves, transcribed by his hand as though in a mirror, 
 we find that we can in fact apprehend nothing of that mirror but its lustreless back. The 
 other side of a psyche. (2005: 7)  
 
This form of mirror in Las Meninas is and becomes, exposes while exposing both the 
technology of representation, painting, and the product of representation, painting. Also, 
this mirror is a ground of this pictorial form of representation, yet through its ability to 
provide the ground for an image, it reminds us at the same instant of the groundlessness of 
any image of our selves. The ground of an image of our selves is a function of the 
imagination that the mirror as space can provide for the self within the act of viewership. 
Las Meninas enables the collection of a sense of self for the viewer within the flickering of 
the mirror function of the painting and the passage-like experience of passing the cycle of 
representation, and the acknowledgement thereof. I consider the power of the painting to 
produce a self, as the pure or ‘purest form of representation’ that Las Meninas enacts 
(Foucault 2005: 18). This stands in contrast to ‘representation, freed finally from the 
relation that was impeding it, can offer itself as representation in its purest form’, as the 
relation that Foucault sees Las Meninas enacting (2005: 18). The ‘limits of representation’ 
that Las Meninas displays and crosses into what critical theorist David Carroll considers the 
realm of an ‘extra-aesthetic’ experience (1987: 59), is in my reading for the emergence of the 
presentation of the self of the viewer. The selfhood of the viewer appears in the 
presentation of the representational ensemble and cycle Las Meninas enacts, and is produced 
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by it. The viewer’s self is produced within the structure of the empty shell or function to be 
filled, in the groundlessness of the painterly mirror.   
 The canvas as a mirror functions in the same way the mirror in Self in the Mirror 
does: as a blind spot. The canvas is the space of the other in which we imagine 
transubstantiating ourselves through the presentation, either by virtue of painting, or by 
virtue of photography. Both technologies allow for this presentational episteme to be 
enacted, independent of their nature of representation, which in both cases present a 
meaningful ontological articulation, a coming into being of a viewer’s self. Photography is 
precisely the technological mirror that the hand of the painter in Las Meninas cannot be: an 
actual technology of mirroring, and an ‘other side of a psyche’ (2005: 7). The self is coming 
into being in a self-assertive process in photography, not in the production of a 
painterly image, which nevertheless in its construction remains powerfully held together by 
the forgetfulness of its othering as a principally subjective process. In painting the episteme 
becomes enacted by virtue of an invisible hand in the image as an object, while in 
photography selfhood is enacted, as seen through the other by the force of the photograph 
as optical unconscious. Whereas the psychological passage of the ‘sagittal dimension’ 
[dimension sagittale], as Foucault (2005: 26, 1966: 12) calls the relation to the painting of the 
painting in Las Meninas, is an observation of pictorial tracing in the Adorno photographs, in 
Las Meninas the passage is and becomes the act of realization of self-consciousness 
of viewerly selfhood. Like the mirror in the Adorno photographs, the canvas is empty on its 
back, not only visually offering a space of projection on its backside, but on its front 
necessitating an imaginative articulation, as I have argued, providing the space of 








The epistemic scenes of Self in the Mirror and Las Meninas both enact a viewer’s sense 
of selfhood through pictorial movement of the viewer within their representational spaces. 
The movement, the advancement of selfhood is through the representational space of the 
photograph and painting. However, this movement, although taking a stretch of time, is 
relational, as I have argued, rather than durational. What happens when we introduce time 
not as only as relational or figurative form of temporal difference into the stillness of fixed 
images, but take the advancement of time as the factor that enables an unfolding of an 
advancement of self to occur? In this chapter, I establish time and temporality as durational 
aspects of the technique of the presentation of selfhood, examined through video-art via 
Rosalind Krauss’s essay ‘Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism’ (1976) and exemplified 
through my reading of Adrian Piper’s 1983 video Cornered in the following chapter. By 
analysing the mirroring function of the durational unfolding of the self in Cornered, I 
establish and interpret the relational forces of a temporal, durational exposition of 
visual selfhood. Therefore I argue in Chapter 5 that Cornered’s technique of the self is the 
exposition and confrontation of a self via the articulation of an immersive monologue, as a 
powerful address of the self as the other. Here in turn, the other returns into the viewer’s 
self as the enactment of the presentation of the viewer’s and listener’s articulation, indeed 
presentation of selfhood.  
  Video art extends the earlier discussion of the visual collection of selfhood through 
an image, but also introduces duration as an aspect of the quality of the image. To recollect 
the earlier argument, Self in the Mirror produces an arrangement in which the self of the 
photographer exposes while being exposed. Las Meninas foreshadows the cinematic sense of 
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flickering of self and subject of the lens-based arts in the construction of a presentation of a 
self for the viewer. Where does video art bring the discussion of the collection of the self 
over time? More than just a quality of the image, video art works through and with 
duration. The collection of selfhood advances and suspends itself while collecting a sense of 
self on screen and for the viewer. My interest in the durational image thus is to argue that 
with duration, in video and – in the next two sections – film, selfhood can be on the one 
hand collected and on the other hand dispersed; selfhood encapsulates itself in transition of 
its construction. As I will argue in this chapter, the specificity of video in comparison to 
cinema is the presentation of a self in a direct immersive confrontation of a self in an 
already bracketing sense of duration. While I continue my earlier discussion of collection in 
Section II with my interpretation of The Congress (2013) and Boyhood (2014), I also move to 
the qualities of dispersion of the relationship of the viewer towards the display of selfhood 
with my interpretation of A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited (2013) and Cool World 
(1992). Before turning towards film and the exposition of selfhood through epistemic 
scenes within feature-film length durational material in Section II, I interpret the durational 
aspect and implication for the collection of a self in the shorter immersive form of video.  
  Returning to self-photography as a point of analogy and genealogy of video, 
however, as self-photography this time “in” time, video art epitomises the relationship of 
the camera as mirroring device. While shorter in time than feature film, my interest in video 
stems from its potential of embracing singularity with respect to the overall more  
simplifying fields of relation of location, cinematography, and mise-en-scène. While sharing 
aspects of this singularity with respect to the earlier analysed untimely, or non-moving 
images Self in the Mirror and Las Meninas, my analysis of the medium video also provides the 
transition to the focus on film in the remainder of my study. Video, so my reading of the 
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medium with respect to the analysis of the cinema of the self, provides and anticipates what 
I later term “moments of selfhood” in Section II and III. This part of my argument thus 
engages with the conceptions of movement and advancement of the self through duration. 
Thereby I interpret the temporal exposition of the self, not in terms of notions and 
conceptions of temporal difference, such as in Self in the Mirror and Las Meninas, but indeed 
observe the unfolding of selfhood within the interaction of a camera over time. The ellipsis 
of the self and the other has moved to an ellipsis that is constructed and constructs itself 
over time – in a bracket – and also plays into the technicalities of its own exhibition, when 
thinking of the conventional looping in which video is presented and interacted with for the 
viewer, for instance in a museum environment. For me the question is, whether the 
mirroring of the camera and the work of the self of the filmmaker, camera(wo)man, and 
depicted self on screen is one that exposes a self for the other, and retrospectively enacts 
the selfhood of the viewer. This means that, like in the earlier part, the relationship of the 
self on screen or on the monitor is analysed with respect to its relational aspects. However, 
this time this analysis of selfhood intricately linked to the complications of this relationship 
that arise through the means of time as duration that intrudes, features and works within 
this relationship. At the same time, the relationship I am interested in remains the same: 
what is the meaning of an image of selfhood – in and through time – and what is the 
relationship to the viewer that emerges through this enactment?   
  In the seminal 1976 essay ‘Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism’, Rosalind Krauss 
diagnoses a relationship between the emerging video art of the early and mid-70’s and the 
notion and potentially arriving cult of narcissism. To use Susan Sontag’s credo and coda of 
‘Against Interpretation’ (1966), Krauss considers the possibility of both the hermeneutics 
and erotics of artistic video works of artists such as Vito Acconi, Lydia Bengli, Nancy Holt, 
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and Joan Jonas, and more broadly of video art as a medium, to be of a fundamentally 
narcissistic nature. The nature of this asserted narcissism, however, lies within the 
techniques of employment, the use of the novel technology of the video camera with 
respect to the artist’s representational apparatus or creation of images. The shock of the 
new here is thus that the work potentially engages an erotics of the medium and the artist, 
as much as hermeneutics of this relationship of the artist towards their medium. In other 
words, narcissism appears rooted within the aesthetics of the work, within the mode of 
producing and the resulting production. These aesthetics, however, are in turn influenced 
by the use and performance with and of the camera as being a device that relates to the 
selfhood that is in presentation and presented as a product of the video. How the video 
camera is being used, for Krauss, equals in a way, in a mirroring function the backside of 
the image that the viewer sees in the product or presentation of the work. At the same time, 
however, like the mirror in Self in the Mirror or the invisible frontside of the backside of the 
canvas in Las Meninas, I suggest that the camera is not being a mirror for the photographer 
or painter alone, but intentionally so for the viewer.   
  According to Krauss, artists in staged solitude and dialogue with themselves 
perform the experiments with the (then new) technology of the video camera. However, 
this dialogue, argues Krauss, in effect turns out to be an address of the selves of the artists 
or filmmakers towards themselves, without the intention of legibility or address towards the 
other. If the medium of video is narcissism, and the object created is narcissistic, and the 
artist an narcissist, then what is video, if not a destination of a psychological drive of 
narcissism? This is the line of argument that Krauss constructs. These relationships, 
however, are more complicated, as the camera in video art works as a mirror of the self, and 
also a mirror to the world. The apparent lack of the other is an interpretation of the viewer 
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and critic of the way in which the medium of video is used. The other is figuratively there, 
the mirroring function of the camera resembles the position of the other that reflects, 
produces the gaze which is then considered to be the artist’s self. The role of the other – in 
which the lack of the other is one option – is chosen by the artists to produce meaning; a 
space is produced as if there was no other.  Contrary to Krauss’s argument, the asserted lack 
of the other is not a testament of the neglect of the other as a psychological default or 
existential template. The viewer, according to Krauss however, in the reading of the works 
with programmatic titles such Centers (1971) by Vito Acconci, Vertical Roll (1972) by Joan 
Jones, Air Time (1973) by Vito Acconci, Now (1973) by Lynda Benglis, or Boomerang (1974) 
by Nancy Holt is not only absent in the directionality of these works, but effectively, the 
viewer is also not incorporated into the mechanics in which the works are exhibited and 
consumed. The loop between the selves of the works exposed and the self of the viewer is 
not established, the makers of the videos exist as selves without any sense of or orientation 
towards otherness, claims Krauss. In other words, the question for Krauss is one that I 
have asked earlier in this first section with respect to both Self and the Mirror and Las 
Meninas: where is the viewer located in the loop or elliptical relationship with the exposition 









































Figure 5. Nancy Holt (with Richard Serra), Boomerang (still photograph), Video, 10min, 1974. 
 
 The main question of video is the effect of time as duration within the unfolding of 
the work. Whereas in the works of photography and the painting discussed before, time 
functions outside the medium, as time is halted, arrested and fixated within the medium and 
continuous outside of it, video records, produces, and reproduces a temporal 
presence. Does duration of time in video nevertheless enable a collection of selfhood to 
occur? Is this collection an act of the self for the self exclusively – as contended by Krauss 
– or is it an act that is also for and towards the viewer? Nancy Holt’s Boomerang serves as an 
example of the self in suspension of itself via the force of othering, as an effect of temporal 
mirroring and delay. In the video Holt speaks, and while wearing headphones, as seen in 
Figure 5, the headphones reproduce her voice in an approximately one second delay of the 
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recording. The cinematography (or continuous self-photography) remains in a stable close-
up of Holt’s face accompanied by the experimental setup inside a barely noticeable 
recording studio in the background. Yet, an improvisational live atmosphere with Richard 
Serra commenting, and interrupting audio trouble in the middle of the video takes some 
attention – and time – of the viewer away from the seemingly endless repetition of Holt’s 
voice and its delayed echo over the ten minutes of the video. Through the delayed replaying 
of Holt’s spoken voice to herself a looped relationality of the voice to the self is enacted.  
 In Boomerang, the other is shown, made visible, as a loop of the self. The other in 
Boomerang is the return of the voice of the self of Nancy Holt. Othering here is a form of 
mirroring and doubling by virtue of the recording and echoing of Holt’s self. Intruding into 
Holt’s understanding of the present moment and her self, the viewer observes, indeed hears 
the attempt of a fixation of a self in suspension through the act of voicing. Besides the 
stasis of the situation, the camera angle, the progression of the video and the face of Holt, 
the voice is all there is in movement. Through the continuous mechanical reproductive 
replaying of Holt’s voice – self-consciously speaking about the act of speaking – a re-
enactment of the already spoken voice takes place “in” time, in a looped delay of repetition. 
This process of overlap (of past and present) is the experience of selfhood through the act 
of othering that the video presents, and enacts for the viewer as a shared, intimate 
experience. Boomerang’s technological setup allows for an encounter of self through the 
recorded, taped, and taping self as the rewinding return of another self as oneself in 
snipingly delayed time. With the parlance to oneself Holt produces a temporal overlap of 
speech and echo, departure of meaning and to resonate upon its return. The self here is in 
sync, counter-intuitively through the non-identity of the spoken and the echo – the process 
of othering of the self is here an experience of rhythmic unison in pre-identitarian ways. 
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Yet, the self is in an identitarian process of mirroring, as an aesthetic function and 
performance.  
  The returning voice touches the self. As seen in Figure 5, Holt’s hands gesture 
towards capturing the other as the voice of oneself in her own self. Holt’s words are 
othering in their sense of disconnection and dislocation of the past. As a function of the 
materiality of the tape, the sound plucks or glitches while intruding back into Holt’s 
articulations of the present moment. Thinking of Derrida’s visual claim of being unable to 
see oneself while (in the act of) seeing, introduced in the beginning of this first section, the 
modality and sense of hearing shares a similar conundrum (cf. 2010: 31). This paradox or 
impossibility of analogously hearing oneself while speaking is made visible and audible as an 
act of mirroring in the video. The voice becomes a mirror of directionality, yet also an 
address, a rapport, a form of glue, and an echo of the self. As Holt suggests in the video ‘I 
have a double take on my self, I am once removed from my self’. The removing yet 
returning, and thus heterotopic experience of self in the suspending brackets of time of the 
“now” of the video informed by speech and echo are concluded by Holt to performatively 
be ‘a constantly revolving involuting experience’: thinking of the viewer’s experience of 
Las Meninas, indeed an act of spiral shelling of the self, here enacted in an durational 
and aural sense.  
 Evacuating the viewer from the equation of the constitution of the artwork’s 
communicative structure, Krauss contends that instead of a relationship of the self to 
others, or the other, video art works inside and towards itself. The situation in which video 
art is constructed is one in which the other disappears – and with it the viewer. The 
involution of the self is an involution towards only the self, and thus a disappearance of the 
other. This is considered an existential condition of the production of video art in which 
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the camera work is also the work towards the presentation of a state of self. Thus, 
temporality and space are supposedly claustrophobic in video art.  For Krauss in Holt’s 
Boomerang, the viewer’s situation is the confrontation of a ‘prison of a collapsed 
present’ (1976: 53). I would rather suggest that the ‘boomeranging’, to use Nancy Holt’s 
formulation within her work, is also a function of the address of the self via the mirror of 
the camera to the world: the viewer. However, is this boomeranging an ellipsis that leaves 
the self of the video maker exposed while not relating to the world but merely back (to use 
the figure of the boomerang) in time to itself? Or is this an ellipsis that through the 
engagement of the world and the viewer becomes closed and thus incorporates the viewer 
into the mechanics of the work?  
  Thinking of the video work of Vito Acconci for which Krauss argues that ‘self-
encapsulation – the body or psyche as its own surround – is everywhere to be found in the 
corpus of video art’ (1976: 53), I see the occupation with the self as a means of address to 
the other via the radical lack of the other – like in Boomerang – within this address. The 
ellipsis in Boomerang, I argue, is closed through the witnessing and recognition of the 
viewer’s self as listener and viewer, and thus incorporates the viewer into the mechanics of 
the work. The spectatorial engagement with the viewer is necessary for the production of 
meaning, and the interpretation of the work. Video achieves, like the previously introduced 
self-photography, a corpus through the camera that enframes the vision and holds time. By 
looking with and conceptualising the perspective of the camerawork in photography and 
video the viewer produces an ellipsis of the self visually seen, and enacted by the viewer. 
Time is the medium of this address, as the operator of synchronicity understood as an 
overlap between self (of camerawork) and self (seen through camerawork), and self and 
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(imagined and real) other/viewer. The viewer shares the synchronicity of the camera, while 
being able to position themselves simultaneously inside and outside the work.    
 Video art enables articulations of the self. Video, indeed, is a technique of the self. 
For Krauss, the other disappears in the world of the narcissistic medium of the world of the 
“I”. For me, however, the question here remains within the critical interpretation of these 
works and the durational visual work of the self to ask, whether there is irony or sarcasm in 
those works, or whether they should be indeed, taken at “face value” as 
narcissistic. The rhetorics and performance of self might very well point towards the 
exhaustion of the medium in its representational capacity, as well as to the alienation 
experienced by the artists through the production of work. I agree with Krauss’s conclusion 
that exhausting the medium to exploit it from within is a productive way to understand the 
expositional powers of video art (1976: 59-64). Yet, for me video is used as a medium to 
describe the need for an other, to understand the construction of a self. Whereas Krauss 
(1976: 58) considers narcissism as ‘perpetual frustration’ through a reading of Lacan’s The 
Language of the Self (1968), this frustration considers artistic intentionality in the therapeutic 
value of the production of the work, rather than in its interpretation (in Sontag’s sense) by a 
viewer. Foucault’s Technologies of the Self (1988b), on the other hand (inspired by Christopher 
Lasch’s The Culture of Narcissism (1978)) considers the productivity of a self – whether 
narcissistic or not – in the construction of a self for the reader, or, as I argue here, viewer.   
  Video art exposes a self through the use of the camera as epistemic device. Rather 
than understanding the epistemic condition of video through the use of the camera to be 
intricately linked to a self that relates to itself, I understand the work of video to be the 
production of an epistemic scene of address to the other: the viewer. As Krauss argues, 
video art allows for the ‘vanquishing of separateness’ between the self of the video maker 
 65 
and the object of the video work as it ‘illusionistically eras[es] the difference between 
subject and object’ (1976: 56, 57). For me this is an argument of immediacy and for the 
viewership of video art to be immersive. Video can produce an immersion into a self of an 
other and thus be a medium of relationality, what in Krauss’s words could be a ‘real 
psychological situation’ (57). Video is the exploration of the presentation of selfhood (of 
others) as others in which the viewers can locate themselves as other. The importance of 
the act of othering is crucial in the confrontation of the viewer with video work, to 
compose and recompose a sense of selfhood within that encounter. The viewer is 
embedded in a process of observation, empathy, and a passage into the other, rather than 
observing a purely self-serving singular self-self looping relation. If the works of video were 
truly selfish and narcissistic, there would be no viewership, no act of relationality possible in 
the first place. My understanding of techniques of the self within the understanding of the 
mirror of video work as mirror-reflection, analogously to Krauss (56-57), implies the 
mirroring of the video camera as being inherently of the nature of being a mirror for the 
















































    
 
Figure 6. Adrian Piper, Cornered: A Video Installation Project (three still photographs). Video installation. Museum 
of Contemporary Art Chicago. 16 min, 1988. 
 
 The durational unfolding of a self is a function of mirroring of the self and 
other. Like in photography and painting – as earlier established with Self in the Mirror and 
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Las Meninas – an exposition of a self is presented through the production of a durational 
visual epistemic scene. The introduction of time, in addition to the introduction of 
continuous camera work as a reflection of that time, produces a mirror, indeed, as 
foreshadowed in the previous chapters, as an endless spiral function. Self-photography, as 
argued earlier, is the instalment of a mirror, however, not only on the self presented, but 
also onto the viewer interacting with the presentation of the self in the chosen 
medium. However, beyond a fixation of a particular perspective, or conceptual perspective 
on the self, time provides the means to collect a self. For me, collection is the act of 
movement of the self, and accumulative movement of meaning from a singular origin, or 
towards a singular direction, or as a singular address. This collection, in the act of 
recollection though the viewer, engages in a dialogue with the presentation of a self 
between the viewer and the presented self and is thus a communication of a loop of self 
and otherhood. Before moving to the chapters of Section II and the analysis of cinematic 
selves in feature length cinema, I here introduce the force of a confrontation of a self via 
the articulation of a self as self, and non-paradoxically also self as other, as a means of an 
immersive presentation of selfhood.  
 Adrian Piper’s Cornered (1988) – like Holt’s Boomerang – is a mirror of directionality, 
address, rapport, and echo of the self. However, Cornered extends the earlier discussion of 
Boomerang. In contrast to Boomerang, the position of the speaker is not in delay and echo to 
its own voice, but the echo is the resonance of the words spoken in the viewer’s 
apprehension thereof. The viewer, unlike in Boomerang, is not observing, but distinctively 
implicated in the rhetoric of speech and the mechanics of address of the video: through the 
viewer’s thought the video’s loop of address and continuation of this address comes to a 
closure. It is the viewer that closes the loop through the confrontation of an other, and the 
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intimate feeling of being addressed as a self. Without the viewer, the address, and thus the 
video itself would unfold into a void, yet be meaningful through its presentation in the 
arrangement of the museum. In fact, this is one of the important mechanics in which 
Cornered works: as a repetitive speech act voicing into a void, through the act of listening 
interrupted in its directionality by the immersion of the viewer, but as a political act not 
dependent on the viewer for its existence as performance. Yet, the speech of the video 
restlessly continues without the influence of verbal response of the viewer, 
and unacknowledged in physicality of the situation the viewer as other remains silent; the 
ultimate strength of the video is Piper’s voice, which silences the other with the immense 
and immersive weight of argument and reasoning. The rhetorics of the video work thus 
point to questioning the overall status of being and belonging, through the 
specific questioning of the establishment of race as a societal institution of difference, in 
and through an act of questioning its very foundation. This racial difference as a powerful 
means of community and separation is deconstructively exposed to be an institution of 
power beyond control of the controlled population, who, additionally, as argued by the 
video, bears the weight of responsibility for this status quo.  
 As seen in Figure 6, the video installation is on display in one corner of the Museum 
of Contemporary Art Chicago. The television set screening the looping videotape is set up 
on top of an upset wooden table leaning against the corner. This installation is accompanied 
by two birth certificates framing the videotape display. The viewer is invited to sit in the 
provided pyramidal seating arrangement, a numerically increasing number of three rows of 
seats. Like in Holt’s Boomerang, the video’s cinematography is decisively simple: a single shot; 
a medium close-up of Adrian Piper sitting at a table, with her hands resting on the 
table. This single shot is a progressive zoom throughout most of the video’s duration 
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halting into a close-up of Piper (from her shoulders up to the top of her hair). This zoom 
both emphasises the progression of the argument and foregrounds Piper’s emphatically 
bourgeois costume, with white pearl earrings and a white pearl necklace, and potentially, her 
visually racially ambiguous or “passing” appearance. Beginning by stating Piper’s racial 
identity, the video progresses with a deep meditation on the meaning of self-identification. 
The continuous visual flow of the video through the continuity of editing puts extended 
emphasis on the meaning of the face as display of the self, in addition to the display of the 
controlled, balanced, and unirritated manner in which Piper’s monologue, despite its 
argumentative complexity, flows in an almost singular unstoppable thread of evocation. The 
only moments of suspension of the flow of speech are physically necessary brief breathing 
interruptions, and pauses of suspense and suspension in the rhetoric of questioning.  
 Cornered addresses the question of the meaning of selfhood and the location of this 
meaning in the axis of self and other. The sense of selfhood of Piper, as articulated by the 
voice, is to be located and found in the conversational encounter with the other, the viewer, 
who, however, is implicated in the process of its construction. Through the rhetoric of 
cornering herself, Piper frames the viewer as the receiver of her verbal address and 
confrontation. Although the prose of Cornered is written from Adrian Piper’s perspective, 
and written towards or stemming from that perspective, this perspective is hegemonically 
imposed upon, and thus not a desirable perspective, although rhetorically defended by Piper 
to a certain degree, but the perspective is one of disarray. The tone defines the elaborate 
address of the video, confrontational through its seemingly endlessly questioning voice. 
Piper announces while looking into the camera in the beginning of the video: ‘I’m black. 
Now, let’s deal with this social fact, and the fact of my stating it, together’ (2005: 182). 
Already here, the use of ‘social fact’ bound with ‘together’ as the form in which this 
 70 
sentence is spoken, while eye contact is made, indicates the inescapability of the speech act 
situation: we, meaning you, the viewer, and me, Adrian Piper, are in this situation as an 
ensemble, a situation, defined by its togetherness. The other sense in which ‘together’ is 
used here, goes back to the question of perspective: stating a social fact and dealing with it, 
at the same time, acknowledging a fact by virtue of repeating it.  
 This rhetoric of responsibility of the viewer-as-listener effectively silences 
opposition and dispute, as it relies on the power of moderation and agreeability paired with 
the authority of elegance, as a characteristic of the argumentative flow. Piper creates 
intimacy in this address by speaking of oneself as the impersonal other – ‘a social fact’ 
(2005: 182). Thereby, Piper uses the thought and stigma of the other as the inner thought 
which indeed, as desired by the other, gives meaning to the self, rather than attempting to 
dispute it. This element of appropriation and re-appropriation of the dominating language 
or discourse is the rhetorical and performative cornering of her self. It is not a narcissistic 
relation to the self that Piper advocates or “un-corners” in Cornered but a relation of the self 
to the other and the other to the self. The loop rather than impasse of the self is 
accomplished through the othering, which, however, is embedded in the function of the 
text: who is it who I am, and how is it defined by you, the white viewer, the self that is the 
other which decides upon my own self, as the dominating giver of meaning? Or, to use 
Piper’s own words with respect to the meaning of her address, ‘why does my telling you 
who I am have that effect? Do you feel affronted? Or embarrassed? Or accused?’ (2005: 
183).  
 Cornered is an address of the self as other, and non-paradoxically, addressing the 
other as a form of self. The video builds a relationship between Piper’s self and the 
selfhood of the viewer, and renegotiates power dynamics of orientation in the space of 
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society and the perception of embeddedness in time outside itself, outside the work. While 
the video addresses the viewer’s selfhood and self of Piper within the work, all it addresses 
is meaningful outside the video work. The video encapsulates a representational 
arrangement, a speech-act situation, and a confrontation of a face that becomes what it is 
through the viewer’s dialogical apprehension thereof. Cornered is an important video work 
that exposes the self twofold. On the one hand, it extends the mirroring function of 
photography, the act of viewership of photography that I have argumentatively established 
earlier in this section. In Self in the Mirror the viewer looks – alongside – into the mirror, 
while the photograph itself is a mirror of the gaze of the photographer. In Las Meninas, the 
viewer is observed – via the mirror of the painter/painting of him or herself painting the 
scene of painting. On the other hand, Cornered exemplifies that the mirror that video art can 
present, can be both of the self of the filmmaker and the viewer at the same time. Piper 
explicitly turns self-consciousness from herself back onto the viewer, emotionally 
questioning by asking the viewer about their feeling concerning the constitution of class, 
gender, and race within their conception of selfhood. This point is an important remark 
concerning the presentation of the self in the manner of twofoldness: the mirror goes into 
both directions, into the self on screen, and the self of the viewer and listener. Thus with 
the auditory exposition of text that Cornered offers accompanying the militant yet formal 
confrontation through Piper as a visual self, as argued above, introspection of the self 
through the verbal excavation achieves a manifold presentation of the self, which, however, 
is accomplished in its speech act through the resonance of the cognisant viewer, and the 
placement of meaning outside the representational dimensions of the work.  
 Cornered offers two further implications for the argument of my study. Firstly, as a 
work of video art, the cinematographic arrangement of the work paired with the sound or 
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the verbal text of the video achieves an exposition of selfhood. Thinking again of 
Foucault’s Technologies of the Self, this presentation of selfhood is indeed an exposition of a 
‘plateau’ of subjectivity and identification (1988: 24). The plateau of subjectivity, however, 
here is the politicisation of the body through the institution of race: binary, immobile, 
assigned, valorised. Indeed, as I have argued earlier in Self in the Mirror, as form of 
relationship between the self of the viewer and the self on screen, the exposition of the 
plateau of subjectivity offers an understanding of the mechanics at work in the constitution 
of a fixation of selfhood. However, rather than on the basis of a photographic bracketing of 
time into a distilled perspective, Cornered uses an inflexible bracketing of subjectivity, and in 
this cornered position explores the flexibility of stretching this position performatively. The 
invasive demand for resonance of the viewer and listener (and of society at large) to assert 
the validity of its argument is addressed through the questioning of race linked to the 
judgment thereof in terms of the foundation of the social institution of race in the first 
place – or indeed, as plateau of subjectivity.  
 Piper advocates that ‘[b]ecause if someone can look and sound like me and still be 
black, then no one is safely, unquestionably white. No one.’ (2005: 184). I understand this 
intrusive reflexivity of Piper’s argument, evolving in the realm of selfhood of the viewer and 
listener as an assertion of the importance of resonance in the expositional meaning of the 
work. This means that ignorance, arguably the most conventional response to undesired 
societal or personal confrontation, is thematised towards the end of the video to prevent 
the selfhood of the viewer to remain untouched by the representational exposition. Indeed, 
the closing of the video goes back to the beginning of the verbal text by thematising the 
‘social fact’ of the politicisation of Piper’s body by virtue of the institution of race, evoking 
thoughts of an adequate response of both viewer and herself (182). The video closes with 
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the words, ‘[w]hat are you going to do’ (186), after which a fifteen second pause and a fade 
out to black follows, and the white lettering on black ground appears ‘WELCOME TO 
THE STRUGGLE!’ (186).    
 In addition to the exposition of a ‘plateau’ of subjectivity through the politicisation 
of the body as harbour of selfhood (Foucault 1988: 24), Cornered secondly uses time-space 
to advance orientation and address. Analogously to the earlier discussion of Self in the 
Mirror, Richter’s notion of time-space is helpful here, as a ‘temporal space’ that brings 
forward a collision with a conceptual perspective (2011: 125). This conceptual perspective, 
however, stretches over time, is of and with time: a moving photograph, a moving address, 
and a moving position of the self. However, there is more than a simple enumeration of 
time, or prolongation of a singular position in time at work in the video. The position of the 
self of Piper is a relation in difference, and in suspension of itself and its proper conclusion, 
which is in the response of the other. The repetitive iteration of the argument and the 
posture of the body in the video of Piper as a performance invests energy in the collision of 
the inhabitance of potentially inseparable bodies. While the time-space of the video of the 
of the viewer and Piper’s self on screen is shared, the intimacy is one of spacing, deferral, 
suspension and non-identity, indeed a Nancean relationality of contact through the from of 
‘skin-show’ or ‘expeausition’ (2008: 33-36). Cornered is the application of a conceptual 
perspective of time-space into a personal yet impersonal positionality, orientation, and 
address, stretching itself into conceptual collision. 
 In Cornered the notion of epistemic scene is extended to encompass the medium of 
video, by virtue of its treatment, as a whole. As anticipated by the earlier video work 
mentioned and discussed via Krauss’s essay, most notably Holt’s Boomerang, video art 
manages to encircle the self via the mirror of the camera, and the presentation of self to the 
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mirror, and the camera. Thus, video art engages in the projection of the self onto a sense of 
the other. In Cornered the epistemic scene the video presents is the engagement with the 
camera as mirror, as a presentation of the self towards the other, a sense of self as I, 
towards a sense of self as you, and the communicative exchange this situational and 
relational aesthetics can offer. By virtue of the establishment of a textual, verbal, and 
situational technique of the self through the address of Adrian Piper, the flickering of the 
momentary image, as introduced earlier with photography and painting, here is shifted to 
the sense of selfhood of the viewer. The viewer, by the technique of the self of Piper being 
mobilised into the space of the address of the other, mirrors itself through the invitation to 
the semantic ellipsis Piper offers in Cornered. The technique of the self of Cornered is the 
flickering of subject and self in the shell of representation of the durational image and the 
form of the epistemic scene as dialogue of self on screen, and self of viewer. Ultimately, my 
argumentative interest is in the concrete presentation of the self Cornered and Adrian Piper 
offer. My conclusions concerning Cornered that will carry the argument further into the 
analysis of film are thus reflections on the questions of inhabiting a self, and collecting an 
other to relate the other to that self.   
 There are two main conclusions that I draw from the engagement with Cornered and 
my interpretation of its epistemic scene, technique of the self, and presentation of self in 
this study before moving on to the analysis of cinema. Cornered is composed in the rhetorics 
of “I”, “you”, “we”, personal pronouns Nancy explicitly pays extended attention to in the 
essay ‘Nous Autres’ (2005: 100-107). Those words are pronounced to enact not only a sense 
of shared intimacy, but to enact the presentation of the representational situation itself. I 
propose that the meaning of nous autres, in Nancy’s previously introduced sense, as a 
superimposition of viewer and photographer is extended in Cornered (cf. 2005: 105). 
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Cornered’s address as text strongly evokes a passage of Nancy’s argument, in which he 
declares, ‘“[w]e’’ is always in statu nascendi, and it is precisely this that nous autres designates: a 
distinctive alterity aimed at, desired, held at a distance’ (2005: 103; original emphasis). It is 
the immersive aesthetics of video that epitomises the meaning of relationality of nous autres 
in Cornered: the looping of “I” and “You” in the communicative structure of the ellipsis of 
the video into a formation of a momentary nous autres. This is felt as an act of orientation in 
the physical realm of orientation in space and time for the viewer, and this embodied 
response towards the video is made possible through the continued contact and spacing 
that the durational medium of video allows.  
 Further to this, the relationality of Cornered is based on the production of another 
within the construction of a presentation of a self. It is not only that the perspective of the 
photographer or video artist is shared, like in Self in the Mirror, but also rather the position of 
the viewer is invoked in the aesthetics of the piece or situation. The expression of the self-
consciousness of the performer and self on screen is the self-expression of an other 
through the verbal address, and through these performative and situational aesthetics, the 
aspect of nous autres is indeed relational to the body, rather than just to the materiality of the 
medium of the artwork (such as photography). Cornered uses duration as prolongation and 
extension of the epistemic force and tonality of the momentary blink of an eye moment of 
photography (earlier associated with time-space) into an extensive mirroring sequencing 
thereof in the duration of sixteen minutes. In other words, Cornered develops the 
momentary sense of the spiral shell attributed to the situation of the Nancean exposing the 
self/the self exposed into another additional realm of exposing the other/the other 
exposed. To use another figure that approximates the French coquille en hélice, the spiral shell 
in which the viewer is ingrained in Las Meninas moves into a spiral shelling, an 
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involution into the mirror mechanics of production and consuming the temporal image (cf. 
Foucault 2005:12; Foucault 1966, 27).  
 
 
SECTION II. The Cinematic Self: Selfhood as 




Film is a medium that uses and produces time and space. Through its aesthetics of duration, 
cinema is an account of time. With the introduction of narrative, the question of the 
selection of visual material becomes further complicated with respect to the attention given 
to specific sequences and scenes. This material, on the other hand, is itself subject to a 
choice. In my study “the cinematic self” is the term I use to describe my frame of looking at 
films: what is the specificity of time and space with respect to the self in the selected 
films? Looking at Ari Folman’s The Congress (2013), and Richard Linklater’s Boyhood (2014), I 
emphasise time over space, and collection over dispersion, as forces that act upon the self, 
constitute the self. In the latter part of my theoretical interpretation of The Cinematic Self, I 
briefly turn away from film to a perfume concert and its re-enactment A Trip to Japan in 
Sixteen Minutes (1902) by Sadakichi Hartmann and A Trip to Japan in Sixteen 
Minutes, Revisited (2013) by the Institute for Art and Olfaction. I flip the earlier arrangement 
of emphasising time over space, and thereby thematise space over time, in a blindfolded 
viewerly experience: the viewer here becomes a cinematic self, dispersed in space, in 
an intrusive cinematic experience. This enactment of dispersion of space rather than the 
collection of time is further emphasised with my reading of Ralph Bakshi’s Cool 
World (1992), in which a singular sense of self for the viewer is in constant negotiation of 
inside and outside, absence and presence, and live-action and animation. Cool World 
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culminates in the presentation of this dialogue through the aesthetics of the hybrid 
assemblage of live-action and animation image as a “hyper-film”. My reading of this visual 
and sensory material is motivated by a specific methodology that builds upon Section I, 
while continuing to nuance the notion and particularity of selfhood as encountered through 
cinema and art.    
 The conception of selfhood is built through the analysis in which the cinematic self 
is understood to emerge qua encounter by the viewer as aesthetical-ontological set of 
relations. Rather than pointing towards the set of relations within selfhood that are “of” 
time and “of” space, I interpret the self as embedded in “time & space”, while also relating 
to a specific time, and to a specific viewerly and worldly space. This, in turn, means that 
there is both the attempt in my analysis to speak about the specificity of the filmic material, 
while also taking into account the implications for both cinema and the society in which 
cinema is produced, screened, and consumed by the viewer: the current 21st century 
neoliberal age. With my analysis I aim to excavate specific scenes – as introduced in Section 
I, indeed, epistemic scenes – of the selected films and durational artworks that contribute to 
understanding, in my singular interpretation, a broader climate of screen studies, digital 
culture, theory of film, philosophy, and cultural criticism. Suggestively, I aim to understand 
the self in its postmodern, neoliberal, or simply twenty-first century condition. Time and 
space, as current as ever in this age of the now, are the main conceptual forces that inform 
my understanding of selfhood. I postulate that spatio-temporal analysis of the self, within 
the cinematic form and outside it, within the frames of its constitution in time and space 
and beyond, in the world and society that it is taken from and a communicative object in, is 
key to an interpretation of a contemporary aesthetic-ontological condition.   
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 Within my interpretation of time and space, I analyse and conceptualise the 
cinematic self through a methodology of close readings. Using the concept of epistemic 
scenes developed earlier, I focus attention on the key moments of expositional force and 
power in the films, together with observations on the specificity of the ontological 
characteristics of the individual work analysed. The epistemic scenes of my selected material 
serve to speak beyond their bounds in time and space towards a broader sense of 
understanding the presentation and exposition of selfhood outside the frames of film 
analysis. What is the self in the 21st century? What is the role of the figure of the mirror and 
duration, as earlier developed, in the cinematic self? How does duration inflict and impede 
the relationships between the self and the viewer? What is the role of the mirror in the 
durational aesthetics of cinema? Which forms of difference, suspension, exposition, and 
afterness are suggested by the selves on screen, and what is the effect of the encounter with 
those forms of cinematic art on the viewer? What is the relationship between 
photographability and the potential for exposition of selfhood? What are the forms in 
which collection and dispersion work on the self? These questions will lead the argument 
and show that collection and dispersion play a crucial role in the comprehension and indeed 
interpretation of the self in its condition as force of cinematic and philosophical 
relationality.  
  I move beyond analysing the singularity of the durational moment of photography, 
painting, and video, as a bracketing of time with the introduction of feature-length 
film. With respect to the individuality or singularity of the scene of depiction, the act of 
mirroring of selfhood although of and in duration, appeared to be stable in the earlier 
examples from photography and video. In the analysis of cinematic works, the mirroring is 
of another nature concerning the ability to fixate the observation of a self in a particular 
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time and space. Directorial cinema through the use of editing – absent in my earlier analysis 
–complicates the aesthetic forces that sculpt a visual self. Yet, I argue, there is a 
continuation of the presentation and exposition of the self within the earlier introduced 
structures. With the introduction of narrative into the evolvement and treatment of time, 
the viewer finds themselves in the interpretation of an arrangement of selves. My analysis 
turns and concludes its theoretical foundation with film as the medium of recording and 
unfolding, mirroring, and presenting the self. The durational aesthetics, established through 
the locus on the self in my earlier reading of video art, increase their force of relationality in 
the cinema of the self. Rather than as simplified narcissistic mirror, this cinema establishes 
the durational unfolding and the exposition of the self, and in particular in the epistemic 
scenes, introduces the force of a collection of selfhood.  
 As a close reading of the durational aspects of the cinema of the self, I unbracket 
the earlier readings of stilled imagery to my methodology of a scene or sequence 
analysis. By focussing on specific selves that are presented in the following films, my 
method moves to the interpretation of specific scenes in close readings as a way to interpret 
those scenes as inherently epistemic, with respect to the argument earlier developed. What 
are the ways in which time and space are employed non-conventionally, both within the 
cinematographic and the narrative realm? What is the collection, respectively dispersion of 
the self that we can see in these films? How does the collection and dispersion change the 
relationality between viewer and self on screen? How does the viewer relate to the 
world? The preceding questions provide the guidelines in the analysis of two films 
concerning the collection of selves on screen. The collection of the self occurs within the 
framework of time and space. However, the selected films, further to the collection of 
selfhood, simultaneously problematise key moments of selfhood.  
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 This occurs in The Congress, as an ontological change to the status of the self occurs 
in the moments of loss of selfhood, enacted through the copy of the self, which can 
endlessly reproduce itself, irrespectively of the selfhood of its original bearer. This self is 
collected (through and via the copy), doubles, and vanishes, or melts into spheres of 
selfhood of a non-identitarian dimensionality to its bearer and world beyond any neo-realist 
understanding of time. The loss of the self is portrayed in the simultaneous loss of the 
world, through the total collection of selfhood and immersion of a world in which nothing 
but the self is encountered, so that there is no othering, no world left.  
 Another cinematic experiment engaging in the exposition of selfhood through 
the collection of a self is Boyhood. As an epistemic sequencing, Boyhood continuously 
embalms, and produces a self, in a flow of time suggesting a force of embalmment, and in a 
temporal narrative collage edited by temporal cuts that seamlessly spiral into one 
another. Thus to summarise, The Congress displays an example of the loss of the self in the 
mirroring collection of Robin Wright as Robin Wright or as a copy yet collection thereof, as 
the production of a reproduction of her self. This reading is supplemented with an 
interpretation of Boyhood. The mirror of the self finds its continuous embalmment in 
Boyhood, and in the unfolding of the self of Mason, through the reproduction of the 
production of his selfhood.  
 The friction of the simultaneous use of live action and animation images in The 
Congress, and the friction of the use of fictional and non-fictional storytelling in Boyhood 
invites regarding these films in an innovative manner. Their somewhat overall queer 
appearance is not with respect to genre genealogy, but has to do with the complications of 
narrative employments of cinematic technology and durational time mirrored in the 
presentation of selves. I propose to use the term “hybrid films” for those two 
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films precisely for the particularity of their narratives, ontologies, and styles. The films, 
through their use of the future as one of the points of temporal orientation, and anchor, 
and indeed horizon are not critically received to break with the current cultural tendency to 
understand reality bound in the brackets of the closed ‘horizons of the thinkable’ future –
 late (internet surveillance) capitalism (Fisher 2010: 9). Obscuring the actual meaning of the 
films, the insistence on genre tags such as scientific-fiction, or biographical film distract 
both criticism and interpretation from the presentation of selves centering the orbiting 
narratives. Both films are rooted in the tradition of cinematic realism, through an emphasis 
on reality, location, style, acting, and costume, to record, document, present, and unfold a 
self. On the other hand, both films radically evacuate themselves from any interventionist 
film historical tradition, and in their avant-gardism pose foundational questions of the 
aesthetics of this cinema of the self: relocating the space of the human experience into a 
temporal realm of collection.    
 In this study of “the cinematic self”, I further complicate the sensual aspects in 
which the self on screen is understood. The self as encountered through cinematic forms of 
exposition is seen or lost in space in the visual mirror of cinema: in distance, in a process in 
which the interiority of selfhood is exposed, or folded into space. On the opposite side of 
the mirror, in the negotiation of the viewer’s sense of selfhood in the encounter of 
the presentation of the self on screen, the sense of selfhood disperses by confrontation, as 
earlier proposed by my reading of Cornered (1988). Outside the intimacy of contact that is 
established through the exposition of selfhood, forces of space, articulated in the 
experience of distancing and dispersion, work to change the durational aesthetics in the 
matrix of manifesting yet destabilising relationality. While Self in the Mirror and 
Las Meninas serve as prototype forms of difference and recording of selves, I complicate the 
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relational aesthetics of cinematic theory, and propose with the dispersion of selves, through 
the relationality of the senses unbound of vision, in concluding effect to be of a dispersing 
nature for the viewer’s sense of selfhood. It is here that I draw on the olfactory, as the sense 
besides the auditory, and the visual, in which experimentation in the aesthetics of time in a 
cinematic framing have historically taken place in (modernity understood as) the cinematic 
age. Through the ritualistic cinematic presentation of smell, a relocation and dispersion of 
self for the viewer is suggested, in my reading of A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes and A Trip 
to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited.  
 The 1902 A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes performed in New York failed, what the 
2013 Los Angeles re-enactment paired with sound effectuated: a presentation of a 
representation, the unfolding of meaning through clouds of smell. The ontology of 
transgressing the ontological realm in the aesthetic sensual experience here digresses into a 
logic of fluid boundaries of selfhood, of looking at a self and looking into, renegotiating the 
self of the viewer. This suggests complicated ontologies for the viewer’s sense of selfhood: 
continuously re-territorialised and reterritorialising, and fragmented and fragmenting – 
dispersing durational realms and spatial spheres of time, and collecting a self in the loss and 
in the losing and dispersal of one’s self. As a second interpretation of dispersion, my 
subsequent reading of Ralph Bakshi’s Cool World suggests another radical intervention into 
the relation to the self on screen. Compared to The Congress, the previously discussed 
epistemic condition of the film presenting a copying collector of a self, Cool World uproots 
the canonised, rigid, exclusionary ontological aesthetics of the live-action colour image, the 
black and white image, and the animation image. As I will establish in my reading, the 
spatial here and there amalgamate in a wretchedness of the self, dispersed in narrative 
spatial anxiety, in a fragmentary, amalgamate, cartographic realm of hyperreality, and the 
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relocation of selfhood in multi-dimensionality. While the loss of self of Robin Wright in The 
Congress provides a singular thread of dislocation, on a vertical temporal axis of 
selfhood, A Trip to Japan in its revisitation disperses horizontally in space. In my reading 
of Cool World, on the other hand, the ontological re-locations and queerings of reality 
completely and totally disperse the self of the viewer as a form of loss in loosing oneself. In 
this viewerly dispersion of the self, the viewer’s self confronts the disintegration of space in 
a form of contact: the materialist ontological spheres of existence disintegrate and form and 
reform anew. Through death and afterness thereof, allegorised by the intrusion into a 
comic, artistically self-induced world – the “cool world” – a hallucinatory synthetic excess 
of the real is suggested, amending the viewer’s self in its own “trip-to-the-self”-like 
function.  
 The analysis conclusively suggests complicated cinematic spatio-temporal aesthetics 
in this cinema of the self. Selfhood is in its continuous cinematic production, or loss and 
destruction, in an anchored now within a set of spatio-temporal relational experiences in 
which the account of self is presented. Through intrusive yet transcending aesthetics, the 
radical explorations of the lost self are in collection, or dispersion. I extend this 
interpretation of the self via excavating the self outside its aesthetic-ontological relational 
foundation, in my subsequent interpretation in the political-societal realm. 
 




The first section Towards A Theory of the Cinematic Self established selfhood as a collection of 
differences of time and space. Via photography, painting, and video, cinema is understood 
as collection of those differences into an image of selfhood. The Congress, a 2013 film by Ari 
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Folman is the first film of this study to present this process of exposition of selfhood. In 
The Congress selfhood is unfolded from inside onto an outside, and recorded, indeed, 
collected in its entirety: digitally, as a copy, infinitely reproducible. In a sequence of the film, 
Robin Wright, who acts as the female protagonist of the film – herself as Robin Wright –
 gets her self collected through the use of the Light Stage, in short, an innovative 
photographic technology capturing the core of a person by recording an all-encompassing 
multi-dimensional archive-like image that allows for endless alterations, duplications, and 
projections of itself. Indeed, it is her self that is being collected in The Congress, not certain 
characteristics of her self, but simply “everything” that she is, her stripped-down self, 
including the unrealised potentiality of her selfhood. This technology that is being shown 
and then used within the film, more than just constituting a sum of the photographic 
enumerative collection of Robin Wright’s self, reproduces this collection of photographs 
as icon in the narrative realm of the film. As I will analyse in depth in the next chapter, in 
this Light Stage sequence where Robin’s self is collected in the first instance, the collection 
produces a total image of a self that is a copy and thus distinct yet identical with the self 
that has given birth and presence to it. Robin Wright is Robin Wright, a self, an other, a 
doppelgänger, original, simulation, and index: more than just of the visual or bodily self, the 
recording inhabits the totality of her selfhood and potentiality thereof, freed from the 
former referent. While this selfhood is recorded in a specific time and space, it is unbound 
of temporal and spatial forces, and gravitates in its status freely within the pictorial realm of 
representation into animation that is – analogously to Robin Wright’s collection – 
































Figure 7. The collection of Robin Wright in The Congress.  
 
 Robin Wright’s self is lost on a singular loop-like point in time, a vertical bar, in the 
temporally linear, horizontal progression of the running time of the film. Within the model 
of Figure 7, the vertical bar designates the figure of the mirror, itself represented in the Light 
Stage sequence. While the film progresses in time after the loss of Robin’s self, on the right-
hand side of the vertical bar, the expositions of Robin’s selfhood are taken from the left-
hand side of the vertical bar, from the past running time of the film, and from her past life 
time. As a function of mirroring, the productions of Robin’s self are thus a 
panoramic construction of a collected image of selfhood projected into the filmic future 
after its collection. As a representational ensemble, this suggests different spheres of 
different times and temporal realities of her self as a continuous epistemic scene proceeding 
her loss. Thus, the second epistemic scene here is an episode of sequences that all relate to 
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the first epistemic scene of the Light Stage. The verticality of the loss of the self indicates 
that Robin Wright encircles her self in the film, and is unable to get out of this particular 
point in time, paradigmatically and metaphorically of an epistemic scene as the continuous 
encounter with herself as copy of her self. This means that the suspense that motivates the 
narrative is the attempt to break out of these brackets of time, yet, nevertheless this is 
not achieved, as the encounters in ‘the Congress’ are loops of images and plot 
circumscribing the vertical axis. Through those overall two epistemic scenes, The 
Congress’ technique of the self uses the scanning technology to complicate relations of 
reality, self and collection, and reproduces an image of the past as a means to project 
countless images thereof in the future. Before looking at this total collection of time in the 
next chapter, in the following chapter the total collection of the self in The Congress remains 
to be established.   
 The Congress is a 2013 film by Ari Folman based on the 1971 scientific-educational 
novel (to keep the Polish term in proper translation) The Futurological Congress by Stanisław 
Lem. The film consists of multiple imageries: colour live-action, black-and-white, and 
animation, to suggest different genre genealogies and temporalities. The narrative of the 
film is a fragmented collage of these imageries: in the nested running time of the film, there 
are selves within selves, and films within films, and videotape-like accounts of an orbiting of 
the self. Nevertheless, a self-centred narrative thread evolves around traversing these 
distinct spheres with the focus on one self: Robin Wright as the protagonist of the film. In 
the film the actress Robin Wright is introduced as herself: an actress. Robin Wright thus 
performs or is an authentic character. The viewer here encounters a quasi-documentary 
exposition of a popular and recognisable figure of the contemporary cultural landscape, as 
many viewers know Robin Wright from the Netflix series House of Cards, or other landmark 
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roles. In the Light Stage sequence, which I analyse in depth in the next chapter, this self is 
unfolded from inside onto an outside, and recorded in its entirety to produce a total image 
of oneself that is a copy and thus distinct yet identitarian with the self that has given birth 
and presence to it. While this self (Robin Wright) that is being presented throughout the 
running time of the film is recorded in a specific time and space (colour live-action), it is 
also unbound of temporal and spatial forces in its presentation as animation. The self of 
Robin can secondarily, in what seems as another realm suggested by the animation, 
gravitate in its status as a copy freely within this realm to additional non-authentic 
representations, and self-presentations. In other words, Robin Wright is corporeally alive ‘at 
the same time’ that a ruin of her self in another ontological imagery yet embedded within 
the same temporal and ontological realm presents itself (black and white, colour live-
action). This queering construction of multiplicity of selves establishes a collection of 
temporal cinematic ontology through the narrative as the presentation of the panoramic 
plasticity of this self.  
 The Congress explores the passage of different senses of selfhood, through the 
employment of different realities, or ontologies of self. The journey is employed, following 
a singular self and its surrounding orbiting worlds over time. These different worlds are 
explored alongside the journey of the female main protagonist: Robin Wright. The film uses 
the 1971 memoir and novel of Stanisław Lem, an auto-ethnographic narrative account of 
male protagonist Ijon Tichy, who loses himself in the narrative of the novel within what 
appears as an endless maelstrom of an amalgamate of the imaginary and the worldly realm. 
There is confusion for the reader alongside Ijon’s over the most fundamental orientational 
and ontological questions of time and space, through the inability to differentiate thoughts 
and perceptions from hallucinations and delusions. In an interview, Folman evokes Ijon’s 
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visit of the fictitious academic Eighth World Futurological Congress at the Hilton Hotel, Costa 
Rica as an ‘inspiration’ for a re-employment of the theme of the loss of selfhood in the 
imagined future (Folman: 2011). In Lem’s novel, the congress is historically placed in a 
post-democratic society that emerged after a catastrophic cycle of events, chiefly 
characterised by spontaneous use of power through violence. In this narrative realm, the 
social life is an inner life fostered by Orwellian Soma-like drugs to attain a sense of harmony 
in one’s self. Through that opiate which artificially harmonises social dissonance for the 
consumer, the loss of the ability to question the social order manifests itself. In the novel, 
the self and the world appear to be in an intertwined relationship that merges classic 
ontological boundaries of self and other, into which mind, body, and society intrusively 
amalgamate. In the film, the presentation of this kind of “neurological age” is the haunting 
allegorical foreshadower of our current postmodern late-capitalist society throughout the 
film’s narrative structure. The neurological human condition here is characterised by the 
restructuring of the sensual apparatus through the intruding transgression of the outside 
into the inside and the undifferentiated interconnectedness of these formerly distinct 
realms. In Lem’s fictitious neurological age and spectral future, the sense of selfhood and 
identity is thus mainly a dramaturgically composed reaction towards psychoactive and 
reactive supplements and synthetic substances. As Professor Trottelreiner proclaims in the 
novel The Futurological Congress:  
 A plurality of minds in a single body. And there are amplifiers [sic] to intensify the inner life  
 and give it precedence over the objective, outside world. Yes, such are the times we live in, 
 my boy! Omnis est Pillula! (Lem 1985: 124) 
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 The re-imagined and re-enacted narrative of The Congress as film pays tribute to 
Lem’s narrative exposition of how selfhood is composed and articulated. This narrative 
authorial and directorial motivation resonates with current cultural tendencies and 
imaginations fostered by, for instance, discussions of augmented reality, virtuality, and post-
humanity, as well as post-apocalyptic societal imaginaries. The ‘plurality of minds in a single 
body’ sketched in the novel is explored in the film through the collection of Robin Wright 
and the unbound panoramic plasticity allowing the free floating and drifting of Robin 
Wright as signifier in the amplified space of the film (Lem 1985: 124). On the other hand, 
the existence of plural selves, such as Robin Wright, stands in a relation to their bearer, their 
producer, and their indexicality. Unlike the mystical pupula duplex, in which a singular eye 
forms two pupils or two perceptions and consciousnesses in a singular body, the ‘Omnis est 
Pillula’ is the invention of a double self, a peeled-off self, a non-identitarian self, a derivate 
(Lem 1985: 124). The plurality of the self is disembodied, as there is a copy of Robin 
Wright’s self, owned and distributed across the narrative worlds, while also her original self 
continues in the narrative realms. The encounter of the copies for the authentic Robin 
Wright within the film manifests the particular neurological condition of her existence: she 
perceives herself while being herself, however, crucially this perception is unlike a 
usual recording of herself which would be per definition of a temporal past, as the 
recording unfolds as projection yet presentation of herself. In addition to questions of 
authenticity and ontology, the cinematic forms in which this narrative is presented, is in 
excess of its proper condition and heritage. The interventionist aesthetics problematise the 
politics of temporal attention, slowness, and focus through the loss and drowning in 
instantaneous excess of communication. The process of scanning and reproducing her self 
does not provide the ultimate self-fulfilment associated with the rebirth and death of one 
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self in one’s professional career, as suggested by dialogue in the film. Rather there is the 
process of an unfolded collection of a singular self into a pluralising afterlife, which co-
exists, shapes, and coalesces life into a state of being singular plural – non-contradictory 
with one’s self – in the experienced reality of the now. In a Deleuzian sense, there is a 
melting of the virtual into the actual image (cf. Deleuze 1989). The distinctions necessary to 
disintegrate the realities in which the self is collected and presented become an 
overwhelming task and fight for a true self, lost in the process of its proper collection, and 
thus, corruption.  
 The job offered to Robin Wright, the recording, copying and distribution of 
herself appears as liberation, but is later exposed as tragic negativity of liberation into 
another sense of world and self. The scanning offers the re-location and re-orientation of a 
sense of the self from the nostalgia of the present time associated with pictorial 
representation as of the past into the potentiality of presentation of a digital future. 
However, in the production of an icon of her self, the collection of Robin is subsequently 
completely removed from the consent of its bearer of resemblance: the autonomy of the 
reproduction as a means of production of selfhood epitomises through the narrative a loss 
of the self, rather than the embodied sense of freedom a liberation of her selfhood would 
entail. As it will be shown in the next chapter, this problem of loss on the other hand also 
becomes a problem of the self of the viewer, implicated into an imaginative neurological 
age and a loss of selfhood through the complications experienced in the 
viewerly consciousness of a world exposed through the film. While the corporate 
commercial world of data desire finds a singular image, something like a “re-icon” of 
Robin-Wright, the re-indivisualising re-productions and bifurcations of the narrative 
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following Robin Wright take place in different realities, which all suggest different 
temporalities, and senses of self.   
 The peculiar construction of the filmic reality and viewerly experience reminds me 
of understandings concerning ontology and selfhood in broader terms within critical theory. 
The main problem of judging difference and representation in this temporal, vertical axis of 
self-experience of the viewer in The Congress arises from the grown complexity, and gestalt-
changing nature of the inability to ‘[d]istinguish clearly between inside and outside, friend 
and foe, self and other’ (Han 2015a: 1). This is experienced as a loss of consciousness, as a 
loss of viewerly selfhood. As further sketched by philosopher Byung-Chul Han, reality is 
decreasingly subjectified in terms of otherness in the paradigmatic change in which 
‘Otherness is being replaced with difference’ (Han 2015a: 2). This epistemic contemporary 
dispositif, in which the status of appearances becomes increasingly difficult to discern 
ontologically and communicatively, is also a key aesthetic distinction between Lem’s prose 
and Folman’s film. The solidity of prose anchors text with a singularity of ontological form, 
a linear language in which the reader distinguishes worlds, spheres, and realities through 
semantics and interpretation as grammar, and in the meaning of words traces differences 
back to otherness in a stylistically coherent flow of text. This readerly engagement as self 
constituting selfhood is much more difficult for the visual viewer of The Congress, as the 
pictorial language of a worldview appears lost. In the film, there is a melted, more liquid 
state of the literary linear form: even though temporal anchors of reality are produced 
through the use of live-action, black and white, and animation, those ontological 
distinctions are melted, decomposed, and encountered as liquid ruin into a visual and 
narrative flow of realities and a sense of ‘terror of immanence’ (Han 2015a: 6). However, 
this realm of constant communication of the mirroring of the self via the encounter of its 
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immanent data collection builds a relationality of the self into a transcendence of the desire 
to collect oneself, completely, in the mirror. The world within this cinema as space and 
place has disappeared, and with it the self, other, friend, foe, fake, and real (cf. Han 2015a: 
1). There is no apparent reality whatsoever, but interpersonal reality in this condition is a 
space of difference – projection, absence, exchange, and in total instantaneous 




Chapter 7: A Total Collection of a Self – Robin Wright 




A singular self is followed in the Congress’ narrative through different enactments of their 
selfhood. The Congress presents the different spheres of selfhood in the narrative following 
actress Robin Wright. As earlier mentioned, Robin Wright is played by the (real) Robin 
Wright following her vocation as an actress, and through her private life as single mother. It 
is through this narrative that the style of the film merges fiction and documentary by 
focussing on a singular person and selfhood. Rather than being involved in jobs as an 
actress, as expected from this narrative exposition, Robin’s career has peaked already and 
the commercial demand for her self in her vocation declines. Robin Wright in The Congress is 
shown as an icon embodying the past, the ‘old’ Hollywood, and analogue film. Through the 
death of cinema, the birth of the digital, computer generated imagery, and the potentiality 
of animation, the ontology of the image changes within the structures of production of 
mainstream cinema in the film. Robin Wright as a trace of modern cinema embodies the 
cinema of the celebrity, the down-to-earth star, a somewhat hippie Hollywood icon. In a 
Lynchian realist yet fairy-tale-like dialogue sequence her (as it is surreally called) ‘last job 
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ever’ is offered, in a modernist setting. Robin Wright accepts this enigmatic calling, without 
fully fathoming the exposure of this intrusion and imminent reproduction of her inner self, 
as a language, a system, as a dictionary of selfhood. While walking through the Miramount 
studio’s hallway (looking back at her self as icon), she halts her walking pace, and looks 
back at her already in-the-process-of-becoming lost identity and the capitalisation of her self 
as former movie star, and mentally prepares for the digital scan of herself. The sense of loss 
and past suggested in this exposition of storytelling provokes a feeling of melancholia for 
the viewer. I understand this melancholia paving the way for the viewer’s apprehension of 
the actual loss of Robin Wright in the digital scan as, in theoretical terms ‘a mourning for 
the lost self’, in its state of enactment (Radden 2000: 335).   
 The notion of a ‘digital scan’ evokes medical technologies such as X-rays and 
Magnetic resonance imaging, and images that excavate, cut through to a corporeal inside, a 
self below the visual surface of skin. In The Congress, the scan is not concerned with an 
image of Robin’s otherwise invisible inner architecture, but solely with the surface and skin 
of her body. Yet, no sense of tactility is evoked through the focus on skin in its voyeuristic, 
yet simplistically touristic recording, it is just Robin Wright as a prototype that appears 
confronting the viewer. The ritualistic collection functions through one temporal durational 
fixation, collection, or scan of her computationally cutting through the visual alikeness of 
her presentation. This, as it is later tragically exposed through the storytelling, suffices for 
the production of unlimited virtual computationally reproduced visual selves. The 
deeper inside of her body, the inner core, is uninteresting, unnecessary, unwanted, and not 
needed: it can be reproduced. With indifference towards the realness of this production of a 
self, the differences of selfhood can be composed. The studio owns the language of the self, 
the self as own capital, does not need the labour of acting. As the agent of the Miramount 
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production studio Jeff Green declares ‘we want to own this thing called Robin Wright’, her 
self as capital construction, the sum of potential imaginary productions to be enacted: acted 
out, in the future, are already owned by the studio. The self is a product and object: labour, 
such as acting, is thus off the market – passé. The scan of ‘this thing’ – the former non-
ownable subject – offers to create a copy: an object, and also a virtual entity of Robin 
Wright as Robin Wright, enslaved in the code of her self as capital construction. The scan 
is a complete archive and repertoire of herself. It is thus commercially used by the studio 
for the display of her as her. The theatrical ambition of the scan is nothing less than the 
cloning and recodifiying recreation of the self as a mechanical and electronic reproduction – 
a technically duplicated entity of images, controlled and manipulated by the Miramount 
corporation. In my interpretation this foreshadows the end of work and life, and the 
enslavement of selfhood for the viewer visually exposed to non-proper identifications of 
their self, as then subsequently suggested by the fading sensation by use of live-action, black 
and white, and animation. The question of reproduction is asked here by means of the 
representation of selfhood, and questions of recording inherent in the temporal medium of 
cinema are relocated to the focus on the self. Thus, questions of death, finitude and excess 
are responded to by the hybrid imagery presenting different lost senses of selfhood in 





































Figure 8. The Light Stage Sequence.  
 
 In the Light Stage sequence in which this reproduction of her selfhood is 
theatrically enacted, as seen in Figure 8, Robin Wright enters the dark space of the image, 
and the viewer observes her march into the centre position within the globe-like 
environment, an installation of the figure of representational space as globe. The sequence 
begins with this entrance and the intrusion into the interiority of the globe. Through this 
shot the Light Stage presents itself stretching across the dimensions of the 
cinematographically held space in perspective of exteriority, in perspective of its tangible 
outside. The Light Stage appears to be both an architectural arrangement and a high-
technology machine, principally a construction of a starlight web of sources of light, as a 
layerlike web-like round geometrical figure. In the beginning of the sequence, the 
establishing shot displays the planetary shape of this exterior. On the surface of the 
structure, the individual cameras begin to boot in a movement from low to high 
latitude. The hexagonical round LED lights encircling the individual camera lenses light up 
accumulatively, forming the globe-like shape, like an illusionary supplementary image, this 
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invisbible room-like structure, as a pictorial space enters the image. Further in this image in 
the foreground, a  screen as additional frame implicates a computer or computational 
device to which this screen is connected, and the time of the visual feed of the screens 
displays as an algorithmic exchange of the data of the exterior light sources, which are in 
fact cameras.   
 The foreground structure re-displays the structure in the wide background, through 
encirclement Robin appears in the center of the dimension of the illusionary space. The 
extensions of the space of the establishing shot, the actual studio, are fading into darkness, 
and underline the transitional appearance of this space. In the continuation of the Light 
stage sequence, a mid-size shot of Robin Wright appears. Robin sports a white unitard, 
which she changed into in the previous scene in a cubicle outside of the actual Light Stage, 
which Christopher (Christopher B. Duncan) handed to her. Robin's hair is collected, 
disciplined into a bun. Robin Wright is now here, simply herself. A dressed yet undressed 
Robin here presents herself, with her arms outstretched and her fingers pointing down. The 
body tension suggests preparedness and confidence of the acting to come, the transcending 
of thoughts of character into a display of being a self. The sequence continues as a 
sequence of close-ups in which the voice of instruction of Christopher and then Al is heard. 
A shot reverse shot sequence follows, as a dialogue between Christopher, Al and Robin, 
who acts out the instructions and directions. Robin Wright speaks, listens, talks, and 
repeats. The close-ups in the sequence, the shots from inside the Planet Robin Wright are 
accompanied by shots of a tangential distance to the surface of the Light Stage camera 
structure in which the camera lights confront the image. The division of the difference 
between exteriority and interiority, the layer of selfhood suggested by this structure is 
emphasised by this sequencing of shots.  
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 Continuing the theoretical discussion of the film, I interpret the sequence of Robin 
Wright’s body scan illustrated by Figure 8. The scan is performed in a planetarium-like 
encircling structure of starlight cameras, and cameras of light: The Light Stage. On its surface 
are individual cameras on all vertical and horizontal axes for a full encirclement of the 
centre stage. The cameras take successive photographs in monstrous, instantaneous, 
spotlight flashes of light according to algorithmic logic. Robin Wright in the centre in a 
form of stage is embraced by this planetary surface structure of cameras. She wears a 
unitard and performs acted reactions towards the commanding voice of Al and 
Christopher. Christopher and Al voice certain desires and so call acting, gestures, mimicry, 
and ultimately emotions into being.  
 There are four main camera angles used in the sequence (as seen in Figure 8). 
Suggesting mobility, and the flow of information and communication, the camera 
consistently tracks the three actors involved in the sequence. This triangulation, 
this tracking is achieved via an orbital encirclement from left to right in a dialogue 
shot/reverse shot arrangement. The cinematography consists of over the shoulder shots of 
Chris and Al and a tracking shot in tangible proximity to the structure of the machine’s 
exterior, bound with medium long shots, and close ups of Robin. The technology used in 
the sequence exists and is real and realises representations; The Light Stage is based at the 
Stevens Institute for Innovation at the University of Southern California, Los 
Angeles. However, the ‘Light Stage 5’ in which the digital body scan is performed in the 
film is already outdated and passé, as the seventh generation is currently in use. The original 
research for the Light Stage was conducted at Berkeley under computer scientist Paul 
Debevec. The technology has recorded Holocaust survivors and for commercial 
reasons created hybrid human selves or selves with extending non-human features, for films 
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such as Sam Raimi’s Spider-Man 2 (2004) or James Cameron’s Avatar (2009). In The Congress 
the scan collects what makes Robin Wright ‘Robin Wright’, the language of her self as a 
capital construction of representations of likenesses.   
 The self is collected in an autopsy of the forces of representation that constitute the 
image of selfhood as enactments of iconisations that follow within the imagery of the film. 
In the Light Stage Robin Wright is encountered in a transitional space and a situational 
sequence. Like in the shorter durational expositions of selfhood in video, comparable to 
Boomerang, and Cornered, there is an other – a voice emerges out of the body, an auditory self 
constructs feelings of interiority, as the selfhood of Robin echoes in voice throughout the 
sequence. Also, the use of the voice is in a dialogic-monologue style suggesting a 
confessional character, relationally accompanying the gestures and performance of the body 
in the acting out thereof. In the making-of style of video art, there is an emphasis on 
process, improvisation, on simply being there as body, and on the repetition-like sameness 
of rehearsal as an end in and of itself. Compared to The Congress, naturally, there is no 
“product" of the recording in video art technologically and representationally thinkable, no 
re-iconising possible “out” of the material as a reproduction of a derivate and illusionary 
captured inner code or language of herself. In The Congress, however, the copy of this 
process, the capital construction is precisely the use and exchange value of the rehearsal. 
This master copy of selfhood allows for the infinite re-edits of Robin Wright’s self in 
another realm of iconic representational enactments of her self. The imagery of the body is 
used in panoramic plasticity in the plural and pluralising copies, where infinitely possible 
reproductions are manifesting through variations of the body.  
 This use and abuse of imagery visually displays the seemingly unthinkable loss of 
agency, and fidelity, to an actual image of oneself in singularity. The photographic umbilical 
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cord is interrupted by the ability to use the bracketing of time, as a means of virtualisation 
and manipulation of the past into the future, however, not as a past, but as an eternal 
presence, reproduced and reproducing, real and realising. Visual and ontological fidelity to 
photography in these projections of the capital construction is interrupted, and by the use 
of animation another layer of alterations, differences, and othering introduced. The 
particular afterness of the Light Stage ritual for Robin Wright’s self, however, is not in a 
controllable realm of remembrance, projection, and desire. In the alienating look onto 
oneself through the force of infinite mirroring of the mirror in the a posteriori encountered 
selves, the traumatic experience of the loss of the self occurs for Robin Wright and the 
viewer as the encounter with a capitalist, profitable, iconic institution, and the loss of a 
sense of authority over the language of selfhood.    
 Robin Wright performs a dress rehearsal of laying bare selfhood with movement, 
difference, and repetition – the Charlie Chaplin-like inherited gestural, iconisable expression 
of selfhood through successive significations through time: dancing herself (cf. Benjamin 
2008: 340-41). The sequence exposes selfhood as event, as performance piece, as something 
to be seen, in the sense of ‘laying bare’ for the other. The white unitard as epistemic 
costume emphasises the nudity of Robin Wright’s self with respect to appearing not 
quite dressed. The scan files the surface of the visible and does not attempt to uncover an 
otherwise hidden appearance. As it is apparent from the screens visually displaying the 
output of the gathered camera data, the costume veils the corporeal appearance, and 
presents a skin-like layered vision of the body without transgressing to the sense of skin 
or underneath the skin. Through its opacity the unitard makes Robin Wright appear neither 
naked nor dressed, rather Robin appears in this seminal transitional state. As philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben remarks for corporeal performances in Nudities (2011: 55-90), the 
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existence and gaze of the other brings nudity into being. Here Robin Wright’s specific form 
of nudity is enacted as event not as a corporeal state in and of itself for and in the eyes of 
the other: the other who is at once the film’s viewer, Al and Christopher as the spectator 
within the scene, and the future spectators of the collection. As suggestive robe de lumière, 
a slippery, silky, robe-like-cloth, a clothing of light, the unitard as full-body suit, as dress, 
gracefully suggests the presence of absence of clothing, yet without the presence of 
nakedness as a state. However, the recording uses the art historical concept of a 
photographic nude not as the excavation, temporarily, of a flicker of the self, as a Nancean 
exposing and exposed. Rather, the nudity suggested here is used to record the self in 
totality, collected, and re-producible, and thus eternally present as archive.   
 The collection of the instantaneous is non-paradoxically the enduring system of the 
archive of selfhood.  Although linearly composed in time in the making of sequence, the 
means of production of the recording as copy are not bound to any apparent limits, but the 
power of the archive is the ownership of data and code of selfhood. Nudity, as Agamben 
remarks, belongs to time, and yet, although the nudity is of a time, it is a total sense of 
nudity that is being captured, a nudity of form and being, a transgression into the recording 
of selfhood (2010: 67). Through the subsequent use of the recorded self in The Congress a 
form of allegorising the unbound potential of reconstructions of selfhood occurs: replaying, 
doubling, cloning, and manipulating the what-has-been-there. In the Light Stage 
sequence, the photographic capturing of Robin Wright is a form of nascent death dance, an 
account of both ‘dancing herself’, and loss of the self in the encirclement of the mirror as a 
planetary, cocoon-like structure. Relocated into the realm of recording and representation, 
the representation of Robin Wright as actress in the Miramount world to follow in 
the storytelling of the film is unbound from her selfhood. Thus compared to Self in the 
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Mirror as an image of a fixation of the self, here a complete collection of the self as capital 
construction takes place through the encirclement and peeling off, and ultimately 
detachment and loss of the self.  
 This reproduction of a female self echoes earlier cinematic moments in which 
bodies are reproduced for the sake of their independent coexistence. Famously, one of the 
first cinematic depictions of a robot, cyborg, or android, is in Fritz Lang’s (1927) Metropolis. 
In the visionary city within Metropolis, the scientist Rotwang reproduces the protagonist 
Maria as double or machine-human [Maschinenmensch]. In Metropolis the differentiation 
between the double [Doppelgänger] and real Maria becomes one narrative thread. Both 
Marias have an ‘identity’, both exist parallel in the same physical world and within clearly 
demarcated dimensions, in difference to one anonther. The metropolitans dramatically 
mislead by aspirations of emancipation, believe in their structural ability to differentiate, 
control, police, and verify Maria’s ontology and being. This stands in clear contrast to the 
copy of Robin Wright, which in its afterness to its bearer bears a different relationship to 
authenticity and identity. As a digital file, rather than a physical, singular, fingerprint-like 
copy, Robin Wright’s copy-appearance is restless, nomadic, transparent, and the production 
of a selfless, tracing machine-like chameleon-automaton as an image.  
 In the Light Stage sequence, the computer linked to the cameras is conceived as the 
controlling instance of this collection of selfhood. The nature of the reproduction of the 
self is not by singularly fixated machinery, compared to the proto-modernist pseudo-
scientific surgical laboratory, as envisioned in Metropolis. Also, it is not conceived of as a 
machine human, like in Metropolis, or as an android human replicant such as Rachael in 
Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) or Bobbie in Bryan Forbes’s The Stepford Wives (1975), or 
as a form of programmed machine with a software or consciousness, such as Ava in Alex 
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Garland’s ex_machina (2015), or a complete software simulation, such as Simone in Andrew 
Niccol’s S1MØNE (2002). Through the use of soft sculpting into electronic data, in other 
words software rather than hardware, the scan of Robin Wright as identity of a self includes 
the use of this self as (collected into) data, and thus cloning possibilities of consentless 
change. Compared to the Frankensteinian Rotwang and the embodiment of a mad scientist 
trope, there is a distinctively post-fordist surveillant arrangement of labour within the scene 
of Robin Wright’s immaculate conception. Human labour, although performed, is auxiliary 
to the gigantic recording power of the machine, and consists of elegant emotional labour, 
and the operation and control of the function of the machine.  
 The electronic body scan for the digital file is performed in a distinctively post-
industrial and post-human arrangement. Chris and Al sit in front of a horizontal desk filled 
with microphones and computers that offer a simulated view of the inner core of the 
computer program and technology. Although these humans control the computers and 
recording, the algorithm manufactures the file of Robin Wright. Thus, the final data is 
produced by post-human means, and in post-human control of production. The voice of 
Chris calls for a panorama of emotions: a smile, a wide smile, happiness, laughter, sounds of 
laughter, a laughter that slowly turns into emptiness, blankness and sadness. The use of the 
two voices here is reminiscent for me of Derrida’s claim in Psyche: Inventions of the Other that 
‘[t]he call of the other is a call to come, and that happens only in multiple voices’ (2007: 47). 
Thereby, as reacted to accordingly by Robin Wright, a panoramic scan of Robin’s body, 
face, emotions, laughter and tears takes place. During the recording of sadness Robin 
interrupts the performance in a stage of agitation, contempt and sorrow. As dramatic and 
corrective reaction, Al takes control over Chris’ microphone. Al’s personal and emotional 
appeal produces the desired reactions from Robin as the flashing and scanning 
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recommences after the suspension through this dramatic break. The other(s) through the 
voice call a self, here Robin Wright, into being. However, this other, so the crying 
foreshadows, is unbound from her self. At the end of the overall nine-minute sequence 
Robin expresses deep sorrow, and touches her face with both hands to hide tears and cries. 
The frame then fades out into darkness. A black screen follows with the intertitle in French 
“20 Ans Plus Tard” – also reminding the viewer through the slow and soft fading into 
animation in the sequence. The forces of self-presentation and representation are moving 
from the moment as momentary and embodied, to the creation of this moment as lasting, 
continuous and reproducible. This stands in contrast to Las Meninas’ moment of 
construction of a self as cutting in time. Compared to the non-identitarian and contingent 
scan of Robin Wright, Las Meninas and Self in the Mirror’s construction are bound to the 
temporal singularity of the self.   
 The Light Stage sequence recalls characteristics Self in the Mirror and Las Meninas 
while also extending the discussion in Section I. The walk-through room in which the other 
two epistemic presentations of these two selves are staged has developed through the Light 
Stage into an overarching liminal stage of a globe-like planet, an empty surface structure 
whose architecture is constituted by the photographic cameras themselves, and the core of 
the self to be photographed inside it. Out of darkness shatters light, and the shattering 
evokes the collection of selfhood. The flickering thunderstorm that collects Robin Wright 
approximates as a figure a complete spiral shelling around the outside of the body. This 
simultaneously evokes a figure of a perfect, complete return into the formation of an 
umbilical cord towards the inside of the Light Stage’s structure. The panoramic plasticity 
created here, through the body as the display of selfhood culminates in its complete total 
recording. The Light Stage records selfhood as a capital construction, the measurement of a 
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totality, and thus a biometrics of selfhood is constructed through photography as 
scanning. However, like in Self in the Mirror and Las Meninas as spaces of a making-of, the 
actual entity produced in this epistemological scene is invisible, is inside or behind the 
computer screen. The recording serves as the infinitesimal recorder of everything that is: 
the being of Robin Wright itself is recorded. Robin acts out herself as herself, yet the 
constitution of her self is entirely based as the response towards the other. Whereas 
Foucault emphasises the relationship of the viewer in Las Meninas as seeing and being seen, 
and existing via the gaze of the other, selfhood here articulates as a set of protocols, 
gestures and emotions performed for the other, and for us, the viewer. Selfhood is enacted 
in relationality and in the performance of emotionality. The range and panorama of the 
emotions of the self are the plasticity that the data as archive projects in the subsequent 
imagery of the film, in its bending illustrations, screenings, and projections of Robin 
Wright.   
 
 
Chapter 8: The World as Vertical Panorama – Robin 




There is a breaking of the self of Robin Wright in the sequences following the Light 
Stage, the remaining three quarters running time of The Congress. The notion of breaking 
refers to the breaking of the unique harbour of Robin’s self being within herself, meaning 
that the self, now being collected, loses its interiority. The self appears as extrapolated 
conception, vision, and form of hallucination within the narrative world’s exposition. I 
interpret the breaking down of Robin Wright during the collection of her self in the Light 
Stage sequence as foreshadowed emotional reaction towards the problematic value of 
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exchange. The emotional breakdown anticipates the unfolding of the sense of selfhood 
from an interiority to a deunified exteriority, principally within a relationship of infidelity to 
its former bearer and continuous inhabitant. This overarching nature of the ‘spiral shell’ of 
the Light Stage, in both representational form shown as a sequence and within the sequence 
as material exchange that qua capturing transubstantiates the locale (or shell) of selfhood 
into a file, also recalls Derrida’s concept of brisure from Of Grammatology (1978: 65-70). While 
the hinge is a form a joint, as it is commonly translated, within my interpretation 
of Derrida’s phonetic concept it is indeed a bridging between representational realms, such 
as nature and culture. In The Congress this bridging occurs in pictorial form between 
representation and presentation, between a temporal recording as representation (of Robin 
Wright), and a temporal re-projection of the representation (of Robin Wright), which 
appears as a presentation (of Robin Wright). The exploration of this deunfied locale of the 
self within the continuation of The Congress is the commercial interest of the collection, 
indeed the product of the capital construction made of Robin Wright’s selfhood.   
 ‘This thing called Robin Wright’ (to recite Miramount agent Jeff Green) is thus a 
collection that occurs both as a breaking and joining, a deconstruction, and re-occuring 
recomposition of a deconstruction of Robin Wright’s selfhood. The brisure is hence here 
further interpretable as breaking-joining, at once understood as both entrance and exit, as 
conception of exchange and movement, and here and there, both ending and beginning, 
through which the visual presentation of selfhood can be understood as an act of 
disidentification. The opportunity for this collection to occur within The Congress arises from 
the intersection of two motivations, the desire of Robin Wright to act out herself for 
financial reasons, and the desire of the Miramount studio to have the thing, the icon, and 
use it anew. The root of the act of disidentification is thus within this instrumental 
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communicative logic – the bridge and bridging – of exchange: the entrance for the 
collection is rooted in desire, in remuneration, and the exit is in desire, in the permeable 
construction of a form of capital with interest. The exchange of desire informs the 
potentiality of the encounter to occur:  the desire to collect the self, in a point in time, 
remunerated for, is thus exchanged with the desire of the studio, to have this point in time 
be permeable. Crucially, however, the studio comes into ownership of a permeable means 
of production, of a means of mirroring anew, of ownership of a mirror of projections of 
Robin Wright’s self. The exchange thereby turns out to be like a one-way street bridge, the 
exchange is instrumental, but impermanent and without a closure in terms of the exchanged 
product, which is continuously in the flow and making. Thus the loss of Robin Wright’s 
selfhood through the collection is by indebtedness of the visual image of oneself being 
delocalised from one’s power of mirroring to another bearer of this power. There is more at 
force in this sequence than the mere constitution of a self through this brisure via the spiral 
force of the other as the Light Stage. The conception of the groundlessness of the spiral shell 
earlier noted in Las Meninas according to Foucault is extended here.   
 It is not the viewer who finishes, assembles the full cycle of representation through 
the witnessing act of the Light Stage sequence. Recalling Foucault’s argument on the mirror 
as both reflecting and epistemic access to an elsewhere, the Light Stage reinvents this 
mirror function in a representational machine, almost like an entrance into the logic of 
the mirror function itself and a renegotiation thereof. The machine collects, and with the 
projections of Robin in the narrative inserts a new representational realm into the narrative 
world by the use of a construction of a reflection or recollection of a past that holds no 
fidelity to its pastness. What follows through diverging storylines in algorithmic logic is an 
encounter with fragmentary and deconstructed recollections of mirroring. The concept of 
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brisure is here thus also a form of exchange of a fundamental perspective onto 
the mirroring function itself, the giving up of the authority over the gaze of the other which 
constitutes oneself, and the permeability of the other to constitute an image of oneself in 
the first place. Selfhood as enacted in the sequence, together with Robin’s breakdown 
during the enactment itself, thus also points towards brisure understood here as a fracture of 
selfhood in the break between seeing and being-seen, as the function of the mirror 
transforms.   
 The relationality or the directionality of the gaze transforms, as the system 
of mirroring transforms. The viewer in the remaining sequences of The Congress is thus both 
overall witness and passerby of the complicit enactment of selfhood in recollection of a 
capital construction as a “commodity of the self”. The self is produced in this exchange as 
commodity, yet the commodity as form of iconic mirroring is breaking the collection, the 
capital construction of selfhood of the studio breaks unified selfhood into de-unified and 
de-unifying vertical disintegrations and fragmentations, or redirections. Elsewhere thus 
embodied pictorially returns as visual otherhood – or rather “elsehood”, to nuance the 
element of difference rather than otherness – of the former yet reappearing mirroring. The 
former subjectivity of selfhood is broken into iconic clusters of projections of materialised 
desires of the self-as-it-has-been, into selfhood-as-reappearing-now, not only conflicting in 
time within the running time of the film, but conflicting with the sense of self. The self 
disintegrates, is lost in a non-united, non-identitarian manner with itself in this narrative 
world of bifurcating recollections, and re-enacting exchanges.   
 The intervention into the structure of the spiral and the constitution of selfhood not 
merely as an object of the other, but as breaking of the unified sense of self within oneself, 
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also recalls an intervention of Barthes concerning the phonetic locale of a collected self. 
Barthes writes in Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes:  
 
 ...today the subject approaches himself [herself] elsewhere, and “subjectivity” can return at 
 another place on the spiral: deconstructed, taken apart, shifted, without anchorage: why 
 should I not speak of “myself” since this “my” is no longer “the self” [soi] ? (1977, 168) 
 
While verbal language of selfhood here is explored through the potential of language to 
articulate a positionality within the language system, the language of selfhood is 
transformed through the fracture of the reappearing self. The fracture of self as another 
anesthetisation of fragmentation and pictorial dislocation of self, is reproduced, or ‘taken 
apart’, or disunified through the archivised commercial production of successive narrative 
gestures and images. I interpret or transfer the sense of dislocations of speech-acts of “I”, 
the returns into the third-person perspective within a visual realm as the effect of mirroring 
in perspective of an “elsehood” of selfhood. Not representation, in the philosophically 
classical sense of the term takes place, but a return of a confusion of mirroring over the 
exposing and the exposed, at the same time. “Deconstructed, taken apart, shifted, without 
anchorage”, to use Barthes’s formulation, yet completed, integrated, iconicised, the sense 
of self here is reconfigured in this loss of permanence through permeability (1977, 168).  
 It appears, in the continuation of The Congress, that the self is everywhere, in every 
image the narrative suggests different locales, sites or temporal visions of the self. This 
temporally confusing reconfiguration of a recollection is what I would according to Nancy 
term re-production: deconstructive reconfigurations of recollections of a self. With this I 
mean that the body is produced, however, not in resemblance to its bearer, but in the 
representational realm of the film disunified and assembled anew, brought into appearance 
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of likeness, not identity. This is the sense in which panoramic plasticity can be conceived: 
the extension of a point in time, the permeability of a point in time as a form of plasticity of 
selfhood. This production is the vertical co-existence of the “collective” plastic re-
productions of the self in different narrative bifurcations and spaces through time. Those 
sculptures of selfhood are temporalised or plasticised, yet collectively panoramically 




















































Figure 9. The three realms of vertical loss of the self in The Congress. 
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 A closer examination of the narrative of The Congress helps to exemplify and 
illustrate more concretely the loss of the self described in theoretical terms. Through Figure 
9, I have chosen three images here as snapshots of the film to orchestrate a three-
dimensional overview of the epistemic scene of the remaining narrative. The narrative is 
principally anchored within three ontologies of the image: live-action, black and white, and 
animation. However, as earlier indicated, the major innovation of the film in terms of 
both cinematic history, and the ontology of the cinematic image, is that the 
singular ontological realms suggested by the properties of the image are transgressed. The 
image’s ontology, and therewith narrative ontology cannot simply be considered 
alone through the perceived ontology of the image, but is hybrid and more plural and 
thus puzzling for the viewer, and moreover confuses the narrative exposition as a whole. 
The puzzling nature of the viewerly experience arises through the 
hybridisation, pluralisation, and superimposition of multiple ontologies of imagery within 
one frame, and continuously confuses the anchoring of the viewer within a distinct 
narrative realm alone. Nevertheless, through an analysis of the overall narrative of 
The Congress, as seen in Figure 9, three principal narrative realms can be identified, in which a 
vertical loss of the self of Robin Wright is exposed.  
 The three chosen images here represent the entrance into the Miramount world 
(image one), the unfolding of narrative within the Miramount world (image two), and the 
exit and dissolving of the Miramount world (image three). All three images, as presentations 
of these particular senses of loss of selfhood, stand in direct conceptual relation of the 
collection of selfhood in the Light Stage. Recalling the model of the vertical bar of Figure 7, 
the images and individual narrative worlds build their relation durationally not only to the 
overall narrative, and to the past that builds the sense of the presence of the narrative at the 
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moment of the now of the running time, but the images stand in a relation of the collection 
of Robin Wright’s selfhood, as this marks a moment of reference to the old non-
hybridised world, the world of clear binaries and distinctions, the narrative world before the 
collection. This non-hybridised world with ontological clarity of demarcations is lost in 
The Congress, and instead there is the hybrid presentation of supplementary constructions of 
images, a renegotiation of selfhood, and a reconfiguration of relationality.   
 The first image of Figure 9 is an over-the-shoulder shot of Robin Wright, the 
first frame of the film that contains the hybrid technique of both cinematographically 
realist live-action imagery and animation. This frame is taken from a sequence, which serves 
as an extended durational crossing and entrance into the new narrative world, the 
Miramount world. Before the animation intrudes into the imagery in this frame, visually 
initiating the intrusion of the new representational regime of the Miramount world, the 
cinematographically realist sequence of the drive illustrates the departure from the old 
world and representational system into the new realm. Robin Wright drives a convertible 
Porsche car in the first person perspective, anchored in a principally realist cinematic 
convention. The long take of a curve in which the car moves on hot asphalt into the 
foreground, the direction of the camera, serves as an establishing shot and confronts the 
viewer. There are juxtaposing third person perspective shots (in a reverse shot convention) 
accompanying the sequence to a flow, an experience of a transcending fast passage in 
time through space. Then, there is the close-up display of the separating vertical road 
markings in daylight as an allusion or homage to this iconic reference of David Lynch’s Lost 
Highway (1997). The vertical markings on the asphalt are suddenly replaced by a set of 
horizontal markings, further underscoring the voyage’s function of transgression. Through 
diegetic sound, the abrupt halt of the car is signified, which is accompanied by a change of 
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visual perspective displaying the exhaust pipe in detail. The camera tilts upward to frame 
the car and Robin’s head, to reveal the cause of the halt: a human-sized booth with a guard 
and gatekeeper. Affirming the initial viewerly intuition, both the booth and the costume of 
gatekeeper, specifically the baseball hat, include Miramount logos. The guard scans the 
license plate of the car, a bar code indicating 2030 as the year of issue, and confirms 
Robin’s invitation to the Miramount Abrahama Hotel in the so-called ‘restricted animated 
zone’ to be entered. While the guard reminds Robin Wright that the only way that any 
return or exit from the Congress can occur is by way of encountering him again, Robin 
inhales an ampule offered by the guard to then forcefully accelerate the convertible, and 
thereby cross the checkpoint and continue the drive. The first hybrid frame of Figure 
9 that contains the distorted reflection of herself in the rear view mirror follows shortly 
thereafter.  
 The departure sequence of Robin Wright from the conventional narrative 
world into the complete immersion of the Miramount world demonstrates the loss of 
selfhood through the use of hybrid imagery. In the first frame of Figure 9, the pictorial space 
of the ellipsis-shaped rear-view mirror is intruded by a non-fixated image, a fluid and liquid 
animation of Robin Wright. Departing from a realist mirroring function, and mending the 
consistency of Robin’s representation through the intrusion of a new persona, 
here a hallucinatory avatar-like image emerges as a new bearer of Robin’s selfhood. This 
first encounter of another self as herself through the intrusion of animation as a juxtaposing 
visual and material ontology realises a sense of reconfiguration of subjectivity. In a shell 
shock-like othering or queering of perspective and relationality, the gaze of an elsehood 
meets the eye of the viewer, from the point of view of Robin Wright. Through the rear 
view mirror, here the gesture of the look backwards, the look into the distance of the past, 
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becomes a look that has lost its temporal and spatial function of reflecting the stability of 
directionality. The vehicle is used here as a medium, as a vessel to visualise the 
holistic change in relational perspective by its functional and representational bridging of 
selfhood and environment. The circle of representation through this hybrid frame extends 
the function of mirroring to the inclusion of the new animated realm. The intrusion of 
this othering into the sense of self is further extended as, a couple of seconds later, the 
whole environment appears in animation, completing the entrance into the new 
representational realm. Here the imagery presents an amalgam of ontological realms, and a 
new hybrid relationality of environment or space, temporality, and the self. While the 
horizon of the rear view-mirror encapsulates the new sense of relationality in a single frame, 
which extends to the complete environment shortly thereafter, the transportation of 
Robin’s body into the Miramount world signifies the loss of selfhood within the narrative.   
 The second frame of Figure 9 is an animation image that displays the interior of 
the Miramount Congress in which Robin Wright encounters a re-enactment of herself as 
live-action image. After the sequence leading to the Miramount Abrahama is completed in 
an animated hallucinogenic rollercoaster-like ride, Robin finds herself in the theme park like 
insular landscape in which the Congress is staged. Upon arrival with the former car on the 
island landscape embedded in what resembles a layer of clouds, Robin leaves the 
vehicle, which now in animation transformed into a boat, and enters the Congress 
environment from the driveway. Upon entrance to the Miramount Alhambra hotel in an 
over the shoulder animated shot, the Congress is revealed to take place in an elliptically 
shaped ground floor lobby of a Las Vegas-style hotel. In this recreational lounge 
environment animated human-like figures in festive attire appear to entertain themselves 
through conversation throughout the environment, catered to with drinks by miniature 
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half-human sized android-like butler figures. Robin’s gaze and with it the camera casually 
follows the stroll of one male animated figure that catches her attention, and after her face 
is displayed in a close-up as animated image, this figure completely transforms its 
appearance, while another second figure is then undergoing the same transformation.  
 In the establishing shot, the Congress space initially appears endless and without a 
demarcated horizon, but the camera angles following Robin’s stroll reveal that all ends of 
the lobby environment have storefronts, like in a shopping mall environment. The upper 
floors of the elliptical tower seen from the lobby above appear to be cabins or rooms, 
suggested by the portholes, separated however, by a strip of screens or projections on 
which moving images appear, which reveal to include imagery of Robin Wright. Within the 
lobby environment other TV-like hanging screens with the same imagery like the wall 
projections numerously and continuously flank the lobby on various heights along the red 
carpet on which Robin proceeds her flânerie further into the interior of the space. 
The camera then follows Robin’s gaze and the second frame of Figure 9 appears, in which 
Robin Wright is seen on screen in a live-action performance as heroine who holds a 
stick that emits lightning or electricity, stamped by a red “R” marking the screen.  
 The encounter of Robin Wright with the display of another screened Miramount 
studio version of herself in the second frame of Figure 9 presents the first re-collected 
display of Robin Wright’s self, as collected through the Light Stage sequence. In the earlier 
first frame of Figure 9, the rear-view mirror image displays the liquidisation of a stable 
selfhood. In this second frame of Figure 9, the encounter of Robin Wright with Robin 
Wright on the multiple screens in the Congress environment does not only present a 
mirror image of herself in othered form. Further than that, the imagery that Robin 
confronts in the frame at hand, and moreover in the sequence, in multiple instances on the 
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various screens, is both an ecstatic and an extracted image of herself. The clip-like imagery 
is taken or rather reproduced from the Light Stage collection of herself, and in excess of a 
static or re-mirroring perspective of this collection, while also extracting and sculpting her 
self into the screened heroine. The reproduction of an image of herself is here produced on 
the basis of an image of herself. The imagery is a derivate of herself, it is a detached 
presentation of herself, it is an impossible image of herself, an artificially constructed 
temporally uncertain and destabilising image, as it holds no reference to having a root in a 
recording or a capturing of what is seen as photographic image. Rather the image and clip-
like sequence on the screens are here an algorithmic assemblage conceived, formed, and 
sculpted, indeed extracted out of the data archive, the inventory of selfhood collected in the 
Light Stage.  
 The previous narrative display, the making-of of the collection of a situational 
collected self in the Light Stage sequence is here brought to a display of its product, its 
commodity. The self of Robin displayed here is an image of likeness and aliveness of Robin 
through the staged re-enactment of acting rooted not in the event and occurrence of acting 
but unbound of the spatio-temporal singularity and uniqueness thereof. Acting which 
previously required per common definition the labour and indeed the enactment of acting is 
disentangled from its means of production, it is as a set of imagery disassembled of its 
defining facticity: as a visual display of the interest of the capital of the commodity of 
selfhood acting appears as enactment of the simulation of acting, by virtue of the 
potentiality of the archive.   
 Robin Wright continues to be exposed to presentations of herself, throughout the 
narrative of The Congress and the continuation of the narrative loss of selfhood. The 
animated Miramount world includes the presence of oneself within the perceived reality, as 
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the augmented reality in which Robin finds herself includes reproduced visual imagery and 
figures that resemble herself. This means that she appears in other films-within-the-film 
within the Congress’ environment: such as a re-enactment of the iconic bomb ride of 
Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove (1964), including Robin Wright riding the bomb in black 
and white imagery. The confrontation of the viewer with the loss of temporal certainty in a 
spatially uncertain environment, and the anxiety induced through the loss of demarcations 
between self and other is balanced in the narrative by the quest for love and escape out of 
this situation for Robin Wright. The loss of selfhood continues as a voyage throughout 
multiple layers of dream-like animated environments in the film, which moves from 
the entanglement of Robin into the show of mass leadership figures in a stadium-like 
environment, to a cruise in a garden of Eden-styled landscape, eventually to a bar, through 
which the animated Miramount world is exited by Robin. Thereby, Robin’s frame of view 
re-emerges into a realist cinematic live-action image by virtue of swallowing a pill and 
passing the gatekeeper (known from the first frame of Figure 9), who re-emerges within the 
animated Miramount world in this sequence as a barkeeper. In a sudden fading-out of 
animation into live-action in a POV shot of Robin’s perspective, the imagery of the frame 
completely transsubstantiates in a slow movement from one ontological quality to 
the other: animated faces transform into photographed ones. The animation image as 
harbour of a virtual reality transforms back into a reality of human vision within the realm 
of the photographable, the carnival-like masquerade wall of faces fades into a viewpoint of 
gazing upon the displayed misery of the masses. However, re-entering this seemingly old 
narrative world further unveils a sequence in which a dystopian or post-apocalyptic ruin-like 
landscape is encountered, in which humans are gathered in public spaces in groups in that 
resemble crowds of refugee-like masses, humans extracted of their livelihood.   
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 In the third frame of Figure 9, Robin re-appears and re-emerges in a spatio-temporal 
realm that is seemingly in continuation of the previously exited live-action realm, in which 
however the order of the old world is reconfigured. While the live-action frame suggests a 
continuation within a realist experience of the narrative, the sequence here unfolds with a 
sense of afterness towards the realist world and time that was previously veiled through the 
narrative within the animated world. The experience of selfhood is brought back to the 
subjectivity of reality, as experience in relation to a fully owned conception of selfhood in 
the encounter of the experience of the narrative universe, suggesting an experience of life 
and aliveness for the viewer. This continuation of the earlier live-action world in which the 
film has begun, takes place after the Light Stage sequence, incorporating an experience of 
afterness towards the commercial collection of the selfhood of Robin Wright. The third 
frame of Figure 9 displays the interconnection of the animated narrative environment and 
the non-animated environment, and the non-animated remainder of the live-action world, 
which however, is embedded in the overall structure of control over the 
narrative. While the transformation of selfhood was presented in the animated experience 
of the Miramount world, through the sequence at hand the Miramount Corporation is 
also portrayed as principal ruler of the live-action world. 
 In the sequence Robin enters an airport area, on the grounds of a round-shaped 
terminal building, to which through a Montgolfier-like line Robin is transported to the 
inside of a Zeppelin, to re-encounter the Miramount world through the operators of the 
Miramount universe, who surveil their creation from the elegant interiority of the Zeppelin 
that flies over the material live-action world. As the Miramount studio appears as principal 
elitist circle of totalitarian governance through enactments of embodied power, the 
structural power of worldbuilding appears to be within the haywire hands of the Miramount 
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Corporation. A narrative temporal loop is suggested here to the earlier narrative exposition 
of the film through the reuse of principally live-action imagery. This renewed filmic 
exposition confronts Robin and the viewer with the full consequences of the Miramount 
world and its rule, their governed regime of the material world. The ruling class is portrayed 
as evacuated from the earthly terrain by virtue of the Zeppelin, which floats unbound of the 
forces of the ground-floor human lost existences Robin has previously encountered in 
despair. The encounter with the medical doctor in the sequence, known from the beginning 
of the film, serves to further strengthen the display of Robin Wright as lost self. Robin as 
lost self is both in dispossession of herself, and without a memory of an experience of 
pastness as an experience of herself, remaining instead indeed lost, as Robin forcefully re-
enters the Miramount animated world, towards the ending of the film.   
 As an overall model, the three different frames and sequences of Figure 9 help to 
problematise the temporal dimension of vertical loss of the self, with respect to the 
collection of the self in the Light Stage sequence. The multiple encounter with oneself 
within the animated Miramount world, and the experience of the transformation of the 
narrative reality as additionally also controlled by the Miramount studio, propose the loss of 
a consistent sense of selfhood that can be conceived of as autonomous. Instead, the 
principal force of relationality of the self is towards the new temporal horizon of time in the 
past, the initial point of collection of selfhood through which the reconfiguration of the self 
as lost is initiated. To thus come back to an overall analysis of the narrative of The Congress, 
in the epistemic scene of sequences following the Light Stage, it appears that the narrative is 
structured and controlled as dream-like experience of a mirror world or realm by the 
Miramount studio. The narrative world of The Congress is owned and managed by the studio 
of Miramount, the experience of the relationship towards selfhood is shaped by the 
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influence of production of selves within the experience within this reality. It appears that 
this narrative world is an aesthetic-ontological platform, or studio, projection, or place of 
excess, containing reproductions, forms of mirroring of oneself, through the production 
of reproductions of Robin Wright. This excess is the obscenity of the reproductions of 
Robin Wright’s selves, anew and let loose from the authentic subjective experience through 
which such a display would occur without the collection of selfhood as its origin.  
 The self-displays of Robin Wright testify to the viewer a co-existence of different 
times of the self in one continuous narrative real time. This is a representational 
arrangement of selfhood in what I term a “plasticity of the now”, vertical extensions of the 
now in bifurcating narrative realms. In this narcissistic mirror-world, controlled and 
induced by the Miramount world, Robin Wright’s sense of selfhood is lost. The experienced 
reality contains as objects, reminiscent of an encounter of mirroring, representations of 
herself, which are not of her proper self, which are outside of Robin’s embodied memory –
 yet a part of the objective narrative reality. In all that can be aesthetically experienced in 
this narrative world, there is always the encounter with oneself as a form of 
mirroring of elsehood.   
 The close reading and examination of both the Light Stage sequence, and the 
following set of sequences of the Miramount world shows the complications of the 
presentation of selfhood in The Congress. In comparison to the previously discussed visual 
material of this study, the narrative of The Congress incorporates the figure of the mirror into 
the durational exposition of the film, as a medium and technology of collection. The 
afterness of the experience of mirroring selfhood, together with the encounter of oneself in 
a narrative world in which the self is objectified as commodity becomes one of the main 
narrative elements of the film. I am hereby moving to an overall interpretation of the 
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ontology and status of the imagery of the film, and the status of selfhood within the 
reconfigurations of subjectivity as experienced within the narrative. While there has been 
already extensive attention paid to the interpretation of the film, I draw an overall critical 
conclusion from The Congress in my engagement with both epistemic sequences that are 
within a broader interpretational paradigm of representational and cultural studies. I argue 
that The Congress problematises the conception of selfhood as autonomous by the narrative 
experience of a loss of selfhood through the collection of the self, and the subsequent 
experience of its recollections. I intervene into a reductionist dismissal of The Congress as a 
confusingly ‘weird’ (Dargis 2014b), or ‘existential fog’ film (Lumenick 2014), by proposing 
that the film inhabits and makes visible for the viewer a complicated relational ontology of 
the image, which arises through the durational relationality towards the collection of an 
image of oneself. Thus, both the relationality of selfhood, and the relationality of 
the ontology of the image are interpreted here from a temporal and durational perspective 
concerning the implications of viewerly engagement therewith.   
 There is a loss in the excess of the encounter of the mirror through the self. This is 
the overall aesthetic presentation of a representational episteme of the neurological age of 
the self. In other words, the existence of the self as self-ruin produces an experience of loss 
of selfhood, through the death of autonomy over a sense of selfhood in the encounter with 
the self in self-recollections. Analogously to the contemporary neoliberal desire to become a 
social-medium, or to become a commodity (fulfilled through self-presentation platforms 
such as Facebook, Instagram, and others), the collection of the self of Robin Wright 
relocates her display into a product. While Robin is authentically experiencing herself, the 
autonomy over the act of appearing mirrored has vanished, through the production of 
herself as commodity. The appearance of the mirror within the landscape of subjective 
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experience in The Congress leads to the construction of the narrative world as a realm in 
which the experience of differentiation between subjectivity and objectivity of selfhood 
becomes problematised. Analysing the temporal ontology of the internet, and the 
relationality of the internet user, cultural critic Rob Horning argues in ‘The Silence of the 
Masses could be Social Media’ that this state of the self is ‘post-authenticity’ (2016: 
61). Through the stage of the self that Robin Wright enters in the Miramount world, a 
comparable form of the post-authentic display of the self unfolds. My interpretation of this 
in critical terms suggests the film as an exploration of the idea of the loss of the self in 
complete re-collection as a medium thereof. Although this temporal archival process of the 
recording of the self appears like a trace, it is actually a selfless re-collection of the archive 
of data. The viewer is lost in a narrative extensive presentation yet looping enumerative 
now-encirclements of Robin Wright’s self-displays. Miramount is the institution of this 
projected world to which the profit, emotional and ontological, of the viewer’s attention to 
the now, goes: the viewer is lost in Miramount. 
 What I term “loss of the self” occurs for Robin Wright, which the viewer 
experiences. The viewer acts as a relational form of passerby towards this narrative 
exposure of selfhood, within the viewer’s sense of reality and self. The experience 
of The Congress as a film is a pleasurable series of brisures, ontologically binary, differential 
corruptions of stability, movements of dislocations of the self. The self of Robin Wright is 
lost, in the properly endlessly unfinished constructions of itself in the experience of a sense 
of plasticity of the now, in which the self as medium can be principally encountered over 
and over again, without a sense of belonging. This is what I term, after Horning, the 
neoliberal human condition ‘post-authenticity’, the loss of selfhood (2016: 61). While the 
self appears in its photographic qualities, the self that is left outside the photographic 
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collection points to the remaining autonomous self to be found within the realm of 
the unphotographable. As Horning explains for the broader collection of selfhood 
through the usage of internet-based media, ‘[s]urveillance and quantification produce the 
self as a set of statistics, a manipulatable data object’ (61). While the manipulations of a 
recorded and collected self are requirements for the presentation of the non-authentic self, 
as experienced in The Congress, the conception of the autonomous self thus remains within 
the realm of the unquantifiable. Further, according to Horning, ‘the idea of an “authentic” 
self that precedes algorithmic modeling disappears’, as the act of recording, quantification, 
and tracing appears at the core of the systematic excavation and extraction of selfhood as 
production (61). There is no self found anymore, in the untraceable, in any interiority of 
a selfhood that is not embedded within these exterior relations that move to the forefront 
of any conception of selfhood in the first place. The non-lost self, the self that cannot be 
lost becomes unthinkable in this state of thinking of the relationality of selfhood 
towards the world. This mirroring state of disavowal of the self is paired with what Jean 
Baudrillard considers in The Ecstasy of Communication (2012) the modus operandi of 21st 
century reality, the excess of the self in instantaneous total complete collective 
communication, an experience of a web of interconnected subjective reality. Returning to 
my reading of Horning who incorporates Baudrillard’s ontological turn to the self, for the 
viewer the societal realm has moved from modernity, as presented within The Congress 
through the “old Hollywood”, to a different distinctively non-modern sense and 
experience of temporality. Analogously to the algorithmic bracketing of digital data 
into mathematical Markov chains, the relationality to time is through the apparent chain 
of the self to the now.  
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 My reading however, builds on Horning’s argument, by considering communication 
as the emptying of meaning through the self. This reminds me of the climatic self of the 
group of authors named The Invisible Committee, in the dystopian doomsday sketched as 
the neoliberal today, in which the self as ‘a being without interiority’ is indeed 
conceptualised by ‘its exteriority, by its relations’ (The Invisible Committee 2015: 110). 
However, rather in climate in relationality to exteriority as spatial, the self is in time, in 
relationality towards a temporal and durational experience of selfhood. My interpretation of 
The Congress thus suggests, there are no boundaries, no limits of the self, and there is no core 
of the self. There is only immanence, indeed a Baudrillardian ecstasy of time, as the only 
transcendental pseudo-rational relation for the self. Something is off, somewhat stolen: in 
this liminal state there is no mirror. Indeed, as sketch this awkwardly limping self in a 
liminal state appears to perpetuate the present, a disciplinatory existence. The self is totally 
connected, golden-caged in the spiral shell of excess of communication, and also, to add 
with Baudrillard, as a medium itself, surface, thin, bland, a reflective object of total 
connection: “pure screen” (2012: 30). Through the Congress, indeed, as Horning suggests, 
my reading of the film as scientific-educational cinema points towards the emptying of the 
meaning of the self beyond an illustration of the post-climatic nature of the self. In the 
neurological age, as I suggest here, the self is a data-based medium. Conclusively, my 
reading of The Congress suggests – as an interpretation of a vision of the neoliberal 
21st century and ontological-aesthetical age – there is no “self” whatsoever left, which is 
not ruined and in ruins. Before death, or the complete closure of the dystopian horizon, 
rolling into its ruin, the self-in-loss is encapsulated in a plastic realm of the now. The plastic 
now, “#-life” – read as numerical and hashtag life – is a temporal set of exchange relations 
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self-displayed in time. In #-life, real time contracts. In its accomplished state, the total post-





























Figure 10. Ellar Coltrane as Mason Evans, Jr. in Boyhood.  
 
 
 Boyhood is a 2014 film directed by Richard Linklater with a running time of 165 
minutes. It stars Patricia Arquette, Ellar Coltrane (see Figure 10), Lorelei Linklater, Ethan 
Hawke, and Marco Perella as the central cast. The film was shot in Texas, in the United 
States of America over twelve years. The film is based on an unfinished script of the 
director. The script served as the basis for the filming, in addition to the improvisational 
responding of the actors to the real-life development of Mason (Ellar Coltrane). The film 
was shot on thirty nine shooting days (over a duration of twelve years) with a four-million 
US-Dollar budget (cf. Chang 2014). IFC Productions kept the project in secrecy, due to the 
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unconventional length of the production and the production schedule stretching over 
monthly periods of time (cf. Chang 2014).  As the title Boyhood alludes to, Mason is the 
focus of attention of the film. He has a sister Samantha (Lorelei Linklater), and Olivia 
(Patricia Arquette) is the single stable parent of both children. In the exposition of the film, 
Olivia takes care of both Samantha and Mason by herself. Mason Senior (Ethan Hawke), 
the non-nourishing father, makes an unexpected appearance and takes the children bowling, 
and throughout the film re-establishes a relationship to Mason and Samantha. The main 
running time frames Mason in his upbringing around Olivia’s family constellations, that 
move from a marriage with Bill (Marco Perella), a former professor, to a relationship with 
Jim (Brad Hawkins), a former student. The ending sequences of the film display Mason’s 
transition from childhood and puberty into adolescence, in the surroundings of entering 
University. The drama of the film arises out of the experiences of everyday life. The human 
condition is explored through the film by the conflicts of intentions, luck, and the role of 
the passage of time in ageing. The accelerated stream of events, the growing up of a boy, 
results in the obvious: Olivia, one more time, is left alone by a male – this time not a boy 
and not yet a man.   
 With my analysis of Richard Linklater’s Boyhood, I return to the core interpretation 
of the collection of the self. I offer a second arrangement of collection, in my argument to 
follow. As conceived of in the introduction of this section, The Cinematic Self, the 
specificities of time and space frame my reading. This spatio-temporal reading is suggested 
as one of the most overarching senses of the term collection for an analysis of selfhood in 
contemporary cinema. However, while The Congress serves as the first pillar of my 
interpretation of the collection of the self, this reading will be balanced through my second 
suggested interpretation of the term collection. The second collection that I present in the 
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following is of a fundamentally changed spatio-temporal arrangement. Via my previous 
engagement in Section I, I relate the treatment of time in Boyhood to the bracketing of time 
and temporality more broadly. This, however, not only redefines the possibility in which 
collection relates to a self theoretically, but also implies conclusive suggestions for a broader 
meaning of the treatment of selfhood and interpretation of the relationship of temporality 
to selfhood. To summarise this comparatively: The Congress uses the fixation of Robin 
Wright for the production of an archive into the future, while Boyhood uses an archive of the 
past for the presentation of itself. The use of archive with respect to both past and present 
points towards the crucial role of this terminology in this comparative analysis of Boyhood in 
the frame of my analysis.   
 The fixated image, the iconising of the self in a moment, in a specific self in time 
and space, is further deconstructively interpreted here. In addition to this, the collection of 
selfhood occurs not only in time, but also over time. The first section Towards a Theory of the 
Cinematic Self analysed the temporal dynamics of stilled live images, or still life 
images through my reading of Self in the Mirror and Las Meninas. In these dynamics the 
viewer constructs their presentation of selfhood in the temporal dynamics of the 
representational arrangement, through fixation and suspension. However, with Boyhood the 
sense of the moment in time and space moves further to a durational realm, with short 
home-video style rewinding tapes, yet professional cinematic pieces of durational works. In 
my understanding, a classical Bazinian realist ontology of the photographic image is 
complicated here (Bazin 1967, Bazin 1971). The image, through presentation in time and 
instantaneous cuts of afterness into the forwarding in time in Boyhood, extends into another 
durational plastic sphere. Building on my earlier reading of Cornered, the film presents a self 
in re-collections, confronting the viewer in “video bits”, and confronting itself. The film 
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constitutes a presentation of Mason, a self collecting itself through its proper constitution 
of itself, as an unfolding and accumulation of time, as a presentation of an account of time, 
in video-like snippets of itself, in temporal suspension of itself. Further, in my argument 
concerning the collection of selfhood in Boyhood, the film Boyhood is “a self” as a film, an 
object, a medium, a cinema of the self, and thus, indeed, a “selfie film”. The term selfie film 
aims to link the notion of the selfie as defined by the OED as ‘a photograph that one has 
taken of oneself’ with the notion of film as mediation of directorial perspective and the 
aesthetics of a durational stream. Non-paradoxically Boyhood epitomises the capability of the 
collection of selfhood in a durational photographic stream of oneself through the aesthetics 
of directorial cinema. To suggest this treatment of the self of Boyhood, I analyse the spatio-
temporal arrangements of the film with a focus on the aesthetic-ontological depth and 
simultaneous groundlessness of the self.   
 Following the section Towards a Theory of the Cinematic Self, I continue the argument 
with a focus on the notion of time as duration. Like in the earlier analysis of The Congress, 
the focus is on the relationship of recording and selfhood, and the medium of film. With 
Boyhood, further complications arise with respect to the visual presentation of selfhood, 
through the employment of time in the film. The relationships of past, present time or now, 
and future, in different fragmented temporal images relate time to one another in 
cinematically unprecedented ways. Compared to other childhood-focused films, such as 
François Truffaut’s début The 400 Blows (1959), Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s The Time to Live and the 
Time to Die (1985), or Linklater’s own Dazed and Confused (1993), Boyhood radically rethinks 
the employment of time as duration in cinema. In Boyhood, there is an unequivocal sense of 
presence in the now, a plasticity.  
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 In my aesthetic-ontological analysis, the film’s radical narrative endeavour in realism 
points towards the function of this cinema of the self, as a form of mirror. For the viewer 
questions arise, intuitively, out of this suggested narrative culture, the temporal culture of 
the film: What is being presented here, in this film? What form of realist image does Boyhood 
present? Why is time passing by, so fast and so slow, at the same time? Why do most 
cinematographic arrangements in film revolve around a boy? What is this self of the boy 
Mason we experience, we are strangely mis en scène as a viewer by observing and encircling 
the intimate presentation of his self? Other questions arise, through the editing. What forms 
of difference, suspension, and concepts of before and afterness are seen? What is the 
process of bracketing of time of the film? What relationships to duration are suggested by 
the employment of time by the film? Further to the questions concerning the aspects of 
storytelling, I postulate there is a mirror implied in Boyhood through the relationship of the 
self to time: in its collection. On the one hand, the self is collected, and vanishes, over and 
over again. It somehow melts into short spheres of selfhood, beyond the classical neo-
realist use of time in unison with space and purpose. There is some magic in the narrative 
of a childhood following the progression out of it. The viewer confronts an endless 
epistemic scene. On the other hand, through this cinematic experiment a collection of a self 
in Boyhood is suggested in the representation of the past as cinematically happening in the 
now of both the world on screen and the viewing experience. It is in this reflowing of time 
as duration in which the force of embalmment in Boyhood, as an epistemic scene of this film, 
serves to continuously embalm: to produce a self.  
 The mirror of the self finds its continuous embalming in The Cinematic Self via  
Boyhood through the unfolding of the self of Mason over time. With Boyhood, my discussion 
moves from a momentary fixation in time, and an epistemological scene of a total fixation 
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of a self and collection in The Congress, to a continuous process of embalming. However, 
this process of sculpting of time or embalming is itself the product of particular moments 
and epistemological scenes of self-formation. Boyhood continuously uses the fixation of the 
moment within scenes as a form of brise vue, continuous momentary scenes of 
confrontations of selfhood, and these individual scenes in turn embalm selfhood as a 
durational process.  While Mason is presented through schooling, play, and interaction to 
family and friends, concrete details of these relations change: lying on the lawn becomes 
playing Gameboy, which becomes playing with a Macbook laptop, which then becomes 
playing with an iPhone. These relations are explored through the particular use of 
durational time in the film, through the exploration of work and play. With the aesthetics of 
the moment as brise vue (in which Mason for instance interacts with the Gameboy, 
Macbook, and iPhone), the brisure fixates itself into a form of collection, as the 
communication of the network of the durational relations, of the summation of all 
individual scenes. This means that all differences in time are located, or temporised, and in 
summation a collection of time. The temporal horizon continuously alters anew, as the 
brisure as joint-in-time confronts itself with the brise vue as break-in-time, with the concrete 
individual flickers of scenes blocking off the overall durational relations in time, which then 
further unfold through the real time of the film. While Mason’s horizon expands 
continuously through personal growth of reaching milestones of adolescence, for the 
viewer the horizons of the respective scenes or known phases of adolescence – and indeed 
the durational experience of time – are continuously redrawn. Boyhood presents selfhood as 
the exposition of “milestone moments” – ordinary yet formative relational experiences of 
subjectivisation – brackets of fragmented fixations of identification.  
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 Milestone moments serve as anchors of the experience of relationality of the self 
towards the world. While the formative moments of boyhood appear highly personal, they 
are at the same time somewhat universal. The legibility of the series of events of the film is 
achieved through the use of American culture, the common popular culture of the late 20th 
and early 21st century as hegemonic dominant culture, to which the viewer can relate. The 
viewer of Boyhood easily (and perhaps involuntarily) remembers the global commercial pop 
culture dominated by American celebrities, such as Britney Spears, which appear as 
referential subjects and markers of time within the film. The film achieves in moments, 
such as Mason being woken up by Samantha singing ‘Oops!…I did it again’ an opening, a 
touch of relationality to the materiality of time as experience of selfhood. Strangely, this 
relationality works on the local or Texan state level, the American national level, and the 
hegemonic Western and global level. This iconisation of the passage of culture is here 
epitomised through the focus on the self-formatting time, or self-formative time of 
adolescence. In adolescence events are somewhat naturally hyphenated and exciting, as they 
happen for the first time and provide a signature, an influence, a path for the self. This is 
emphasised in the film by the emergence of Mason’s sexual identity and the presentation of 
dating culture through his relationship to Sheena (Zoe Graham).  
 Whereas I defined through Las Meninas the viewer through the mirror as epistemic 
scene of representation, Boyhood complicates this form of mirroring. The viewer is offered a 
continuous, complicated passage of time and the over-the-shoulder perspective of a 
“lifetime” of boyhood. The exposition of the self here is achieved through the congruence 
of the self of Mason and Ellar Coltrane: chiefly due to the parallel duration of Mason’s and 
Ellar Coltrane’s boyhoods and similar life paths. In the film, there is a continuous re-
drawing of the borderlines of fixations of the pluralising and continuations of brise vues. For 
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instance, the graduation from high school is presented through the social ritual of a party, 
and with it a new frame, view, or vue of horizon is introduced for the viewer. Also, the 
mirroring force of moments continues, through the editing in some rupture, and breaks, as 
milestone moments seamlessly melt into the next moment: after the graduation party from 
high school, the move to college follows.   
 Boyhood’s narrative is not the presentation of a dislocation of the self, no self-
doubling either, but an endless rolling production of a self. Boyhood is a flow of brackets of 
time, collecting over time, as a cinematic form forming a long take: twelve years of boyhood 
and twelve years of making of the film shaped into watching 165 minutes. The film is an 
epistemological long take and the durational experiment of a rewound tape recording of a 
singular unfolding self over the course of a boyish adolescence. This is a photo-album-like 
past, a personal past of the private realm. There is a sense of orientation, rather than a loss, 
suggested for the viewer into this redrawing, recollecting, that is nevertheless, through the 
use of temporal cuts of time, moving into the future. This recollection of the past that rolls 
into the future, however, focuses on one singular identity and self, namely Mason’s, and 
collects through the multiplicity of the presentation of itself. The selves of Mason that are 
seen in the film are multiple and one, non-paradoxically non-identiarian yet identitarian: in 
difference, identity, suspension, and fixation to time. I thus propose Boyhood as a film offers 
a transitional space of the collection of selfhood, as it offers no actual and singular space of 
transition to be localised, but only time itself as transition in time and space, collected 
through the flow of fixations of time over time.  
 The transition of time is spread over the whole film. There is no Light Stage-like 
collection, no collected archive to be drawn from, but the film itself is the archival playback 
of a remix, and an edit of a collection of time. The Best-Of production of a self, an edited 
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version, as a document of twelve years and yet essay of twelve years, a narrative as curated 
collectors edit – indeed a director’s cut – is presented as a film. There is a certain involution 
or inversion of the previously analysed arrangement of collection: whereas The Congress uses 
one image – or one sequential series of images – to produce an endless flickering of the self 
in the future, Boyhood uses all flickering images of itself to edit, produce, and collect a 
singular self over time.  
 I also understand Boyhood as philosophical inquiry into the lifetime of adolescence 
through everyday-life in historical time. The film is the collection of the self: the account 
of a boyhood. The film, as a function of this editing is a documenting collection of a self, a 
collection of directorial choices. Boyhood is a making-of of the experimental collection of the 
self, while also being a realist narrative tale of a boy growing up. The viewer here is a tourist 
of twelve years of lifetime. The self of Mason is in a continuous recording, unfolding, and 
suspension, while the film is the video-tape-like record thereof, a cinema of this self. 
However, thinking about the editing more expansively: there are numerous temporal cuts or 
edits, over the twelve years, as time goes on within the feature-length film of thirty-nine 
recording days. The recorded time is a “plastic project” of the film as an essay to sculpt a 
self. The use of plastic project refers to the film as an experiment in plastic arts, rather than 
suggesting the dubious physicality of a malleable material. The project, the directorial 
ambition is clearly indicated through the title of the film, and the linearity of the unfolding 
of the plot. The plasticity is temporal. Rather than unfolding as panoramic plasticity, as 
suggested in my reading of The Congress, the plasticity is in contemporaneity. The brackets of 
the cinematic narrative suggest the plasticity of this contemporaneous “porous plasticity”. 
Most of the events, rituals, and moments in Boyhood the viewer (and also otherly gendered 
viewer) has experienced – or can imaginatively relate to. Porosity is relational.   
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 Time is relationally porous, as the sequences and scenes are edited in a process that 
resembles them melting into one another. This experience of a manufactured porous time 
sculpts the running time of the film into a plastic, while this plastic as a figure forms and 
indeed sculpts the self of Mason. Mason’s self is subject to time, and time as durational 
experience in Boyhood is presented as gravitational or inescapable force. As indicated earlier, 
many experiences of the film are down-to-earth trivialities: the world as backdrop is 
characterised by the emissions of pop culture through media, the formations and 
reformations of family groups, and the various stages of schooling. This porous plasticity of 
time, this particular relationality suggests a sense of a mirroring cut through a prototypical 
human condition during the historical time of the film. Most of the events are globally 
understood (if not personally experienced) Augenblicke, moments embedded in news, and 
cultural references, refreshing a sense of self for the viewer in the viewer’s personal 
memory. Figure 10 is an image (not taken from the film itself) that to a certain extent 
does justice to the overall film by consisting of a photographic album-like grid of Boyhood 
that presents eight different frames of view or portraits, as a collection or catalogue of 
Mason’s self or selves. As seen through the spacings of time in this grid-like image, the cuts 
of time, Mason inevitably grows up and grows into adolescence. Figure 10 exemplifies 
the simplicity and complexity of the film in a single documentary-style shot, as it displays 
the sameness and difference of the body of Mason in this catalogue-like display. Indeed, in 
the film, there is clear cinematographic focus on the growing-up of the body, established 
from the first shot of the film onwards (which also serves as one of the main 
promotional posters of the film), in which Mason’s face is framed in a high-angle close-up 
looking up towards the cloudy blue sky, while the camera zooms out and reveals Mason as 
lying in the grass of his elementary school. The mise-en-scène complements this focus on 
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the self by the increasing plasticity of the porous body and mind through a dramatic exposé 
and exposition of a self, collected in an ever-growing world of complexity. The self of 
Mason is collected in repetitions, and differences, while itself as a self – ‘Mason’ as a 
character in the film – attempts to locate and produce a self within this process of 
becoming and adolescence.   
 The self of Mason is excavated in drama through the porosity of time. The editing 
of the film consists of interstices of temporal brackets, concrete individual horizons that 
merge into one another, through the use of editing. Consider the use of night and day in the 
exposition of the film: Mason goes to bed in the temporal bracket alpha (the first of thirty-
nine shooting days), and after a cut, wakes up in the temporal bracket beta (the second of 
thirty-nine shooting days). The passage of time occurring through the human daytime and 
night-time cycle, and the connecting narrative tissue of sleep as bridge of time, is amplified 
in its temporal effect in the film here, by the insertion of an extended duration of time into 
the perceived divisional effect of day and night. To continue the previous example of the 
passage of time, another prominent example of the porosity of time is the use of cars in the 
Texan everyday life experience. Olivia drives a car in the temporal bracket gamma, while 
after a cut and the subsequent arrival at the destination of the move, the narrative continues 
to take place in the temporal bracket delta.  
 Mason’s display, the display of his self in the film is a signature of time. The 
signature of time, on the other hand, produces the effect of Mason being seen in difference 
to his earlier display as a function of time. The porosity achieved through the described 
form of editing effectuates a radically hyphenated display of time. Time in the individual 
temporal brackets of the film is not self-contained, and although occurrences take place in 
an individual time in relation to the establishment of the situation, oftentimes this 
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occurs due to the past of another temporal bracket influencing the now of the current 
temporal bracket - such as in the earlier examples. Time is oozing, leaking, seeping from 
one sequence into another, and achieving a sense of a fluid non-fixated identity of 
Mason. In every temporal bracket of each shooting day anew, the viewer is in a process of 
captivating afterness of the preceding temporal bracket, in a chase of time, apprehending 
the cuts into new times retroactively as they have occurred already, yet are still happening in 
the now of the respective bracket. The cuts technically skip and jump large amounts of 
time, yet harmonically reorient the viewer through the swift Fellini-like temporal mending 
and charging of the plot (such as in Fellini’s 1963 film 8 ½), elegantly moving from one 
temporal bracket and environment into another.    
 A sense of magical realism of this cinema of the self stems from this porous 
plasticity of time, and the collection of the self in this nevertheless extending durational 
passage of plasticity. There is a post-haptocentric focus on the body, which does not 
privilege the exclusively sensuous realm of the figure of touch, even if this might be 
suggested by the materiality of surface and skin through the terminology of porous. Instead 
the film presents a plasticity of time, an iconised now in the process of continuous spiral 
shelling in suspension (rather than accomplishment) of a fixation of the body of Mason. 
This non-fixating exposition of a self, in its passage-like presentation, is a mirroring, 
relational invitation towards the viewer’s own self and past, and the sense in which the 
pastness haunts the viewer’s sense of self. Particularly for the millennial viewer, whose 
autobiography is closely aligned to Mason’s, the sense of self is an archived curriculum 
vitae, a film, an object, a DVD.  
 As it appears through the experience of watching Boyhood, the self is displayed as a 
collection, an edit of the archive of real memories of one’s existence, pulled together onto a 
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collecting timeline of events. Through the use of collective cultural and historical memories 
Boyhood is, indeed, happening in the viewer’s own millennial past. As a form of a 
compressed travel in time, the soundtrack in tandem with historical events inserts further 
factual atmosphere into the temporal brackets of the film. Through the triggering of 
collective memories, the viewer thereby experiences a relationality to the phenomenon of 
the passage of time in their own life. Mason is presented around snapshots of American 
cultural memorabilia: Volvo 240 station wagons, television sets, 9/11, Obama elections, the 
iPhone, and the College campus, and concludes with Arcade Fire’s song Deep Blue and 
accompanying the credits, the viewer hears ‘and here in my own skin, I can finally begin’. 
Then the film stops, ends, and the viewer just stands up and leaves the cinema, shuts down 
the TV, or closes their Macbook – or lets it all continue. The film discontinues with a sense 
of contemporaneity, yet has just reached a point in time, and no end. There is a passage in 
this process of a travel, a tour of a self – which continues to grow, as Mason and Ellar 
Coltrane’s body continues to grow, after the film ends, in another now. A sense of passage 
evolves for the viewer, of a relationality to a self, and to time, to memory, and to the archive 
of the self as collection.    
 
 
Chapter 10: Collecting Crystallisation – Mason’s Self in 
Temporal Relations  
 
 
The collection of self is a form of crystallisation, of images, and sequences, and scenes into 
a film. From the isolation of one image, to the meaning of a sequence, to the meaning of 
the film as a whole, intuitively, Boyhood exemplifies the property of time as a quality of the 
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cinematic image. In its most basic, often overlooked property, the ontology of the 
photographic image, famously after André Bazin, is temporal. Reminded here of my 
discussion of realism in Self in the Mirror and Las Meninas, I extend the observation to the 
cinematic image. As developed in the section Towards a Theory of the Cinematic Self, 
photographic realism is a temporally defined ontology. Informing my argument with 
respect to the relationship of time and the image, in 1958 Bazin famously asks the 
ontological question ‘What is Cinema?’ in deeply ingrained temporal terms. I am thus 
following this lead, and looking at the collection of the self in the collection of time, by a 
suggestive closer reading of time as durational, and the aesthetic-ontological 
pictorial properties of time in Boyhood. This technique of the self as collection in Boyhood is 
thereby demonstrated in this chapter in three steps. First, as already anticipated, I analyse 
the unique treatment of temporality in the film through a reading of Bazin. Second, I 
provide two direct examples from the film as isolated epistemic scenes in which an 
additional layer of materiality of time is present through the plot of the film. Third, I 
conclude by means of a further interpretation of Bazin and the relationship of temporality 
to realism and suggest implications of Boyhood concerning cinematic forms of storytelling 
more broadly.  
 Bazin writes in the classic essay ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’ on the 
relationship of ontology to time in the photographic and cinematic image (in Bazin 
1967). Central to this question is the passage of time and the concept of collecting, or 
recollecting time – put differently, understanding time as durational. Bazin argues cinema is 
the answer to a human desire, a desire to collect what I term a self, and this desire of 
cinema answers to what he terms the mummification complex. He writes (1967:9): 
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 If the plastic arts were put under psychoanalysis, the practice of embalming the dead might 
 turn out to be a fundamental factor in their creation. The process might reveal that at the 
 origin of painting and sculpture there lies a mummy complex. The religion of ancient 
 Egypt, aimed against death, saw survival as depending on the continued existence of the 
 corporeal body. Thus, by providing a defense against the passage of time it satisfied a basic 
 psychological need in man, for death is but the victory of time. 
 
Bazin considers the role of embaling of the dead into icons, a genesis of selfhood, by a 
reading of the self in plastic and temporal, durational terms. Paradoxically, the viewer 
encounters a self, in what is not a fixation, but essentially a suspension in time, an 
“embalmment” in durational terms. The image offers, as does my reading of Bazin, a 
collection of a singular self in time, encapsulated, like in ancient Egypt, in a monumental 
account of a self in time in the appearance of the pictorial image.  
 To recollect my earlier reading of Cornered, indeed like Cornered this poses questions 
of this ontological encounter of what is not alive, yet is somewhat a self. The 
mummification complex, according to Bazin, is the mechanism of coping with this 
human desire, of the production of objects, of communicative structures – of what I earlier 
in Section I termed cinematic selves. Further, Bazin’s strange yet conclusive statement, ‘[t]o 
preserve, artificially, his [or her] bodily appearance is to snatch it from the flow of time, to 
stow it away neatly, so to speak, in the hold of life’ is interesting within this context (1967: 
9). The use of ‘charnelles’ in French (for bodily) is evocative of the carnal structure of the 
cinematic encounter earlier developed after Barthes (1981:10). Here, however, 
Bazin concretely thematises the temporal dimension of the experience of film, by the use of 
flow and duration. There is in Boyhood, I argue, a fixation, an odd unity of an image 
of durational time. As earlier suggested through my reading of Figure 10, the images of time 
 140 
that the film consists of are in and of a specific and unique time, yet the images 
are embedded in the spiral shelling environment of a film, endlessly ageing within the 
framing limitations of the running time of the film. The term mummification, as suggested 
by Bazin, intuitively invites me here to think about the relationship of the image to the self. 
The image, in my reading of Bazin, is the presentation of a self. In Boyhood this is a complex 
process, a presentation of a self in crystallisation.  
 Accepting Bazin’s classification of film into the plastic arts, I argue that Boyhood, as a 
magical form of realism, presents what he calls a ‘flow of time’ through the presentation of 
a self (1967: 9). The use of the archive of time, of a self, in terms of collection is asked 
through the film differently than in The Congress. In contrast to the Light Stage copy of Robin 
Wright, and the copying sequence of Robin Wright in The Congress, the viewer here 
confronts a self in continuous crystallisations. An embalmment of a self through and with 
and over time, is the gestural suggestion of the film to collect a self. This flow of time is the 
film as a series of sequences of a boyhood, in its summation an abstract figure, an episteme 
of a film as cinematic long take, yet somewhat strangely cutting in time sequentially. Boyhood 
suggests a realism of a plasticity, a stretch, a tape-like quality of an extended “now” in its 
long-take-like sequentiality. The indexicality of the image is temporally fixated, anchored in 
the presentation and preservation of the self, as the function, the apprehension of time in 
its pictorial collection. This phenomenon of an archival indexicality of the film, rather than 
indexicality of an individual image alone, arises from the employment of time as a temporal 
ontology in this technique of the self. The presentation of Mason is achieved by 
Barthesian umbilical cordings, iconising images, a continuous spiral shelling of a self: indeed 
a collection as a crystallisation. Thinking again of the temporal bracketing and the examples 
of the exposition of the film suggested earlier, this dynamic of temporality is achieved 
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by flows of time into another time, achieving this sense of crystallisation. Yet, there is a 
non-fixating sense of continuous spontaneous evolvement in this flow of fixed points in 
time into a temporal experience of holistic unity in the compressed account of a self over 
the running time of the film. I see in Boyhood a continuous form of non-
singular embalmments, of reoccurring, and thus pluralising mummifications that crystallise 
a sense of time. Boyhood is a Bazinian durational complex form, neatly stowed away, a 
plastic, a project, an object, a stream as a ‘hold of life’ (1967: 9, 1981: 10).  
 The origin of plastic artworks, to recall Bazin’s argument, is the desire to counteract 
death and the passage of time. All plastic arts, for Bazin, come into form from a desire to 
produce artifacts as a reaction to the mummy complex. Film has the function – in and as its 
ontology within the realm of reality – to feed this human desire of mummification. As 
Bazin further writes, ‘photography does not create eternity as art does [here understood as 
for instance sculpture], it embalms time, rescuing it simply from its own proper corruption’ 
(1967: 14). As Laura Mulvey formulates in the discussion of Bazin in Death 24x a Second, this 
rescuing means that ‘[o]nce time is ‘embalmed’ in the photograph, it persists, carrying the 
past across to innumerable futures as they become the present’ (2006: 56). I take Mulvey’s 
argument concerning the employment of time within the mechanics of the ontology of the 
image, here suggestively as supportive of my argument for Boyhood. In Boyhood, the self is 
toured, through time, through cinematic images carried across to the future, as the self, 
Mason, becomes innumerable, yet crystallises into “one” self through the passage, the tour 
in linearly developing durational time. Whereas, on the one hand Mulvey’s analysis echoes 
and recalls The Congress and the ability to indeed capture and carry the image across to the 
future, in a wholly mummified way, on the other hand it testifies to the ability of the image 
to carry time itself across itself to the future, which occurs in Boyhood. However, to make 
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time visible, the image has to have a marker to have its signature on, which is the unfolding 
or continuous marking of time onto the momentary self of Mason in Boyhood, through 
which Mason’s self is constructed and collected over time. This means that indeed, as Bazin 
further stated in the ontology essay, ‘[t]he aesthetic qualities of photography are to be 
sought in its power to lay bare the realities’, or in French ‘[l]es virtualités esthétiques de la 
photographie résident dans la révélation du réel’ (1967: 15, 1981: 16, my emphasis). In the 
case of Boyhood, there is a sense in which a revelation of reality (to use a more literal reading 
of Bazin) occurs through the aesthetic quality of the image as deeply temporal 
experience: the collection of the selfhood of Mason over durational time, which is 
produced through the continuous process of mummification.  
 There are numerous examples in the film where the embalmment as collection of 
the self of Mason is presented, or presents itself. However, the embalmments of Mason’s 
self in Boyhood do not occur without the use of a cinematographic visual perspective, the use 
of a presentation from a particular point of view. Primarily, perspective is used to present 
Mason within the social and family relations he is embedded in. Also, there is the faithful 
use of a child’s perspective upon the world throughout the entirety of the film, as a 
narrative element of how the storyline is constructed. For instance, the first and second 
divorce of Olivia does not happen as event for Mason and Samantha, but visually outside 
their radius. The revelation of reality occurs thus in a somewhat magical and childish 
manner for the viewer, as there is the process of puzzling together the relations between the 
different and changing members of what is presented as the intimate family circle. 
Cinematographically, for instance, there is a point-of-view and over-the-shoulder technique 
used to amplify the effect of experiencing the situation from the children’s perspective. This 
technique provides for a particular piercing quality of the intimate family sequences that 
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reveal conflict, for instance when Bill, the psychology lecturer and first stepfather of Mason 
and Samantha collects their mobile phones against their will, to cut off their possibilities of 
communication with Olivia and the outside world. The children’s perspective here 
confronts the viewer with the inescapability of the situation, and the power relations in 
which the children find themselves without their consent. To continue the storyline of the 
struggle of Olivia’s relationship with Bill, another highly emotional example of this child’s 
perspective is the sequence in which Mason and Samantha are rescued from Bill’s house. 
While the cinematography here takes on their point-of-view, the adult viewer understands 
their situation from a more omniscient point-of-view incorporating the life experience that 
they lack. The mummification of Mason occurs within the passage of time, and the 
relational transformations concerning his perspective onto the world in which his ageing 
self is implicated in.   
 The plot of the film in which the mummifications and relational constellations 
occur is narrated in brackets (or moments) of time, earlier named brise vues, and understood 
as epistemic sequences. In each of those bracketing sequences a slice of narrative and real 
time reveals both a moment in time in Mason’s life, a particular slice of his selfhood, and a 
relational diagram of forces towards the constellations of the family he finds himself in. 
These fixations of time into durational bits are themselves ephemeral points of fixation due 
to their instability, their fragility, their relentless ever-moving and slipping nature, their 
ability to be different and divergent, to also possibly having been completely different. 
Boyhood exemplifies, with the form of the cuts, as discussed above, the nature of time not as 
fixed, immobile and anchored or ‘set’, but essentially as mobile, fluid, holistically ephemeral. 
Boyhood thereby indeed ‘channels the flow of real life’, as critic Morgenstern points out 
(2014). This means that the way the cut works in the film is comparable to Deleuze’s 
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reading of Bergson’s conception of time within the discussion of the movement-image 
(1986a: 56-70). The ontology of Boyhood’s images is close to the movement-image after 
Deleuze: a spiral-esque, slender narrative of transformation of its relations to ‘the Whole’ 
(Deleuze 1986a: 8-11). The presentation of time occurs within the ‘coupe mobile’ or mobile 
cut structure of elements (Deleuze 1983: 12). There is not a regulated passage of time 
(understood as frames) from one frame to another but transformative passage of relations 
through time: identities and relations of the protagonists to each other and the viewer 
undergo substantial transformations. This is linked to the important idea of ‘the Whole’ 
(Deleuze 1986a: 8-11). Analogously to images normatively understood as documentary, it is 
always a “slice of life” – in a huge framing of ‘the Whole’ – that is presented and treated as 
such in Boyhood (Ibid). The shot is thus a ‘temporal perspective or a modulation’ including 
its own past-future (Deleuze 1986a: 24). The relation to the image for the viewer is thus a 
relation to this form of passage of time, to the image as changing-in-nature, and also as 
response to the interpersonal relations presented in the particular image and sequence. 
 The mechanics of temporal collection of Boyhood work on two simultaneous layers, 
in the moment itself and as a collection of moments. Boyhood preserves a passage of time 
both through the indexicality of individual images, and the framing of the running time of 
the film as indexicality in and of itself. This holistic indexicality, however, also spans over 
time within the film’s individual scenes or sequences, itself being process of a passage of 
time. This process that the film engages in produces a fluid, non-permanent mummification 
– a continued existence of the corporeal body – that is seen as sculpture/sculpted with and 
over a time span. This temporal aesthetics, the ontology of the image works in Boyhood in a 
Nancean dynamic of exposed and exposing rather than belonging to an embalmed point in 
time. In other words, the film complicates the traditional Bazinian realist conception, as 
 145 
there is this double indexicality: an embalmed indexicality that further embalms itself over 
time. This double indexicality is most strongly perceived in the film through the passage of 
historical time engrained through the use of technology. While Mason Sr.’s black 1968 
Pontiac GTO convertible tours Texas throughout the running time of the film 
encapsulating a sense of stability – exposing a singular temporal archival reference to 
reality – the home entertainment technology displayed in the film drastically skips chunks of 
time. Through its continued process of embalming, Boyhood thus produces a new ontology 
of passing of the photographic image. 
 The film is a passage/passing, Boyhood is the mirror and the brise vue, at the same 
time, standing still, a fixation, yet a skipping, a fast-forward non-fixation in time. In other 
words, or to adapt to a Nancean terminology or the film presents collection/collecting 
through a collection/collecting.  There is a continuous embalmment of passage and passing 
in the image. However, to recall the foundational Nancean dynamics of presentation, rather 
than representation, not strictly speaking a likeness is suggested, not an aboutness of the 
self, but a somewhat naked self. As the film displays the body of Mason, the 
collection/collecting implies there is the presentation of a body with and through its 
durational materiality. For instance, while the Dragon Ball Z cartoon (1989-1996) makes 
Mason’s curious kindergarten-aged face shine, the Nintendo Wii home video game console 
(2006-2011) used in a later sequence of the film exposes Mason’s teenager hands moving 
awkwardly up and down in front of a television set. The viewer here experiences the 
crystallisation of collection through a unique exposure of a body that is sculpted through 
time. Through the display of durational difference of time within the same corporeal self a 
pioneering sense of passage evolves for the viewer. Boyhood is not a representation, but 
rather, with a sense of tracing as documentation, the exposition of a presentation, indeed 
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with Nancy a ‘skin-show’, an embalmed “striptease” into the future, a realist presentation of 
a self (2008: 3).    
 The invention of an unprecedented realism is the chief artistic merit of the film, 
reflected in and by the universal critical acclaim (such as the 100 Metacritic rating). 
Although the direction of leaps in time linearly progresses into the temporal future of their 
respective former shots throughout the film, a sense of con-temporality (of past, present, 
and future) comparable to the Deleuzian time-image haunts the film (cf. Deleuze 
1989).  Nevertheless, despite the unidirectional unfolding of time the film innovates a 
‘magical’ realism of time, in a contemporaneous conception of time that works through its 
construction of presence (Dargis 2014a). Thinking of the relationality of time and the 
temporal nature of the photographic image in realism, Bazin writes on the use of 
symbolism in Jean Renoir’s work (1974: 85): 
  
 The word “realism” as it is commonly used does not have an absolute and clear meaning, 
 so much as it indicates a certain tendency toward the faithful rendering of reality on film. 
 Given the fact that this movement toward the real can take a thousand different routes, the 
 apologia for “realism” per se, strictly speaking, means nothing at all. The movement is 
 valuable only insofar as it brings increased meaning (itself an abstraction) to what is created. 
 
 Bazin here suggests that there is no clear meaning in realism as a term, and indeed 
the meaning of realism cannot be sought in its relationship to temporal fixation. In my 
reading, Bazin reminds the theoretical reader and/or cinematic viewer of the limitations of 
a focus on the temporal indexicality of the image. Thinking of a Derridean intervention into 
the cinematic archive of the image understood as mere still life, the cinematic image is also a 
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trace, while tracing in duration. The viewer, on the other hand, in realism, epitomised by 
Bazin in Renoir, is facing the cinematographic moving image through ‘continuity in time 
and its vanishing point in space’ (1974: 88). The indexicality of the realist image, is always 
also at the same time an index of technology of its construction. Embalmment and 
mummification are intricately linked, temporally, and in the aesthetics of the image. There is 
a form of Derridean arche-traceing in the ontology of the moving image constructed in the 
film, something like a tracing of original presence (cf. 1978: 61-62, Spivak in Derrida 1978: 
xvii-xviii). With respect to Boyhood, the camera’s view, the brise vue of the camera, is in a 
direct, directional, and directing relationship to the archive – the duration of twelve years of 
recording the film. Faithfulness to the Bazinian ‘real’ is not a value per se, of a recording 
machine, but of the subjective rendering of the embalmment of a reality. Being reminded of 
the figure of the Barthesian umbilical cord, the machine and the camera operator record, 
produce the image, and with it this plasticity of time. This means that the technology in 
which realist film is created, with recordings and edits in time, is always in relation to an 
idea of indexicality as plasticity, as a form of sculpting in time.  
 The use of editing in Boyhood allows for the sculpting in time to take place that 
builds a sense of crystallisation through the compression of time. Thinking of one of the 
first examples in which the sense of a compression of time is achieved through a jump cut, 
through which then a bridging of real time occurs, I am reminded of Olivia driving Mason 
and Samantha to Houston, to move to this destination and resettle there. While the first 
time that Olivia’s Volvo 240 is used, in the exposition of the film to pick up Mason from 
elementary school, there is a continuation in narrative and durational time, in the second 
use of the car as vehicle of transportation, the arrival to the destination, as earlier suggested, 
is combined with the editing technique of the cut to the next image to relocate the viewer 
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not only in a new destination, but also in a new real time. Although the destination is 
reached in the evening, and the next shot displays the unfolding of a new day, this form 
of continuity editing here is in fact the first example in which the cut bridges temporal 
distance of real time.  
 From one shot to the other, another sense of time, another sense of now is being 
bridged by the cut. Nevertheless, a sense of faithfulness to time is suggested through the 
use of travel, and indeed the move to re-establish a new narrative and spatio-temporal 
environment. The sculpting of time as a compression of time occurs analogously to the 
natural change of day and night, and the cultural change of the actors of the film wearing 
different clothes than on the previous day. Rather than constituting a jump cut, the 
temporal break is intended to happen in cinematographically almost invisible, or barely 
perceptible ways to allow for a sense of narrative realism. However, it is exactly 
this strategic use of the skipping of chunks of real time that produces the sense of magical 
realism of the film and plasticity of time, as one brise vue cuts to another. The plasticity of 
the sculpting in time is thus introduced here almost in invisible ways, only perceptible for 
the viewer in the first instance by taking a closer look at the faces of all three actors as the 
signs of ageing in this form of a skin-show seem to manifest themselves as a marker of 
time. Further to the body as a marker of time the film uses temporality within the plot to 
produce a sense of crystallisation of time. In those scenes in which the materiality of time is 
explored within the plot, the viewer witnesses the dynamics of personal development, such 




























Figure 11. The Lunch Sequence.  
 
 
 Thinking of one particularly strong epistemic scene to provide support for my 
overall argument of the crystallization of time as collection, I am reminded again of ways in 
which Mason’s sense of selfhood is implicated within other relationships that frame his life. 
The plot of the film offers numerous examples of the punctuating force of emotional 
conflicts that rearrange the experience of reality for Mason, and thereby progress the 
temporal experience of growing-up as growing out of (and thereby growing into other) 
spatio-temporal configurations.  The personal experience of childhood is excavated in 
Boyhood through the presentation of the self of Mason being a non-autonomous agent, 
within the web of relations of the adults he is surrounded by without his consent. Mason’s 
childhood development is characterised by the different stages and phases of Olivia’s 
relationships. One of the strongest emotional situations the viewer experiences is the way in 
which Mason suffers under the abusive relationship towards Bill, and the decay in the 
harmony of the overall relations of Mason, Samantha, and Olivia towards Bill. The viewer 
here witnesses the situation from a perspective within and surrounding Bill’s house, and 
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through the point-of-view of Mason. The scene that I am referring to here, the last lunch 
that the two families have together, as seen in Figure 11, occurs just before the earlier 
mentioned break-up and altogether rushed departure from Bill’s house.  
 Mason returns together with Randy, Bill’s son, on their bikes to Bill’s house where 
the two families live together. While entering the premises of the house and leaving the 
bikes in front of one of the garages of the house, to enter the house through the garage, 
both children see Olivia unexpectedly lying on the ground of the garage screaming and 
crying. The camera here pauses in front of the half shuttered garage gate, and Olivia reacts 
in panic to Mason’s question of what happened, and asks the children to return to the 
house, while Bill has entered, or presumably re-entered the garage through the doorway that 
connects it to the house, with a glass in his hand. The adult viewer here apprehends Bill 
holding a glass in his hand as a signifier for the alcoholism that has lead to the physical 
abuse that occurred before the children returned for lunch. The two children, avoiding 
physical proximity with Bill, swiftly return outside the garage to leave the frame again, while 
the camera continues to give justice to Olivia’s breakdown within the garage, before it cuts 
to the lunch sequence. 
 The social and family ritual of the lunch presents the faux intimacy of the two 
families as one, while they dine together. The scene has a particularly ingrained piercing 
character as it displays the separation of the families while being together. Emotionally 
charged by the incident in the garage, the scene portrays the climax of Bill’s emotionally 
abusive patterns towards Olivia and Mason, due to the decay of the constitution as a 
husband and parent. In the establishing shot of this lunch scene, the camera takes on a 
position adjacent to Bill’s empty chair, while the four children face each other, and Olivia 
sits at the other end of the round table. A sound is being heard, which appears to come 
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from the kitchen, as the alerted facial reactions towards this noise indicate, the camera cuts 
towards the open kitchen and Bill appears in a mid shot. After a reverse shot in which the 
lunch table is seen again, the camera tracks backwards accompanying Bill’s movement 
towards his chair while simultaneously the entrance out of the kitchen area reveals Bill 
holding an almost empty bottle of whiskey, besides a glass in his left hand that he picked up 
in the kitchen. While the camera moves behind Olivia, Bill forcefully lowers both the glass 
and the bottle and establishes fierce eye contact with Olivia, and from the perspective of 
Figure 11 announces having a drink with his dinner.  
 In the next shot, Olivia’s face is seen in a medium close up shot, and her reaction 
reveals anxiety. It is in this intense exchange of eye contact that the viewer feels the 
emotional distance, coldness, anger, and anguish that have crept into the relationship. Bill 
turns to Samantha, and then Mindy to ask whether they have ‘a problem’ with him having a 
drink, to which they in a reverse shot convention both reply no to. Continuing the round, 
Bill then turns to Mason to confront him with his impression that Mason does not like him 
very much, to which he adds that he does not like himself either, and while he further asks 
whether that is funny, he throws his glass on Mason’s plate. In the perspective of Figure 11, 
the glass smashes on the plate missing both the camera and Mason’s face and body by an 
inch/a couple of centimetres. Olivia’s scream foreshadows the cut towards her hands 
protecting her face in mid close up from Mason’s perspective. Bill continues the rage from 
the perspective of Figure 11 and after asking Randy whether he feels left out throws the 
whiskey bottle on the ground next to him, to then push him out of his chair, and 
ostentatiously throw his plate on the ground. A jump cut to a ceiling fan in low-angle 
close up ends this two-minute dinner sequence that smashed and crushed the relationship 
and family constellation. The forceful rearrangement of family constellations is one of the 
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main devices of the plot to produce a sense of crystallisation of time throughout the film. 
The lunch scene provides a prime example of the punctuation of trauma as both a mental 
cut and a construction of involuntary memory that the viewer witnesses in its moment of 
collection, and while it is collecting. The scene presents the emotional event in a flash-like 
perspective, and the viewer is here confronting the piercing experience from the inner 
perspective of the family.   
 At the dining table where Bill throws a glass at Mason that smashes and breaks, the 
viewer finds themselves attacked by the shattered substance, thrown in the camera’s and 
Mason’s direction. The viewer faces Bill through the camera placed between Mason and 
Olivia. Through this shot perspective, the viewer is implicated into the dynamics of their 
relationship to each other, and partaking through the over-the-shoulder perspective in the 
space in-between both Mason and Olivia in a relation towards Bill. A couple of 
viewerly real-life minutes ago, and filmic running time minutes ago, Olivia and Bill reported 
from their honeymoon travels. The viewer is thrown into a fast-forwarding durational 
experience of a passage of a relationship, in the experience of a tragic decay, unfathomable 
in its depth of experience for the viewer, but rather presented as piercing through the 
brevity and intensity of the shock-like duration of the unfolding of event. This is one of the 
senses of crystallisation the viewer experiences, the breaking of a collection of time that 
leads to a recollection of time, and a recollecting anew of the social roles and experiences. 
The milestone moments portrayed in a framing of rituals that compress and extrapolate 
meaning provoke the feeling of common and shared experience that enables a relationality 
to be enacted.  
 Relating to the passage of time, and the conception of ‘the Whole’ (Deleuze 1986a: 
8-11), one fantasy Boyhood plays with is the arrangement of characters. The viewer tries to 
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understand the aspect of randomness of life and the bifurcations this produces, and thus 
traces developments, changes, fulfilments and disappointments. Olivia does not make grand 
mistakes, ‘just poor life decisions’ as she proclaims herself that direct the plot’s path and 
Mason’s life journey. However, as the viewer hopes for a good life for her, as empathy 
demands, and tragedy although anticipated, is not desired, the viewer finds themselves 
arranging characters. For instance in the lunch scene at the table the viewer looks at the 
characters like Leibnizian monads, not quite like in Alain Resnais’s Last Year in 
Marienbad (1961) through different Deleuzian ‘sheets of past’ and ‘peaks’, but rather through 
emotional memories built or collected within the recent span of the film (1989: 101). The 
viewer here, with the example of Bill, wishes him some strength and character, demands 
exceptionality and purpose from him, if not passion for life, rather than being a caricature 
and cliché of himself as an alcoholic and abusive parent. Indeed the viewer wishes for 
another slice of ‘the Whole’, and it appears that with the shattered glass a crystalline cocoon 
of memory of their happy days is destroyed (Deleuze 1986a: 8-11). It is in this moment 
where life itself through its scripted possibilities becomes more real than just imaginable, 
where developments appear guided by those moments of intuition that have appeared as 
indecision in the very first moment Bill crossed the viewer’s eye on screen, and he seemed 
just a bit ‘off’. A piercing relation was built and it is in these moments of fission where 
character learning comes at a small price for the viewer, and a big one for Olivia, Mason, 



































Figure 12. The marking of time in Boyhood.  
 
 Besides the trauma as mental cut of relationality, the film also makes use of a more 
subtle sense of marking of time to produce crystallisation. One of the ways in which the 
marking of time occurs in Boyhood outside the use of editing is through the direct role it 
plays in the narrative itself. There is a direct marking of time within the plot to present the 
collecting that takes places as such, thereby the plot almost self-reflexively emphasises the 
passage of time as a product and production of collection. In fact, the different rituals, 
travels, and milestone moments of the film are all storytelling devices in which the role 
of temporality within the depicted society is negotiated. However, while the different 
relocations in the film begin as involuntary movements of Mason alongside Olivia and her 
relationships, the sequence in which Mason moves out of Olivia’s apartment is changing or 
swapping the force of this relation – as now Mason leaves the direct physical relationship of 
sharing space with Olivia. This subtle difference appears as major break of the dynamics of 
the relationship, displayed through the scene and thereby initiating the passage into 
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adulthood through the physical and relational emancipation from the parent.  In the three-
minute sequence in which the shot of Figure 12 is featured, there is a dialogue filmed in 
shot-reverse-shot convention with no shot of both Mason and Olivia in the same frame, 
foreshadowing their separation to come. Mason enters and leaves Olivia’s apartment, and 
both his and her facial expressions throughout the dialogue are emphasised through the use 
of close-ups. Mason discusses the role of computers and technology in our everyday life, 
and the increasing role of computers – understood as a decision-making machine or 
artificial intelligence rather than just calculating and computing machine – to influence 
physical and human reality. In this discussion Mason refers to the computerised roommate 
assignment software as ‘spooky’, as the software-based allocation somewhat paranormally 
increased the freshmen roommate satisfaction rate from 60% to 100%. The broader topic 
of the conversation is the ‘programming of life’ by virtue of decision-making of algorithms 
and surveillance, and the future outlook presented by Mason: ‘soon they won’t even need a 
questionnaire, ‘cause they’ll just let the NSA scan your digital ghost and they’ll tell you who 
your roommate is, based on everything you ever said, written, or clicked’.       
 In this scene the evolution of electronic consumer industry and the overarching and 
increasing role of technology in everyday lives is discussed. Yesterday, it seems, there was 
no mobile phone and no iPhone, somehow, these devices appeared and they become 
common and became increasingly invisible. Moore’s law, the doubling of technological 
power over the passing of two years, is felt throughout the apparently accelerated speed of 
technological intrusion into Boyhood’s narrative, reaching its concluding point in our 
contemporary moment, echoing the conclusions drawn from Laura Poitras’s (2014) 
Citizenfour. Like many viewers might have experienced in their own lives, there is a sense of 
naiveté or unawareness of Mason of the uniqueness and singularity of the moment and 
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situation he is in: the only time he moves or – is moving out – of his mother’s apartment to 
go to college. At the same time, however, a discussion of uniqueness and individuality takes 
place, and the dialogue emphasises the uniqueness of the situation through its 
commonplace character. The situation as ritual is important as one ‘milestone’ and here 
capstone of adolescence as individual and cultural experience, legible in its importance and 
passage-character for the viewer. Also, there is a temporal bridge built to another anchor in 
time, the request or insinuation of Olivia to take Mason’s first photograph, a frame of a 
skateboarding scene, with him alongside to his dormitory room. As seen in Figure 12, 
Mason inspects this photograph with his own hands on top of the box, which he packs to 
leave the apartment. There is an emotional response of Olivia concerning this moment, a 
Proustian reflection on time, inspired by the madeleine-like nature of the framed photo: 
‘This is the worst day of my life…I didn’t know you would be so fucking happy to be 
leaving...I just thought there would be more’.  
 From the passage of technology, to the passage of Mason to college, to the passage 
of time with respect to the first photograph the sequence concludes with Olivia’s 
breakdown and the disillusionment about the passage of life as such. This sequence is an 
example (such as the dining table sequence) of the fluid borderlines of fixations culminating 
in the arrangement of these passing moments into one another in the building of a 
cinematic scene of passing. The collecting and collection of time within the plot of passage 
of Boyhood does produce a sense of crystallisation that includes a social critique of how the 
self is sculpted in society over time. A radical and innovative neo-realist aesthetic is visible 
in sequences like these, and I am reminded of two convincing evaluations of Bazin 
concerning Vittorio De Sica’s Bicycle Thieves (1948) that seem to apply to Boyhood. First, the 
 157 
‘limpidity of the event [is raised] to a maximum, while keeping the index of refraction from 
the style to a minimum’ (Bazin 1971: 57). Second, Bazin assesses:  
 
 events and people are never introduced in support of a social thesis – but the thesis 
 emerges fully armed and the more irrefutable because it is presented to us as 
 something thrown into the bargain. It is our intelligence that discerns and shapes it, not 
 the film. (1971: 52-53)  
 
The social thesis of Boyhood relates to the subjection (and subjectification) of the self to time 
and its passage, and, like in Bicycle Thieves it is transparent that the power over one’s own life 
is out of one’s hands. Olivia is astounded at how fast life has and is passing, while it passes. 
The statement ‘I just thought there would be more’ epitomises the disillusionment – 
understood as a form of discovery of oneself – through the passage of growing (or ageing) 
herself. The person (with the hopes, beliefs, and dreams) she has once been has disappeared 
and there is the discovery and process of ‘awakening’ through the assembling of a portrait 
of herself. The photograph she wants Mason to keep seen in Figure 12 serves here as a 
memento mori, of Mason’s childhood that passes into adolescence, and her purpose of life 
which centered around her children growing up. Olivia laments the discovery of life being 
an endless to-do list, a given script filled with selves around it that are principally 
interchangeable. The melancholia of the situation arises through another “mummy 
complex”, Olivia’s sense and articulation of loss of life displayed through this scene, which 
serves as an epistemological long take spanning Olivia’s and Mason’s lifetime through the 
compression of topics, problems, and feelings within the scene.     
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 The discussion of the two scenes of Boyhood that produce a further sense of 
collection as crystallisation brings me to conclude the discussion of realism and the nature 
of duration suggested in the film. With film theorist Daniel Morgan, and the interventionist 
2006 essay ‘Rethinking Bazin: Ontology and Realist Aesthetics’, I conclude by more broadly 
rethinking the ontology of the cinematic image employed in and by Boyhood. As Morgan 
suggests with Bazin, the cinematic form, the editing process that constitutes a film, is a 
‘reproduction of an antecedent reality’ (2006: 445). This reality, at the core of a form of 
realism, presents itself in the film through the production of moments in time. The 
antecedent reality turns into presence, into “nows”, to then be suspended anew, into 
another new reality, a new now. The Bazinian ‘faithful rendering of reality’ moves into the 
photographic core terrain with Boyhood (1974: 85). There is a rendering, a sculpting of 
memory, of a life, in photo-album-like aesthetics. Rather than in a strict congruence of 
running time of the film and real time, suggested through one-shot cinematography, such as 
in Alexander Sokurov’s Russian Ark (2002), or in Sebastian Schipper’s Victoria (2016), 
Boyhood epitomises the aesthetic of a hyphenated, momentary real – what I have described 
as the collection and collecting of the film. This aesthetic is embedded in the viewer’s desire 
to understand the self of Mason, in a formation of the real, Mason’s world, as the narrative 
of the film suggests. However, I reform the sense of realism with Bazin, radically as a 
rethinking of the relationship of the trace and the archive. The self is in difference, 
suspension, fixation, and momentarisation of itself. As Bazin remarks regarding Renoir, 
there is the relationship of ‘the vital richness of form’ towards ‘the simple cloak of reality’, 
which in Boyhood results through the ‘draping’ of time onto the self (1974: 91). Indeed, in 
Boyhood there is what Bazin considers an ‘increased meaning (itself an abstraction)’ (1974: 
85), an ingrained relationship to the archive, what could be termed a “hyperrealism” 
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through the employment of collection while collecting, and the production of a sense of 
passage through the plot. As an increase of meaning this gesture of abstraction of meaning 
as a form of mummification, as an iconisation, as an endless tracing, means that Boyhood is 
an epistemic scene – as an enumeration of realist images that in their sequentiality turn into 
more than just a sum thereof: hyperreal images. To indeed rethink Bazin, I argue for a form 
of contemporaneous concrete monumentality in Boyhood.  
 This means for the self in Boyhood, that there is the first person narrative of Mason 
presented in the form of a Nancean exposing/exposed. The film exposes a self for the 
viewer, in sense of the Derridean mirror image of seeing while being seen. As Morgan 
further suggests, Bazin is interested in ‘the ontological identity of model and image’, or 
‘l’identité ontologique du modèle et du portrait’ (to use the French original) within the 
notion of realism (1967: 10, 1981: 10). Indeed, there is no strict sense of ontological identity 
between model and portrait needed, as Bazin further suggests, the image is liberated from 
this sense of faithfulness, through this post-identical relation perhaps a more meaningful 
sense of self is suggested through the image (cf. 1967: 10, 1981: 10). However, inherently, 
Bazin is interested, in my own reading, in the sense of ‘magic’ understood as a sense of 
spherical perception of the image. To avoid the complicated term aura with its Benjaminian 
trace, indeed a sense of “porous plasticity” evolves through the viewerly construction of a 
durational temporality. The image, argues Morgan, who correctly rethinks Bazin, is 
‘something more than a mere approximation, a decal or approximate tracing’ (Morgan 2006: 
448, Bazin 1967: 14). Thinking again of the photographic sense of presentation of Self in the 
Mirror and the sense of formation of viewerly subjectivity of Las Meninas, in Boyhood there is 
the production of a trace of the now, which forms the force of presentation of a self, into a 
stream of the now, the continuous re-tracing of the image. There is a porous plasticity in 
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this presentation of Mason’s self, as the viewer completes or unifies a sense of synchronicity 
in and of time, merges the divergent time that lies between the cut from one image to the 
other in which time is being melted together. The performative plastic form of 
embalmment is suggested by the rolling sense of the now, the cinematic temporality, the 
materiality of the film, the real time of the film. The term mummification, however, points 
to its proper paradox: death and life as an icon, from the past carried or rolled to the 
present, as the present time, in its death-yet-alive image. This image is not, as the term 
mummification might suggest, of a God-like figure, but, quite the contrary, as suggested by 
the norm of realism, an image of the quotidian, which as an idea is sought to be excavated 
as the collected, embalmed self.  
 There are broader implications of porous plasticity of the image with respect to 
understanding the film as a holistic durational piece. Boyhood re-invented the cinematic 
medium’s relationship to the self and realism through its use of editing as stretching and 
accelerating in time and thereby developing the sense of collection as crystallisation. 
Boyhood is an “epistemological long take” of episodic following and into-one-another-
flowing epistemological scenes: considered as a piece, a film, its temporal space forms a 
transitional space. Time itself is the film’s ontological materiality and a force and sculptor of 
selfhood: the film presents life as periodical series of transitions or momentary fixations 
that suspend themselves anew and anew. This porous plasticity is explored in this aesthetics 
of the now. Boyhood is a film of the presentation of a collection of selfhood, or the 
adolescence of selfhood as film. Twelve years as the recording time of the film shot over 
thirty-nine days is the concrete temporal space, to recollect Richter’s previously 
introduced notion of Zeit-raum or time-space (2011: 25). This is the real time in which the film 
has been produced, and it is thus through the afterness of those twelve years in the real time 
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of the film that this lifetime is presented. As a collection of loss, it is presented in the 
gesture of retrospectivity as a continual Barthesian advancement and suspension of itself. 
However, yet again I am reminded of the notion of magic in realism, to which I suggest a 
closer observance of the grammar of the exposition of the mummification, in the forms in 
which the images relate to one another, compressing, yet extending in time. The rupture of 
this arrangement of images, the narrative, through the editing, unfolds, into “nows”, as a 
form of temporal montage. I return thus to a deconstructive reading of the term magic, in 
the language of the cinematic image, in its enumerative ontology. I again take Bazin, and the 
closure of the ontology essay as an invitation of a rethinking, and update, as a suggestion to 
the assertion of Bazin, that the cinematic image is a ‘langage’ (1981: 17).   
 The rolling of the now, the temporal space in Boyhood is the recollection of the self 
of Mason that occurs through a new form of cinematic langage. Whereas in The Congress the 
technique of the self produces a technology of an image of the past as means to project 
countless images thereof in the future, the images of Boyhood are collections of a proto-
language. This protolanguage articulates itself particularly strongly in Boyhood through 
a cinematic sense of contact with the self, a relational, Nancean ‘nous autres’ (2005: 105). I 
offer here to rethink what Bazin means by a langage, and indeed, ask, what can be a 
cinematic langage. I suggest that the language of Boyhood is in the Nancean nous autres of 
visual language. As a semiotic analogy to understand the film as a cinema of the self, I 
suggest an emoticon-like aesthetic, grammar, and logic of nows as signifiers of porous 
plasticity. The ontology of the cinematic image of Boyhood is shaped by the linear writerly 
grammar of time as duration in complete linearity of duration, with innumerable breaks, 
cuts, as the grammatical bubble of nows as they move into the future. The film is the 
collection of a self, through atomised, fixated sequential images of a self. Rather than a 
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strictly semiotic reading of singular icons, the transcendental logic is the immanent grammar 
within the aesthetics of the enumerative durational collection of the self. On all image and 
durational levels, there is a sense of iconography of selfhood. The iconicity of the self is 
explored in an aesthetics of tapes, a home-video aesthetics, into a film. The meaning of 
those nows, is in their attributive and performative exposition of “milestone moments”, 
data of “video bits”, that suggests a narrative presence of the viewer in a session of now. 


























Figure 13. Page 1 & 2. From: Une histoire sans mots. Xu Bing, 2013. Paris: Grasset.   
 
 
 Analogously to Xu Bing’s 24h first-person chasing sequentiality of a collection of a 
self in the 2013 Une histoire sans mots, Mason in Boyhood goes from point to point. A sense of 
Griffith-like continuity of editing of seemingly irrelevant ruptures in time, as suggested by 
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the logic of Bing’s illustrative chase-like narrational form exemplified through Figure 13, also 
creeps into the durational ontology of Boyhood. Bing’s artwork here serves as indicative for 
the iconisation of the “milestone moments” and “video bits” that I read in Boyhood. I see a 
sense of groundlessness of time, of duration in an aesthetics of presence, in collection, in 
the pleasure of the archive of building a life, having a mirroring image of a self formation 
over time in the durational aesthetics of cinema. To further illustrate my reasoning for this 
rethinking of the cinematic ontology in “emoticonality”, I more closely observe the 
emoticon and interpret its suggestive meaning. In its durational form, the emoticon, as a 
sign and grammar, is in equal right an image or graphic. The meaning of its singularity as 
image or graphic is depending on the use, the numbering, the plural, the writerly 
enumeration of itself into chains of meaning by editing, and montage. This function of 
magic as a Bazinian flow of time is paired with the unison of a self as a mummification, yet 
at the same time the formation of a narrative of a self, into an image of a self. Emoticonality 
is a collection of a self in porous plasticity, in individual plastic “bracket signature” forms of 
a now. The rolling now is a response to the Bazinian imperative and indeed approximates, 
simplifies cinema as langage, as a figure of temporality. As suggested with Boyhood, narrative 
moves continuously into afterness in these aesthetics of this cinema of the self, in the 
collection of the self.   
 
Chapter 11: Blind Viewership in A Trip to Japan in Sixteen 
Minutes, Revisited  
 
 
The analysis of The Congress and Boyhood revealed the formations and collections of selves 
within a durational realm. In these films, the world exists as backdrop to the self. The 
Congress problematises a collection of selfhood within the cinematic realm of the film 
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through the recollecting production of a self as a product therein. Boyhood produces a self 
through the durational technique of embalming paired with the cinematographic framing of 
the film. Within both films, the collection of selfhood the viewer observes, witnesses, and 
partakes in, is with respect to the selves on screen and within the cinematic realm and 
medium of film. The presentation of these collections occurs for the viewer in the 
cinematic realm as an experience on screen. The durational unfolding of the material is 
brought to the attention of the viewer in a confrontational arrangement; the viewer is 
looking at, with, and through the cinematic works. In the following analysis, this 
relationship is rethought, and further complicated. I suggest for this endeavour a rethinking 
of the boundaries of cinematic space with respect to the body, the self, and the viewer in 
cinema more broadly. Problematising the temporal relationship of collection of selfhood as 
informed by the past, or working through the past to construct a present moment, I return 
to the continuous construction and reconstruction of viewerly selfhood in the encounter 
with a durational artwork. Thereby I understand the aesthetic experience of participant as 
viewer here as an exercise in projection of the cinematic experience. In other words, the 
construction of meaning within the cinematic experience is performed by the aesthetic 
engagement of the viewer’s self, which in turn is renegotiated through the encounter with 
the artwork. In the following analysis the relationship of the observational core in which 
selfhood is conventionally encountered in cinema is inverted, as the artwork principally 
does not form an image, but allows for an image to be formed by the viewer.   
 With the following introduction of Sadakichi Hartmann’s perfume concert A Trip to 
Japan in Sixteen Minutes (1902), and its re-enactment in 2013 by The Institute for Art and 
Olfaction, entitled A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited, the collection that is conducted 
through this cinematic experience is one of the (blind) viewer, rather than on view for the 
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viewer. A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited thus presents a state of passing for the 
viewer, in which the sensory experience is unstable, and with it the signification of this 
cinematic experience. The principal aesthetic function of the work is the construction of a 
sense of selfhood of the viewer within and alongside the experience of a narrative trip in 
space over time. The viewer as partaker and performer of the experience is subjugated to 
the aesthetics of space and time as the subject of the trip. Thus, the viewer actively 
performs the work of art in the relationality towards the narrative, brought into being 
through the operation of scent and sound. This means that the artwork creates the 
intrusion of “a world” into the spatio-temporal experience of the viewer, in which and 
through which the viewerly sense of selfhood is negotiated in the compressed sixteen 
minutes video-like duration of the piece. Within the 2013 re-enactment that I analyse, the 
viewer experiences a multi-layered durational performance. As the title indicates, a trip to 
Japan is suggested principally through the sensory realm of olfaction. Thereby the sense of 
what I term “dispersion” through the trip constitutes the narrative experience that leads to 
a refashioning of the viewer’s experience of selfhood. In contrast to collecting, or working 
towards collecting a self, the technique of the self the artwork engages in is one of 
continuous reconstitution of selfhood – thereby indeed dispersing anew and anew the sense 
of self – instead of anchoring selfhood like in collection. This means that there is a different 
relationship of the self and the image than in the previous analysis, namely a topographical 
one of continuous evolving elsehoods. 
 Before coming to a closer description and examination of the re-enactment of the 
2013 artwork that will serve as the foundation for my argument, I introduce the historical 
background of the work. Stepping back in time, the first or original A Trip to Japan in Sixteen 
Minutes was performed at the New York Theatre on 30th November 1902. Sadakichi 
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Hartmann, the pioneering inventor of the perfume concert technique, at that time 
introduced that the perfumes of Japan will be worked into a song. However, as a New York 
Times article also adds, for the untrained nose, soft Japanese airs and a dancing geisha girl 
are necessary for the ‘proper appreciation of the smell music’ (1902: 32). The viewer at the 
time thus expected to be confronted with a multi-layered rhythmic unfolding of sensations. 
At the time the work was seen distinctively within the context of the new inventions of the 
photographic arts; also by placing the work within a theatre, the viewer expected a 
performative dimension of the piece. A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes intended to produce 
narrative pieces of a manufactured sense of reality composed through the dramatic 
assemblage of visual, auditory, and olfactory sensations. The promised magic and desire of 
A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes is what historian Christina Bradstreet calls a production of 
a ‘fantasy mode of instant air travel, a magic carpet ride of memory in which gusts of scent 
would waft the audience across vast tracts of mental landscape’ (2010: 51). As the aesthetic 
experience of the piece, the viewer produces an account of a travel of a ‘mental landscape’ 
crafted together by the effect of the sensations upon the viewer’s imagination (Bradstreet 
2010: 51). To achieve this rich sensation, Hartmann’s carpet ride consisted in addition to 
the dramatic performance and musical part of the following six perfumes. Hartmann 
describes the aesthetic concept and experience as follows:  
 
 I endeavored to suggest the journey by a recitation accompanied by eight perfumes, of 
 decided contrast, which I used in the following succession :   White Rose to suggest the 
 departure from New York, [...] Violet [to tell] of a sojourn on the Rhine, Almond of 
 Southern France, Bergamot of Italy, Cinnamon of the Orient, Cedarwood of India and 
 Carnation of the arrival in Japan.  (1913: 224) 
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 During the same month in 1902 that the vastly celebrated journey film A Trip to the 
Moon (in ten minutes) by Georges Méliès was shown in New York, the perfume concert 
despairingly failed. The fascination of Hartmann to create an artistic representation in smell, 
another unfolding narrative through time, like film, was unsuccessful. Unfortunately, the 
durational experience could not provide the aesthetic experience as intended for the viewer, 
as the smells did not produce the suggested effect for the audience in a satisfactory manner. 
The narrative pieces of perfume that intended to suggest different locations of the viewer 
over time could not provide this sensation as effectively as desired by Hartmann. The travel 
around the world the perfume concert intended to evoke for the viewer was too ambitious 
of an aim to be accomplished. After four minutes in which an electric fan blew the first 
perfume of white rose over the audience, the performance was cancelled – audience 
members (some of whom smoked tobacco during the performance) furiously left finding it 
extremely dissatisfying (New York Times 1902: 32). In retrospect, Hartmann evaluated that 
‘the sensation of smell was not produced instantaneously enough’ in A Trip to Japan in 
Sixteen Minutes , leading to the ‘complete failure’ (1913: 225). He insisted, however, ‘the 
sense of smell [is] capable of artistic and intellectual functions’, deferring rather than 
abandoning his project (1913: 217).  
 Hartmann developed the olfactory-based technique of the perfume concert in 
tandem with his interest and involvement in photography – the perfume concert technique 
is invented analogously to visual art. The Japanese-German-American inventor Hartmann 
produced visionary work at the edge of the 19th century, among more than hundreds of 
essays and reviews in English and German, as well as drama and narrative fiction, and the 
well-respected monograph A History of American Art (1901), and Japanese Art (1904). A 
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largely forgotten figure in cultural history of photography, Hartmann was one of the earliest 
pioneers of proposing camera work as art, treating photography similarly to paints.2 
Hartmann’s idea with A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes was to melt the solid representations 
of the new visual arts that were evolving at that time – photography and film – into air, 
sublimate meaning, and produce an original artistic medium out of the art of olfaction: a 
perfume concert, and with that, in a modernist avant-garde spirit, revolutionise the 
expression and ability of art. Around the same time that Hartmann’s friend, Alfred Stieglitz, 
published some of his first photographs in Hartmann’s magazine Camera Work – such as 
the famous 1907 travel photograph The Steerage, some of the first major successful 
experiments with motion pictures were conducted and presented, such as Meliès’s 1902 A 
Trip to the Moon. I mention both Stieglitz and Méliès here, as Méliès provides a window to an 
imaginative world and to the moon, and Stieglitz a recording of ordinary reality. Hartmann, 
on the other hand, aspired to combine and transgress both: the beauty of the magic that 
temporally unfolds through Méliès A Trip to the Moon combined within an urban reality of 
entering and observing a voyage, like in Stieglitz The Steerage.  
 The modern age of the twentieth century spans between Hartmann’s inventive 
experiment of A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes and its postmodern re-enactment. In this 
century, since Hartmann’s early steps, smell-inducing technology – chiefly used as an add-
on to audio-visual stimuli – shares a commercial history of failure, with technological 
experiments occurring up to date. For instance, Scent of Mystery (1960) by William Castle 
used a smell-inducing technology called Smell-O-Vision. Other major smell-inducing film 
                                            
2 For the Archive and Nachlass see John Batchelor, Harry Lawton, and Clifford Wurfel, ‘The Sadakichi 
Hartmann Papers: A Descriptive Inventory of the Collection in the University of California, Riverside, 
Library’ (Riverside: University of California, 1980). See also Sadakichi Hartmann, Critical Modernist: Collected Art 
Writings, ed. by Jane C. Weaver (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), and Sadakichi 
Hartmann, The Valiant Knights of Daguerre: Selected Critical Essays on Photography and Profiles of Photographic Pioneers, 
ed by Harry W. Lawton and George Knox (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978). 
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productions were John Water’s Polyester (1981) that used a scratch ticket technique 
comparable to lottery scratch-cards called Odorama. Another technique called Aroma-
Scope was also used in Norton Virgien and John Eng’s Rugrats Go Wild (2003), and Tommy 
Wirkola’s (2010) Kurt Josef Wagle And The Legend of the Fjord Witch, while in Robert 
Rodriguez’s Spy Kids: All the Time in the World (2011) the technique was called 4D Aroma-
Scope. Also, various enterprises developed television ‘smelling screens’ in the 2010’s, and 
USB-Stick devices such as iSmell that emit smell while using a computer. In 2013 a 
prototype of a ‘smelling screen’ was presented at the IEEE Virtual Reality Conference in 
Orlando, Florida by a group of researchers from Tokyo University of Agriculture and 
Technology (cf. Ishida, Matsukura and Yoneda 2013). While adequate smell technology is 
still being invented for a mass consumer market scale, Hartmann’s original experimental 
setup of A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes sparked the curiosity of contemporary artists to 
achieve its original aim of aesthetic success.  
 A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes was revisited, as the artists in the title of the piece 
call it, and thereby reproduced and re-enacted with the crucial variation of including 
viewerly blindness as a technique. The revisiting of the 1902 experiment in 2013 by the 
artist collective The Institute for Art and Olfaction points at the idea of modifying and 
concluding the unaccomplished projects of a time passed. Accompanying Hartmann’s life 
journey, the contemporary scent machine moved and relocated from New York to the 
cinematic dream factory of Los Angeles. The completion of Hartmann’s vision of a 
perfume concert also marks a resurrection of the 1902 groundwork and mission: an 
expansion of the senses in temporally unfolding art towards the olfactory. Another way to 
conceptualise it is offered by Bradstreet: ‘[i]n creating a series of simulation smellscapes that 
replicated the scents of place, Hartmann aspired to a level of fidelity that would blur the 
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boundaries between reality and its representation’ (2010: 59). While the earlier 1902 
experiment was unable to effectively achieve this blurring of boundaries, the 2013 revisiting 
of the project produces the desired original effect through its arrangement of aesthetic 
forces of scent and sound, within the environment of blindness. The use of a blindfolded 
arrangement for the viewer is crucial in the effective and successful enactment of the 
aesthetic blurring of boundaries: the viewer is in a visual situation of complete darkness 
invited to form a multi-sensuous impression of the piece.  
 To provide an auto-ethnographic account of the experience: 
 
 A 2014 January Sunday afternoon, a casual Los Angeles art and museum crowd waits in the 
 sunny outdoor lobby of the Hammer Museum on Wilshire Boulevard in Westwood. Some people 
 read cultural press; others engage in chats, waiting for the doors to open. Walking inside the white 
 cube exhibition space, the visitor sits down in a vast room more like a machine, in a space that 
 looks as if something is tested here – a lot of wires, cables, unidentifiable apparatuses – an 
 experimental laboratory. The seating arrangement is reminiscent of a small theatre with about 80 
 seats, including an airplane-like middle corridor. After a moment of seated waiting, the visitor is 








































Figure 14. A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited.  
 
 As an introduction to the embodied viewerly experience of A Trip to Japan in Sixteen 
Minutes, Revisited, the above paragraph describes the initial experience of encountering the 
artwork in person. Figure 14 further illustrates the setup in which the viewer is placed before 
the work itself begins. As a durational performance, A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, 
Revisited is structured by the interplay of the scent, sound, and stage performers in the 
theatrical museum space. Like in video or cinema, the three different sources of stimulation 
build a composite effect and interact as an ensemble on the viewer. Also similarly as in 
video and cinema there are sequences of scenes constructed through the different stages of 
the trip. However, in contrast to the so-called visual arts, the viewer here constructs a 
coherent and consistent “image” through their force of imagination. Rather than being 
offered an image, the viewer does not encounter a completed representational ensemble, 
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but is implicated within one. The distinctive technique of the self that A Trip to Japan in 
Sixteen Minutes, Revisited offers is the relocation of the image-building capacity from the 
camera to the viewer. Throughout the sixteen minutes of the piece, it is the viewer as 
performative participant who assembles in and through time their account of the 
interaction played upon their senses. The viewer’s self articulates in the visual blindness of 
the piece in relation and in response to the stimulation offered by the perfume concert. 
Starting within the groundlessness of blindness, the viewer confronts a representational 
arrangement, rather than a representation as such, in which a presentation is enacted. The 
viewer here faces the inclusion into a representational cycle, in which the viewer actively 
produces the cinematic experience. As a representational arrangement, the artwork offers 
the viewer a space of projection through which the cycle of representation is completed.  
 The viewer immerses themselves into A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited 
through the encounter of six different stages through the length of sixteen minutes. In 
contrast to the 1902 Atlantic and land route, the revisitation materialises as a transpacific 
flight, and thus follows the route of a conventional contemporary traveller who aims to 
reach Japan as quickly as possible. In the presentation of the representation of the trip, the 
viewer immerses thus actively into the dynamics of travel through the aesthetics of 
successive changes of space. The narrative exposes the viewer to the six following stages: 
SuperShuttle to LAX [Los Angeles International Airport], Airplane, Narita [Tokyo 
International Airport], Tokyo, Hotel, and Dreamscape. As a principal mechanism of 
sequential order, the narrative of the trip linearly follows the conventional parts of airplane 
travel from Los Angeles to Tokyo, concluding in a stage of sleep upon the jet-lagged arrival 
at a hotel. Through this storytelling structured in the form of travel, there is an emphasis on 
the presentation of the experience of traversing space. While the scents in general escape 
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descriptive verbalisation, they trigger momentary relational impressions of space, which 
through the blindfolded arrangement overwhelm in their suggestive presence the viewer’s 
sense of belonging. The different modes of transportation such as the SuperShuttle (shared 
taxi) and airplane are evoked by the use of characteristic and associated sounds and noises. 
Environments such as the two airports are characterised by their dominant loudness, while 
the hotel environment is suggested through ambient silence. The traffic noises of both Los 
Angeles and Tokyo are used as a backdrop to the experience to manufacture a sense of 
placement within this physical landscape. The Los Angeles International Airport and Narita 
Airport frame the airplane travel, and the hotel stage in Tokyo induces a sense of arrival, 
while the Dreamscape stage further invites a zooming out from the stages of travel for the 
viewer and an inner space for reorientation, and an overall cooling down of the 
performance and experience.  
 A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited is composed through an alignment of 
cinematography, editing, sound, and mise-en-scène into an overall piece resembling a 
cinematic experience – a “cinematic concert”. The individual six stages mentioned above 
are primarily evoked by the sound, which works most directly onto the sensual apparatus of 
the viewer. By initiating the individual stages of the performance, and dramatically guiding 
the viewer through the piece, the sound structures the cinematic concert. The viewer is lead 
through the cinematic concert in a continuous flow by virtue of the immediate and direct 
apprehension of the sound. While the viewer is cognisant of the sound, the waves of 
perfume that are lead into the viewer’s vicinity juxtapose the impressions of the sound, and 
complement the sensual impression to a multi-dimensional ensemble. Comparable to an 
interaction between sound and image, the sound intertwines with the scent to create a 
holistic situational ensemble. In harmony with the sound, which builds the background of 
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atmosphere in the piece, most redolently through the iconic sounds of transportation such 
as traffic noises and inflight passenger announcements, the scent reconfigures the viewer’s 
sense of location and travel by the confrontational nature in which the scent infiltrates the 
viewer’s sensual apparatus. Further to that, there are the movements of performers within 
the theatrical setting, although invisible, noticeable for the viewer, most vividly in the 
airplane stage, where an airplane trolley is used to simulate the flight experience. The scent 
is “read” by the viewer supplementing the continuous atmospheric soundscapes, and thus 
the viewer thereby composes scent and sound into a holistic situational experience, together 
with the tangential impressions of the performers.  
 In A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited the viewer negotiates a conception of 
self in time and space through the relation towards the work. The viewer collages and 
puzzles together the experience of travel from the fragmented sources of released scent, 
recorded sound, and the sensed movement of stage performers. The blindness in which one 
apprehends the artwork invites the sense impressions to conclude in a novel multi-sensuous 
production, which ultimately disrupts the representational coherence of an image 
altogether. Thereby the work of art potentially offers the production of an image for the 
viewer through the engagement with it over time, however, without the primary power of 
fixation that an image gives through the freezing of a moment in time. Thus, the viewer is 
in a constant enactment of their position in space within the artwork’s flow in time. The 
moment is in continuous suspension of its photographable nature as a moment in time by 
the impossibility of its recordability. While the viewer engages in the mirroring function of 
the work of art, the viewer completes the cycle of representation, and with that embodied 
relational response completes the performance. In more abstract and interpretative terms, 
the viewer here is implicated in the technological arrangement of what in the analysis of Self 
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in the Mirror emerges as the concept of the umbilical cord. In the carnal medium that the 
cinematic concert produces parallel to the forces of a self-photographing fixation by means 
of a camera, it is as if the viewer is photographing their sensual impressions to a visual 
experience. In further comparison to the earlier analysis, the representational situation is 
similarly to Self in the Mirror and Las Meninas a making-of, a presentation of a representation. 
Nevertheless, the viewer cannot produce a recording thereof, cannot fixate the 
unphotographable experience of this performance outside the interiority of this carnal 
medium, cannot collect the experience to an outside of themselves such as an image 
thereof.   
 In pictorial cinematic techniques the image and sound interact together, and thereby 
compose the cinematic experience as audio-visual working on the senses. This convention 
of meaningful sensuous interaction is analogously used in A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, 
Revisited, however, the iconic difference is that there is no commonplace sense of a 
cinematic experience composed entirely by scent and sound. In other words, while the 
distinctive elements of sound and image relate to one another in a meaningful way 
commonly shared by viewers, and communicable through reference to language of visual 
and auditory sensual perception, the ephemeral aesthetics of the olfactory disrupt this 
convention. Although similarly to cinema, there is a technological repeatability of the 
screening experience that would allow for experiences to be of an equal nature, there is 
nevertheless a strong subjective element of comprehension inherent to the aesthetics of the 
cinematic concert. From a technological point of view, the different stages of the cinematic 
concert melt into one another, as there is no direct cut, like in motion pictures, from one 
shot, scene or sequence to another, but rather a soft sense of melting and moving stages 
that amend from one stage to another. Not only does the viewer perform the camera-like 
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function of assembling individual momentary impressions here, but the viewer also 
assembles the piece over time throughout the different stages. This means that the viewer 
experiences the cut of editing as the transformation from one stage to another in subjective 
terms, or rather it is the viewer, who to a large extent performs the cuts of the editing 
process mentally. Further, from an interpretative point of view it is also the viewer who 
assembles the piece into one distinctive holistic experience. This may include an 
apprehension of the stages as separate, distinct, concrete bits, akin to moving images, but 
may also be subject to a more fluid reading of the stages as flowing-into-one-another, non-
separate entities.  
 The immediacy in which A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited enacts its 
aesthetic regime onto the viewer reminds me of an idealistic statement of Bazin concerning 
the ontology of the photographic image. Writing on the structural constitution of urban 
realism in Bicycle Thieves (1948), Bazin proposes an ontological vanishing point of cinematic 
technology via dissolving into reality as such. He writes, ‘[n]o more actors, no more story, 
no more sets, which is to say that in the perfect aesthetic illusion of reality there is no more 
cinema’ (1971: 60). It appears that A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited finds a method 
to approximate Bazin’s longing for the ideal of a disappearance of cinema into reality, or the 
construction of an illusion thereof. By concentrating on the concept of mobility, Bazin 
finds ‘pure cinema’ in its ability to both transcend ‘the action of a “spectacle” and of an 
event’ (1971: 60). It is through the directness, immediacy, and immersion of the cinematic 
concert that the viewer is embedded within, rather than confronted by this form of 
cinematic work. While A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited does indeed ‘endow the 
audience with a sense of presence in an olfactory-mediated landscape of the mind’, as 
Bradstreet (2010: 59) notes, it also allows for a blurring of the boundaries that a screen-
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based cinematic experience constructs: the viewer is simultaneously inside and outside the 
piece. Rather than finding themselves visually confronted by a world that reconfigures the 
viewer’s sense of self, the architecture of the cinematic concert forces the viewer to 
reconstitute their sense of selfhood throughout the cinematic experience of the piece, as a 
main part of its aesthetic experience.  
 A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited presents the viewer with a durational 
situation in which the earlier established sense of collection of The Congress and Boyhood is 
complicated. Rather than the work of art itself constituting a collection of selfhood through 
a specific technique of the self and an epistemic scene that the viewer retrospectively 
encounters – as an observer, partaker, and witness thereof, the viewer is here dramatically 
implemented into the constitution of the work of art to be meaningful. In other words, the 
crucial distinction between looking at the motion pictures of the other films and videos in 
their duration, and the looking into or looking with the experience of durational motion in 
A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited is the constitution of the viewerly self through the 
immersion and embeddedness into the work of art. The transitionality that an epistemic 
scene provides in A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited is turned from the waves of light 
as temporal and durational image, to the waves of scent and sound. The ontological 
instability of this situation structured by its constant renegotiation of a momentary sense of 
presence within the narrative development of travel leads to the continuous sense of 
location and relocation of a sense of self. However, otherwise than, for instance, in the 
analysis of Self in the Mirror, the present moment here is not a moment that can be 
understood to consist of a possibility of fixation and conclusive representation thereof in an 
image.  
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 Dispersion is the experience of the viewer of being in a constant state of negotiation 
of their viewerly self. Blindness as a form of groundlessness, in which the viewer is 
positioned in the piece, amalgamates with the excess of the scent significations to a 
constant experience of deferral of stability. The viewer finds themselves negotiating anew 
and anew their spatial position within the cinematic experience over time in momentary 
positions that continuously change anew. As there is no arrestation of the flow of sensuous 
engagement, the viewer’s consciousness works towards apprehending the meaning of 
difference, while the differing continues anew and anew. The exposition of selfhood occurs 
here as a form of excess, the differences of meaning of the cinematic concert cannot be 
framed as distinctive pieces. There is a true aesthetic of the instant moment as the viewer 
engages in a process of constant collection and deferring of that collection, due to the 
impossibility thereof. In contrast to an experience of void or flux, the viewer as participant 
is encaged within a narrative arranged like a string of pearls that unfolds in temporal 
progression in which positions in space are exchanged. The composition of selfhood of the 
viewer is reconstituted anew and anew through the encounter with the work, which is in a 
state of coming-into-being that does not stabilise itself in the same way that a 
photographable situation does. This means that the viewer’s sense of selfhood is 
continuously re-territorialised and re-territorialising in the voyage that A Trip to Japan in 
Sixteen Minutes, Revisited suggests. Orientation in space here becomes the aesthetic and 
ontological experience of the artwork. There are no holistic points of reference and 
anchorage of this experience, but the viewer’s sense of selfhood is fragmented and 
fragmenting – dispersing durational realms and spatial spheres of time. The viewer 
themselves recollects anew and anew their positionality within the realm of the narrative of 
the piece without the stability suggested by the visual characteristics of the image. This 
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process of the encounter with the work of art results in the constant and continuous 
reconfiguration and the deferral of one’s self as fixated, stable, non-moving entity. 
 A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited makes use of duration as aesthetic quality 
as a non-collecting force. While in The Congress collection refers to a point in time to which 
the recollection refers, earlier suggested as a vertical point in time or vertical bar, A Trip to 
Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited breaks from the anchorage to a specific point in time. As 
there is no collection evolving, but the dispersion of space throughout the experience of 
duration, there is only a momentary now experienced by the viewer, which however, is 
evolving anew and anew as the piece linearly progresses. Space on the other hand, is 
unstable, non-identifiable, non-singular, and non-fixated, as it exists conceptually for the 
viewer as a horizon that amends in perpetuity of the piece. While time as duration moves 
on linearly and steadily, the location in space for the viewer progresses in successive 
exchange relationships. The work of art thus becomes an ontological experience for 
exploring travel in space. From a very practical perspective, the viewer sits within the 
presentation of a journey, a compressed and condensed durational activity that induces a 
sense of wondering and daydreaming-like state. By facing a void-like black blindness in the 
beginning of the trip, the viewer begins to comprehend this visual non-image as an 
invitation to conclude the sensual experience in their head through the visual impression of 
an image. Although there is a progression in time that similarly to Boyhood rolls into the 
now, there is no collection of a continuous embalmment achieved, but the continuous 
relocation in space. In the process of the impossibility of grounding the experience in 
anything but the excess of possibilities of meaning-making the viewer faces the experience 
of dispersion of their experience of location in space.  
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 In a similar way to Boyhood there is a vast compression of time that the artwork 
achieves through the technique of sequences or stages that flow into one another. A Trip to 
Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited uses the technique of temporal compression with the clear 
purpose of inducing a sense of space and spatial presence for the viewer. However, unlike 
in Boyhood there is no collection of a self achieved within this process, but rather the process 
achieves the sensation of a dispersion of a self over time. There is a similar use of – literally 
– milestone moments like in Boyhood to allow for the viewerly sensation of recognition of 
where one is positioned in the unidirectional trip. However, there is one crucial difference 
with respect to the technique of the durational unfolding compared to Boyhood as there is no 
recollection of a past that folds into a temporal shared presence between viewer and self on 
screen. The exposition of presence occurs within and through a sense of dispersion that 
does not collect itself over time. A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited does not work 
with temporality in this manner, but uses temporality as a means to achieve its aesthetic 
effect of placing and replacing the viewer in space. Nevertheless, the different olfactory 
stages of the trip are drifting from one into the other stage, thereby like in Boyhood the sense 
of the present moment rolls on from one stage to the next one. While the scents produce a 
sense of location and relocation, the accompanying sound structure generates the sense of 
progressive movement in space, which is nonetheless not grounded in a singular 
distinctiveness.  
 A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited produces a superimposition of sense 
significations within the spatio-temporal passage of the piece as durational experience. The 
viewer is located in this work of art that unfolds into the future through the mechanical and 
technical reproduction of an immersive environment, which, however, presents rather than 
represents a momentary presence in time. Crucially, the technique of articulation of the 
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present moment is freed from the indexicality, the trace of the past of the pictorial 
cinematic image. While the pastness of representation is not integral to the viewer’s 
experience of the immersion into the presence of the piece, there is nevertheless a strong 
sense of temporal layering occurring for the viewer, as the piece negotiates the placement in 
space through the subjective workings onto the imagination and memory of the viewer. 
This magical enactment of a viewerly sense of selfhood within the presentness of the 
artwork is reminiscent of what visual scholar Max Silverman in Palimpsestic Memory calls the 
‘principle of the superimposition of different traces to condense surface and depth, present 
and past, and the visible and the invisible’ (2013: 25). The forces of superimposition of 
sense impressions together with the condensed experience of spatio-temporal presence 
produce dispersion for the viewer, a constant process of the intuitive workings of 
imagination and memory. Through the synesthetic effect of the scent and sound onto 
blindness, however, the forces of superimposition gain non-visual meaning thereby 
producing a holistic sensual panorama.  
 In conclusion, A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited breaks with the structure of 
inside (the screen) and outside (the screen) that a cinematic work conventionally consists of. 
The viewer is not only witness of the Nancean motion of the real through the cinematic 
unfolding, but the viewer here is in the practice of motion. Breaking this separation leads 
on the one hand to the sense of immediacy and contact that makes the work powerful, on 
the other hand this leads to the sense of dispersion in space as an experience enacted upon 
by the viewer. Thus, the viewer constructs a cycle of representation in its most immediate 
form, as the viewer moves from the relational construction of the cycle of representation 
into the enactment of representation itself. I am reminded here of a note of Nancy in The 
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Muses that provides theoretical guidance through this process enacted in A Trip to Japan in 
Sixteen Minutes, Revisited:  
 
 [a]rt is the transcendence of immanence as such, the transcendence of an immanence 
 that does not go outside itself in transcending, which is not ex-static but ex-sistant. A 
 ‘transimmanence’. Art exposes this. Once again, it does not ‘represent’ this. Art is its 
 ex-position (1996: 34–35).  
 
 Nancy here develops a language to bridge both the difference of inside/outside that 
the work crosses, and the durational logics of immersion and embeddedness. What art 
exposes, and not represents, is the simultaneous going out of the experience of the work, 
while remaining within the work. As Nancy also remarks, ‘each work [of art] is in its fashion 
a synesthesia and the opening of a world’ (1996:31), and it is within the logics of the 
opening of a world in which the viewer is able to articulate a sense of selfhood within the 
process of dispersion. From a cinematic perspective, A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, 
Revisited allows us to understand the refashioning of subjectivity as a process of 
renegotiation of the cycle of representation, by the enactment of forces of inside over 
outside, and space over time.  
 
 




With the introduction of Ralph Bakshi’s Cool World (1992), I conclude the analysis of The 
Cinematic Self by further developing the conception of dispersion. While I introduced the 
concept of dispersion of selfhood in the previous chapter with the interpretation of A Trip 
to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited and the aesthetics of this particular work that transgress 
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rigid conventions of the cinematic based on the primacy of the visual, I now further 
conceptualise this term in more immediate relation to cinematic work. In A Trip to Japan in 
Sixteen Minutes, Revisited the function of dispersion is immediately linked to the experience of 
the viewer’s selfhood relocating in space over durational time. This characteristic of 
dispersion is further developed in the analysis of Cool World with respect to the 
understanding of the dislocation in space of cinematic selves in this motion picture. While 
the viewer themselves engages in a dispersion over time in an unstable environment created 
by the intrusion into the dynamics of the work of art in A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, 
Revisited, it is the presentation of an environment that escapes any intuitive stable 
representational nature in Cool World which disperses the sense of ontological grounding in 
space. The aesthetic experience of the viewer is thus profoundly shaped by the confusion in 
terms of belonging in space. The viewer experiences not only a fundamental ontological 
confusion in the narrative of the film, but this complicated narrative is paired with the 
additional ontological complexity caused by the use of hybrid imagery. Diverging from the 
use of animation as opposed to live-action images that are not animated in The Congress, in 
Cool World these two distinct imageries interact with one another within frames and scenes. 
In other words, the dislocation of selves that Cool World exposes is not inside an easily 
accessible narrative realm of visual representation, as there is the creation of a hybrid realm 
within the film parallel to, or rather on top of a realist and animated realm.  
 The distinctive cinematographic characteristic of Cool World is the experimental 
composition of a complicated hybrid imagery transgressing conventional cinematic work. 
While Cool World fulfills the ontological main criterion of constituting a cinematic work by 
virtue of consisting of a durational ensemble of motion pictures, it simultaneously escapes a 
rigid classification therein. Throughout the ninety minutes running time, Cool World consists 
 184 
of three different cinematic ontologies: two independent yet interrelated realms, and one 
that exist as an amalgamate form. Like The Congress, the film consists of both live-action and 
animation images. In contrast to The Congress, however, where this different imagery is used 
to demarcate distinct narrative realms within one another, with the exception of the 
transitional car scene, the different cinematic imagery is used in Cool World in a more 
complicated and innovative manner by melting into one another. This means that Cool 
World contains what I term the “hyper-image”: a third category of an image, namely blends 
of animation images and live-action images. Telotte (2007), for instance, enlists Cool World 
among other films such as Joe Pytka’s Space Jam (1996), Des McAnuff’s The Adventures of 
Rocky and Bullwinkle (2000), or Bobby and Peter Farelly’s Osmosis Jones (2001) as ‘hybrid 
animation’ (2007: 108). Yet, there is no scholarly conception of the fusion of animation and 
live-action imagery besides the naming as hybrid or, to use another term, ‘mélange films’ 
(Bruckner 2015).  In my conception based on Cool World, the hyper-image is a combination 
of both live-action and animation, in which there is a hybridisation achieved by combining 
foreground and background into divergent ontological categories. Crucially this includes the 
display of selves within the film as either live-action characters or animated figures in 
divergence to what the background or principal realm of the imagery would suggest. This 
means that the film consists of three different image qualities, in which the third novel 
image category of the hyper-image escapes an intuitive understanding of its anchor to a 
photographable or realist sense of reality.  
 This chapter frames Cool World through the analysis of the hyper-image and its 
distinctive composition. The reading of the film progresses through the interpretation of 
the narrative, which is intertwined through the use of the two different image techniques 
and the production of the amalgamate third image technique. This production of the hyper-
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image is the specific technique of the self that the film advances. In other words, the hyper-
image allows for the articulation of selfhood within this distinctive framing. By situating the 
location of the exposition of selfhood of the narrative within this hybrid realm, the film 
suggests a particularly strong sense of dislocation and vanishing in space. The analysis of 
Cool World thus serves to further point out the technicalities of the dispersion in space 
earlier introduced through A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited. The relationship 
between inside the artwork and an outside reality is here revisited through the composite 
nature of an amalgamate image that constructs its own sense of diaphanous and hybrid 
reality. I analyse the viewerly experience with the new form of presence of the image with 
respect to the aesthetic-ontological set of relations that emerge through the articulation of 
this form of imagery. Throughout the film, the viewer is in a state of constant apprehension 
of the location of the selves with respect to the realms of the film. Further to that, the 
narrative of the film even includes the dislocation and loss of selfhood as part of the 
dramatic storyline, pointing to location and dislocation as crucial narrative thread.  
 Ralph Bakshi directed Cool World in 1992 as a Hollywood blockbuster film produced 
by Paramount Pictures with the two main protagonists Jebb Deebs (Gabriel Bryne) and 
Holli Would (Kim Basinger). To give a reductionist account of the highly fragmented, yet 
consistently linearly evolving plot, the storyline principally evolves around the cartoonist 
Jebb. In the process of leaving a prison sentence, Jebb enters the world he envisioned and 
produced in his artistic work, as he is summoned into the so-called cool world, leaving the 
city of Las Vegas. In this cool world suggested through the use of animation imagery, Jebb 
encounters Holli, who is an animated character or doodle that is knowledgeable of the 
façade of the cool world and aspires to enter the real world. Holli who has summoned Jebb, 
pursues him and intends to seduce him sexually as an opportunity to enter the real world 
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through that action, and leave the cool world behind. However, Detective Frank Harris 
(Brad Pitt) – a human character forced into the cool world after a tragic accident seen in the 
beginning sequence of the film – polices these attempted trespassers aspiring to enter the 
real world. Frank thus chases Holli throughout the film, yet nevertheless fails to prevent her 
from sexually seducing Jebb, and in turn transubstantiating from a doodle to a human self. 
After Hollie enters the real world and Las Vegas with Jebb, their appearance begins to 
flicker between doodle and human, or animation and live-action image. As a solution to the 
non-groundedness in either world and loss of belonging, Hollie attempts to get a hold on 
the so-called “Spike of Power”, which however fails, and leads to the transformation of 
humans into doodles in Las Vegas, and the ending of the film.   
 The study of selfhood within Cool World is intricately linked to the complicated 
composition of the narrative of the film. While the three different ontologies of the image 
disperse the attention of the viewer across those three realms, the narrative further 
complicates the sense of grounding any belonging or relationality within a singular realm. 
Thus, my reading proposes that the experience of watching the film is an experience of loss 
of viewerly selfhood in space understood as the sense of belonging in reality. The 
grounding in space of the viewer is disturbed and disrupted, and the viewer experiences 
dislocation. While the film dramatises the dislocation of its characters over time in the 
different spatial realms throughout the film, the viewer experiences the dispersion in space 
analogously not only through the confrontation with this narrative, but through the 
multilayered spatial presence suggested through the hyper-image. Further to that, the 
different sequences of the film are cut and edited in a disorienting manner that further 
complicates the tracing of the narrative. In addition to that, the rhythm and fast pacing of 
the musical score, consisting of dominantly shattering electronic music, contributes to a 
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shaky sense of orientation. The viewer is quite simply lost in the attempted apprehension of 
the complexifiying relationalities within the film, while the framing of the realities depicted 
loses, rather than gains, a sense of collection in and through time. Through the relocation of 
the sense of self in this dislocating multi-dimensionality, the viewer is wretched in their 
ability to comprehend a stable relationality towards the world and worlds on screen. The 
viewer encounters through watching the film their own trip-to-the-self-like aesthetic 
experience, analogously to the exposition of the selves on screen that advance through the 
technique of the self in the hybridising articulation through the hyper-image.  
 The live-action and animation hybrid image constitutes the most radical 
intervention of the film within the cinematic canon. The first time this technique was used 
is in Robert Zemeckis’s Who Framed Roger Rabbit (1988), in which so-called “toons” or 
cartoon personae interact with humans. Ralph Bakshi envisioned this technological 
invention through Cool World as a means to construct ‘a living, walk-through painting’ (in 
Gibson and McDonnell 2008: 219). My reading of the film advances that the graphic, 
painterly, animated, and crucially animating intrusion into photographic imagery or motion 
pictures introduces a sense of layering of reality or realities over one another. In other 
words, the characteristic of ‘living’ Bakshi aspired to create, or the aspect of ‘walk-through’ 
of the painterly is the sense in which there is another, second aspect of staging of the 
photographic image (in Gibson and McDonnell 2008:219). The photographic image – and 
with that the mimetic representation of reality through the photographic – is intruded upon 
by another realm within the same frame. The reality depicted by the photographable, the 
realist ontology is supplemented through this intervention resulting in a hyperreality of the 
image. By choosing the fabric of reality as the main narrative theme of the film through the 
drama of the plot, the relation between the imaginative world of the artist and the real 
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world becomes further thematised by aligning form and content. The metaphysical and 
ontological questions the film provokes with the storyline of Holli Would concerning the 
existence of selves within multiple, supplementary worlds are thus articulated through the 
choice of form or imagery of the film itself. In addition to that, the film further intruded the 
limits of representation outside its own boundaries through the commercial promotion. As 
seen in Figure 15 below, the commerical promotion included the intrusion of a model of an 























Figure 15. The promotion of Cool World.  
 
 The promotional work that the film has been marketed with to the viewer illustrates 
the interplay of spatial references of Cool World as a phenomenon. While Figure 15 shows 
the printout of the simulacrum of Holli Would in the physical reality of Hollywood, 
epitomised by its tagline intruded upon as a marketing sting, this photograph also 
allegorically illustrates the complexity of the referential universe of the film. The materiality 
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of reality is played upon, and intruded upon through the hyper-image – in the promotional 
activity suggested by the placement of the printout figure in the world – which results in a 
configuration of reality as a hyperreality. The symbolic exchange between the physical, 
filmic, historic, allegoric and other spaces enacted in Figure 15 displays the layerings and 
depth of communicational maneuvers and orientation the viewer mediates within the 
encounter of the film. In other words, Cool World presents a world in which there is a 
constant quest for understanding relationalities with reference to one another, such as the 
belonging in space of the different selves. However, this quest leads to the redirections and 
bifurcations of significations across the realms of the film, which ultimately also escape the 
contained realms of the film. The constructed referential realm of the film spans into, or 
slips outside the filmic frame very vividly through the interrelatedness of for instance the 
choice of Las Vegas as the primary filmic location, and the real world connotative 
characteristics of Las Vegas as a space of desire. The relationships of realities as structures 
of meaning within the narrative of Cool World produces the sense of a fabrication of an own 
kind of reality through the repeated use and reference of the cool world. The signification 
of the dialogue, however, often times also escapes meaningful interpretation through the 
effective meaninglessness of many interjections and dialogue sequences. The rhythmic 
unfolding of the sequences of the film is most strongly held together through the 
fabrication of the hyper-image as the in-between stage of the immersion into the two 
distinctive realms.  
 The dialogue that Cool World constructs on the cinematographic level in the 
production of hyper-images produces a “hyper film”. Cool World cannot be classified as 
either live-action or animation film, and thus exemplifies a hyphenated and hybrid category 
of filmmaking. The narrative exposition of a dramatic story also moves attention away from 
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understanding the film within the categories of the essay film or the experimental film. Cool 
World is further hybrid as it includes its own metafilmic interpretative clues, containing 
more self-reflexive depth than the Hollywood blockbuster conventionally allows for. In 
other words, the film includes its own structurally invented ontological reality through the 
Cool World, which is self-reflexively thematised within the film. Also, the storytelling 
includes references to the film’s constitution as a cinematographic piece sui generis, as 
many dialogues in the film center on the question of the constitution of reality. Indeed, 
most of the meaningful dialogues in the film – in contrast to the countless interjections – 
center on the question of belonging in space, principally by Holli Would and Jebb. Within 
this dramatic arrangement, Detective Frank serves as an explanatory helper of 
understanding the nature of fabrication and interrelatedness of both realms for the viewer. 
The metaphysical realm is thus directly thematised by means of questioning and reflecting 
upon the location in space by the selves of the film, while they move among realms. 
 Cool World consists of three different types of selves that are present within the film. 
The first category of selves are the live-action characters, such as the protagonist Jebb. 
These selves exist within the realistic and photographable realm of reality known as the real 
world. In the jargon of the film these characters are known as “noids”. Principally, most 
characters that remain rooted within the real world in their existence are unaware of the 
cool world realm. Thus, the supporting cast of the film within the Las Vegas setting falls 
within this sub-category, while Jebb and Detective Frank navigate between the real world 
and the cool world realm. The second category of selves is the non-live action characters, or 
animated human-like characters, such as the protagonist Holli. These characters are 
essentially representations of humans and share human features through their appearance, 
actions, and speech. These characters are known as “doodles” within the jargon of the film, 
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and they exist as human-like and non-human-like graphic form. What differentiates the 
human-like doodles from the non-human-like ones is the capacity for a human-minded 
consciousness, developed language skills, and the knowledge of the boundaries of the real 
world and the cool world.  Thus, the third category of selves are the non-human-like 
doodles, animated comic figures on a varying scale between animal representations, fantasy 
forms (such as objects or spectral appearances), and android representations. These 
exclusively animation-only figures appear as inhabitants of the cool world realm, and many 
of these figures seem to be primarily attention grabbing creatures disturbing the noids and 
the viewer, irritating any grounding of concentration as durational span. These often times 
most heavily distracting figures qualify as noise-like appearances that plague the viewer. 
Unbound of gravitational logics or other worldly or social conventions, these doodles are 
mindlessly wandering figures that permeate the cool world realm.  
 The relationalities between the three different forms of selves in the narrative of the 
film are exposed and explored within the three different image qualities. While the live-
action image evokes the real world, and the animation image the cool world, the film’s 
narrative consistently complicates this dualist understanding of the two realms of the film. 
For instance, in the earlier mentioned flickering sequences, there is no clear sense of 
belonging in either of the two realms of the film, and the characters appear in not only the 
in-between stages of those two realms, characterised by the pulsating rhythm of the 
flickering, but also outside of these two realms in a void-like state or environment. Turning 
to the qualities of the hyper-image, the relationality of the different realms with respect to 
the image is further complexified. The hyper-image produces complicated ontological 
relationalities through the assemblage or the amalgamation of different qualities of the 
image. However, the relationality of the two images with respect to one another is 
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complexified not merely through the question of the nature of the amalgamate image in 
terms of its ontology, but via the question of perspective. As the cool world is both a 
fictional realm in its own right, and also the subjective vision and manifested imagination of 
Jebb, the viewer finds themselves following his perspective or consciousness within this 
complex set of relations. Jebb’s angle onto the cool world is juxtaposed through the 
perspective of Frank, whose storyline from the beginning sequence of the film does not 
only incept the journey into the abyss of the cool world, but whose role as a detective 























Figure 16. The hyper-image in Cool World.  
 
 
 The film spans the modern age and problematises understandings of localizations in 
space through its use of spatial geographies. While the film begins in 1945 in the desert 
surrounding Las Vegas with the narrative exposition of Frank’s return from World War II, 
the intertitles indicate 1992 as the new point in historical time after this introductory 
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sequence. Like in The Congress, where the entrance into the Miramount world includes a 
caesura concerning the continuation of historical time, this temporal spacing foreshadows 
the ontological spacing to come. While Frank has been taken from the real world by an 
initially seemingly invisible force, suggested through the visual presentation of an eclipse, 
Jebb’s entrance into the cool world is suggested through the pulling force of the character 
Holli he draws in his prison cell. The drawing he makes of Holli begins to move out of the 
ground of the paper, in black-and-white graphic form Holli’s hands intrude the three-
dimensional sphere of the cell. Through the display in the foreground of the live-action 
image that turns to – and thereby transforms to – a hyper-image, her hands pull Jebb 
towards her direction. The visual effects of lightning and flashes, and the erasue of Jebb 
from the image suggest his departure from this realm, that after a cut is additionally 
presented as a fall downwards into an animated Metropolis-like dystopian cityscape – the 
cool world. Although in the next sequence Jebb is presented in his attempt to touch or seize 
Holli whom he faces responding to her dance movements, as seen in Figure 16 he is then a 
couple of seconds later shown to be physically present again in the real-world cell. This 
effect introduces the dispersion of Jebb’s selfhood: Jebb is torn and in-between the real 
world and the cool world, in the process of exchanging his physical location between those 
realms. During the brief first encounter with Holli in the cool world the theme of contact 
through the failed physical touch emerges as the desire that drives the plot, while after the 
sequence Frank and the investigation team set up the chase for Holli as a suspect.  
 The hybridity of the space of reality is established within the film by manufacturing 
the cool world into the narrative and into the live-action image. The live-action image and 
narrative of the real world is intruded upon by the cool world story: Jebb is moved into the 
display within that realm. It is not through the juxtaposition in separate imageries of the 
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two realms that the selves of Jebb and Frank are presented, but through the integration into 
one visual image and frame. The dispersion of selfhood is articulated here in the film 
through this mechanism of systematic continuous dislocations: the world becomes 
groundless through the intrusion of this second ontological realm into the experience of 
reality. With respect to Jebb, and the continuous evolving encounter with Holli, he appears 
to encounter with the cool world a psychological space, a subconscious space, and a space 
of desire. Nevertheless, he is taken into the cool world in what is visualised as a fall into it, 
and subsequently follows the logic of awakenings and dreams. While this means that Jebb 
loses a sense of reality and a sense of selfhood, it also displays vividly the force of 
dispersion into the spatial territories and geographies within the film. The major experience 
that Jebb and the viewer with him confront is the loss of the plateau of a coherent sense of 
selfhood experienced through the grounding in reality. The cool world as the creation of a 
comic book as an object, a physical thing of the real world has not only transformed into a 
form of experienced, walked-through supplementary reality, but also exists for Jebb within 
the film as a form of consciousness. The cool world infiltrates Jebb’s consciousness and 
renegotiates his most fundamental conceptions concerning the status of his belonging in 
space and the ontology of reality. The hyper-image very evocatively displays this manifold 
layering of reality as consisting of multiple realms within the human experience of Jebb.  
 One of the most striking moments of dispersion in Cool World is the 
transubstantiation of Holli from a doodle or animated self into a human self. The sequence 
serves as an epistemic scene that presents the transformation of the sense of reality and 
consciousness for Holli paired with the witnessing of the accomplished desire of Jebb of 
the sexual encounter. The materiality of both realms and the belonging in both realms 
substantially amends and transforms through this encounter. The film makes it explicit that 
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it is possible for Holli to cross into the real world through a magical sense of contact 
established through the sexual encounter, which motivates her behaviour that leads to the 
seduction of Jebb. The longing of Holli to enter the real world is because of her knowledge 
of the benefits of a real world existence in comparison to a cool world existence. Holli 
develops a passion to penetrate and permeate the reality that appears to give her 
corporeality and sensual perceptions more truthfulness and authenticity. In other words, it 
appears that Holli experiences a sense of double consciousness, able to perceive the reality 
she is bound to, while also understanding the reality she is encaged in from the perspective 
of the other. The process of othering here is the distinction created between the privileged 
real world and the cool world, a subordinated realm in terms of authenticity of the wordly 





















Figure 17. The transformation of Holli Would from a doodle into a human.  
 
 
 The sequence of transsubstantiation of Holli into a human self breaks the 
consistency of her displayed identity as a doodle. As seen in Figure 17, the transformation of 
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Holli occurs visually through the intrusion of the live-action properties into the animated-
image. The articulation of Holli’s corporeal existence as human self – the dispersion of 
ontological categories – is presented as an event in a close-up frame. The transubstantiation 
of her body is visually accomplished through the creation of the blending of the ontological 
difference between animation and photographable live-action in a soft fade out. Rather than 
breaking, or appearing in a sudden eclipse-like fashion – such as the initial entrance of 
Frank and Jebb into the cool world – the transformation of the body of Holli occurs as a 
cinematographic effect. Thereby the metalepsis, the ‘jump across’ the ontological realms is 
suggested for the viewer as an experience of corporeal transformation. The layers of 
graphic display that are visible in this rotoscope-like image disappear in the extreme close-
up within the passage of a couple seconds. While in the rotoscope-like still of Figure 17 the 
transformation process is visible in the phase of a doubling of the image in a gestalt 
changing fashion, which could suggest a doubling or division of Holli into two selves, the 
peeling-off of Holli from animation to live-action happens as a transubstantiation in this 
hyper-image. Holli exchanges the realm in which she appears to belong through this 
palimpsestic process, a sweeping and transitional moment of instrumental exchange.  
 In conclusion, in Cool World the viewer is subjugated to an experience of dispersion 
through the hybridisation of reality. The experience of consciousness of a singular moment 
in time is not anchored within a singular conception of space, but oscillates and is in 
exchange between the co-existing spaces of the films production of hyperreality. Through 
the film’s use of hyper-imagery the film presents a world constructed according to the 
principle of dispersion therein, as a continuous experience of exchange, groundlessness and 
existential void. Through this experience of dispersion, the film positions the viewer in 
what Frederic Jameson describes in The Seeds of Time as ‘a purely fungible present in which 
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space and psyches alike can processed and remade at will’ (1994: 14-15). The experience of 
dispersion as a spatial process in which consciousness is negotiated through the experience 
of reality is thus a principle of representational looping that achieves to disorient and agitate 
the viewer’s constitution of selfhood. While there is a closure of the cycle of representation 
in A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited through the cinematic experience, as the viewer 
is dispersed in space of interaction with work of art, in Cool World the viewer confronts the 
experience of dispersion as process in which a sense of spatial belonging is impossible to be 
achieved. The dispersion in Cool World is achieved as a matter of location and re-location in 
various ontological spaces and galaxies, the augmentation and co-inhabitation of augmented 
realities, and the interaction with non-human selves.  
 
SECTION III. Moments of Selfhood: Neoliberal 





In Section III, I look at films within the episteme that The Cinematic Self self-reflexively 
suggests, the contemporary neoliberal age, and the forces on selfhood enacted therein: 
morality and ethics, conditions of corporeal work, and the emotionality of existence, in 
relations of love. I analyse three filmmakers working at the friction of documentary and 
fiction, in hybrid and mixed documentary and fiction aesthetics across their oeuvres with 
a focused reading of epistemic scenes in their films that inhabit a presentation of 
selfhood. While the films as a whole have a clear focus on the presentation of selfhood as 
the main narrative theme and topic, individual key scenes serve as portraits of the selves 
and the forces that each film emphasises. The use of the term portrait does not direct overt 
attention to the face, but rather refers to the style of filmmaking that foregrounds the 
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characteristics of the composition of selfhood. In other words, portraiture is understood as 
the cinematic exposition of the forces that work on the self. The analysis thereby moves 
from the understanding of the body through the figure of the other and relationality in 
abstract terms to concrete forms in which the forces of space and time act on the body. 
There are a number of questions that the analysis will focus on, such as: What are the 
techniques in which the self is presented, exposed, and excavated? How does the 
cinematography, mise-en-scène and editing compose a sense of selfhood for the viewer? 
What are the distinctive characteristics of the broader individuals, which are both revealing 
their self and a condition of selfhood that is part of the human condition more broadly? 
How is the self constructed with respect to its distinction from the other? What is the 
relation that is inhabited by the selves with respect to the other? What is the basis in which 
the relationship to the world is constructed? What role is given in the world to the subjects 
and what world do the subjects choose to give to themselves? These questions are 
embedded within the broader interpretation of the forces in which selfhood is explored in 
the cinematic works.  
 In the following section of the thesis my reading of cinematic selfhood turns to the 
exposition of moments of selfhood. This means that there is extended attention to 
epistemic scenes that present and expose the constitution of selfhood. The constitution of 
selfhood is understood as confessional and confrontational with respect to its exposition: 
there is a confessional practice of moments of selfhood directed towards the viewer, and 
there is a confrontation through the immersion of selves in relationships of identifications. 
I thus anaylse and interpret epistemic scenes in which there is a constitution of selfhood as 
a moment in which there is a force of durational collection and spatial dispersion achieved 
within the interaction of the viewer and the selves on screen. However, rather than focusing 
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on the theoretical constitution, like in Section I, or the force of contact in terms of time and 
space, like in Section II, I turn to the experience of selfhood within the experience of 
reality. The self is thus analyzed with respect to the aesthetic-ontological constitution of 
reality, and the cinematic is considered as a locus of imagination of the interaction of the 
self and reality. Rather than understanding the film thus within the rigid demarcations of 
documentary and fiction, the analysis transgresses these boundaries through the 
interpretation of the constitution of selfhood.  
 The storytelling that portraits selves in lived and performed reality in Joshua 
Oppenheimer’s, Michael Glawogger’s, and Yorgos Lanthimos’s cinema is structured in 
three thematic strains of the neoliberal self: death, survival, and love. These three examples 
of the contemporary practice of a focus on selfhood in cinema are embedded within the 
neoliberal world, understood as denoting a global era of economic ordering according to a 
worldwide market structure. Also, the neoliberal is understood as an attribute of the style of 
portraiture in the sense that subjectivation in terms of individuality, autonomy and 
globalisation is part of the style of the films. The selves on screen also make visible the 
foundations of existence of the societal worlds these films excavate and present: portraits of 
selves as cinematic form to mirror societal forces in embodiment. Each filmmaker is 
respectively shown to construct expositions and presentations of specific dramatical selves 
in their cinema of the self with respect to the struggle with ethics, labour, and love. I here 
pay extended attention to the aesthetics of the composition of the body as self, and 
aesthetisise its construction in time and space, while also considering the body and self of 
the viewer itself as spatio-temporal composition. In the analysis, the constitution of the self 
within reality is displayed with respect to the interaction with the past (Oppenheimer), the 
production of presence (Glawogger), and within an imaginative utopos (Lanthimos). This 
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section concludes my doctoral thesis through the implications the cinematic self of the 
selves on screen have for the self of the viewer, through the societal and ethical 
complications of collection and dispersion, and neoliberal relations of death, survival, and 
love. 
 
Chapter 13: A Site of Ethics – Re-enacting Death & 




Joshua Oppenheimer’s documentaries The Act of Killing (2012) and The Look of Silence (2014) 
thematise the ethical complications of the violent political conflict in Indonesia of the mid 
1960’s. The practice of portraiture of the two films is the exposure of selves in the 
performance of remembrance of this conflict in the present moment. Rather than 
representing a past conflict through its documentation, the films present selves, which 
today live and embody its consequences. To use the formulation of the opening titles of The 
Act of Killing, ‘the Indonesia government was overthrown by the military...over one million 
“communists” were murdered’. As of today, the coup remains a willingly neglected issue in 
the modern historical narrative within the country. Quite the contrary it is a non-issue – as 
the perpetrators of injustice remained in power ever since. ‘The army used paramilitaries 
and gangsters to carry out the killings. These men have been in power – and have 
persecuted their opponents – ever since’, as the opening titles further put it. Simply stated, 
the perpetrators of the committed crimes against humanity live under stable conditions of 
impunity, while the relatives of survivors of the genocide fear existential repercussions to 
speak up against the elite. In 2016, The United Nations condemned the Indonesian ‘mass 
killings’ through the International People’s Tribunal 1965, explicitly formed as a reaction to 
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The Act of Killing (International People’s Tribunal 1965 2016a). Nevertheless, the state of 
affairs at the time of filming both films remains still the status quo of the official and 
popular perspective concerning the history of Indonesia, as the government refused to 
partake in the Tribunal, and thus escapes this international authority of justice. Although 
from The UN’s perspective, it is now established that ‘the Indonesian genocide must be 
included among the major genocides of the 20th century’, this has not yet led to an end of 
impunity in any meaningful way (International People’s Tribunal 1965 2016b). Promoted by 
the ethical question of how relatives of survivors can live with the state of impunity of mass 
murderers, the documentary project follows the pursuit of justice.  
 The two documentaries of the Indonesian atrocities form a diptych that confronts 
the ethical construction of memory from the perspective of the perpetrators and relatives of 
victims. The role of the films as diptych, as Oppenheimer explains, is that ‘they stand side 
by side...rather than one following the other’ (in Cohn 2015). The films are a diptych 
through the choice of perspective and framing of their subject matter and an interwoven 
selection of portrayed people. The asymmetrical relationship of memory and justice stands 
at the forefront of the documentary project. Both films present this ethical issue of the 
construction of memory as a discursive matter. This means that the relationship of 
historical action – or memory of the past – to the present moment in time – or experience 
of now – is contextualised through the lived consciousness thereof, or remembrance of the 
memory of the past as a lived custom. The practice of portraiture of the films disrupts the 
concept of the past as a stable state of memory through the presentation of the 
construction of memory of the exposed selves on screen as lived matter. The films expose 
selves in the performance of remembrance and display the lived experienced of 
remembrance in the present moment. In The Act of Killing this translates into a practice of 
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portraiture of perpetrators that works with the method of staged acting, vis-à-vis the 
reflection on the hands-on practice of genocide. The filmmaking strategy of dramatic re-
enactments of mass murder made the film a cause célèbre, and enabled the depiction of the 
victims’ perspective in The Look of Silence, which was subsequently finished. While the 
making-of structure of The Act of Killing brings back the atrocities of the perpetrators 
through the action and practice of mass murder, The Look of Silence more intimately 
excavates the structure of rationales and reasons for the involvement therein.  
 In The Act of Killing mass murderers re-enact their crimes in their desired forms, as 
part of a film-within-the-film structure. The film consists of episodic re-enactment scenes 
of a fictitious film production of the perpetrators, which serve as the main form of the 
presentation of selfhood. Accompanying these direct scenes of re-enactments, there are 
interwoven interviews and monologues with the perpetrators throughout the film, both 
concerning the real historical events, and as a commentary of the production of the re-
enactment project. Focussing on Anwar Congo, and Adi Zulkadry, who both are former 
leaders of the notorious Frog death squad, and Herman Koto, a former gangster of the 
Pemuda Pancasila youth organisation, these three perpetrators confess to mass murders 
within a referential framework of heroism, innocence, and freedom. The means of 
storytelling and cinematic form that the film-within-a-film scenes of re-enactment take is 
profoundly shaped and inspired by Hollywood and gangster films, musicals, Westerns, 
horror films, and War movies. These cinematic genres and cultural stereotypes shape the 
individual memory and imagination to an overarching degree in terms of how action is 
envisioned and is performed. In the re-enactments, the perpetrators act out themselves, 
they play themselves as they both remember and imagine themselves to be. Through this 
portrayal of acting out themselves, The Act of Killing becomes a documentary of the 
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imagination of the perpetrators. The re-enactments are temporal tools of making the past 
appear again as present, including the distortions and dramatizations of the stance of the 
actor as former perpetrator. This means that the re-enactments are recollections of a former 
past and subjectively enacted epistemic scenes: performances that re-negotiate 
remembrance in the present moment of the now. However, the perpetrators are also acting 
out the roles of the victims in the re-enactments. The re-enactments are thus actions of a 
dramatic space beyond likeness and representation of an event. 
 The re-enacting performer reconfigures their relationship to their self through the 
enacting anew of the past in a process of self-mirroring. This mirroring process through the 
distancing of time within the intimate restaging of action builds what Camilla Reestorff in 
an article on The Act of Killing considers a ‘cross-temporal connection’ of perpetrators to 
themselves, which in turn displays them as ‘troubled indexes of themselves’ (2015: 24). The 
testimonial and confessional character of their restagings is troubling for the viewer. The 
documentary aspect of The Act of Killing is the display of reality as interplay of fact and 
fantasy – and the excavation of the memories of killing through corporeal remembrance 
and imagination. On the one hand the actions as indexes or recollections alone are deeply 
disturbing already, and on the other hand the stylistic performance of their remembrance 
adds a layer of distortion and re-troubling nature to their display. What Alexandra Moore in 
an essay on The Act of Killing calls ‘heterotemporality of atrocity’ is this presentation of a 
doubling of time within a repeated unethical action (2016a: 209). Analysing the repetition of 
re-enactment in The Act of Killing, Homay King describes this technique of the self as the 
engagement of the ‘self as actor in the midst of a drama[,] and the self as observer’ (2013: 
32). Rather than constituting a traditional form of Brechtian distancing effect, the 
performer of the re-enactment renegotiates the forces of remembrance by distorting the 
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past through dramatization or escapism into grotesque, surreal, obscure or other styles of 
re-enactments. The cinematic experience for the viewer moves away from the 
confrontation of a realist documentary of the events of the Indonesian genocide to the 
portrait of fractured selves that establish an intimate yet self-alienating relationship to their 
historical self – and the victims of their own atrocities. Also there is the element of 
dispersion of an exchange of identities and roles between perpetrator and victim, which 
display the ethically troubling mindset of the perpetrators, for instance, when Anwar 




















Figure 18. Still from The Act of Killing. 
 
 
 Figure 18 is a still from one of the first scenes in which mass murders are restaged in 
detail. The realistic re-enactment of the garroting technique of Anwar marks the beginning 
of the restaging of horrific atrocities in various forms thereafter. After the camera follows 
Anwar through a clothing store to the rooftop of a residential building, he presents the 
authentic place and the means through which he conducted mass killings. He introduces the 
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space of the roof as inhabited by ghosts to reference the many people that ‘died unnatural 
deaths’. The roof itself here is thus metaphorically introduced as collector of dead souls, 
charged with inhabiting the spirit of the dead. In this setting Anwar nonchalantly explains 
that at first people were beaten to death on the roof, but this way there was too much 
blood and smell to be dealt with in addition to the corpses. Therefore, for reasons of 
efficiency Anwar developed a garroting system that he enthusiastically presents with an 
assisting friend, as seen in the shot of Figure 18. Anwar vividly displays how he used a wire 
to strangle his victims to death by re-enacting the method, while he also speaks about the 
management of dead corpses. This factual restaging and narration of the re-enactment is 
paired with a spontaneous reflection concerning the actions. In the scene, Anwar further 
reveals his personal strategy of winning over his conscience through entertainment, 
nightlife, and recreational drugs. What follows thereafter is a grotesque and ecstatic 
moment of selfhood in which Anwar abruptly begins to demonstrate his Cha Cha dance 
skills. This dramatic intrusion of action appears socially awkward and as a diversion of 
attention. Anwar’s assistant in the mid-size shot during the dance stands on the roof 
without purpose and looks into the camera. He begins to chuckle while he continues to face 
the camera and appears to be tempted to burst out in laughter. Instead he pronounces, ‘he’s 
a happy man’, after which the scene ends with the troubling aural resonance of this 
commentary.  
 The garroting re-enactment scene returns within The Act of Killing as a screened 
video. Anwar is seen at his home with his grandchildren and Herman watching the 
recording of the re-enactment on his personal TV set. The viewer is here witness to both 
the reaction of Anwar and Herman, and the reaction of Anwar’s grandchildren towards the 
re-enactment. This sequence displays the sense of an afterness of afterness, a double 
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spiraling of meaning and time in the derivate discussion concerning the style of the re-
enactment. Anwar contextualises the differences between the re-enactment and the 
memories of the real events: ‘I never wore white’. The additional layer of mediation of 
seeing himself acting out himself here gains a surreal punctuating force for the viewer, as 
the recorded re-enactment appears to be seen as detached from what it actually depicts. 
There is a dispersion that Anwar performs away from the actions as meaningful in terms of 
their consequences to understanding the actions as meaningful in terms of their aesthetic 
intensity. Anwar is very concerned with not appearing as cruel and sadistic as he envisions 
himself to be and to have been. As Oppenheimer summarises in an interview ‘[h]e’s 
watching that scene with his grandchildren, who are a projection, a part of himself. He’s 
talking to himself’ (in Nayman). The revisiting of the scene here makes the viewer feel once 
again as accomplice of injustice through the repetition of the sequence as a video and the 
reaction of Anwar towards his own re-enactment.  
 The viewer here confronts the perspective of the perpetrators as an accomplice of 
their aesthetic and ethical point of view. Written after Regarding the Pain of Others as a 
response to the infamous Abu Ghraib photographs, Susan Sontag observes in ‘Regarding 
the Torture of Others’ that with Abu Ghraib the production of images of torture turned 
from professional journalists to perpetrators themselves, and that the viewer is partaking in 
‘their war, their fun, their observations of what they find picturesque, their atrocities’ 
(2004). In The Act of Killing, which also offers a productive response to the Abu Ghraib 
torture and prisoner abuse scandal, the viewer is forced through sequences like the one 
above to repeatedly re-confront and re-endure the atrocities themselves and face the 
perverse persistence of a ‘moral vacuum’ concerning those deeds from the perpetrators side 
(Oppenheimer in Jelly-Schapiro 2015).  
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 The role of remembrance as a matter of recollection and force of presentation of 
selfhood is central is central to the practice of portraiture of The Act of Killing. The method 
of acting and re-enacting blends afterness and now in the performance of the present 
moment through which the selves of the film are both portrayed and portrait themselves. 
The power of constructing a form of representation as the repeated presentation of the past 
is given to the perpetrators, they construct their relation to themselves in whatever form 
desired. This technique of the self of acting out the past in the afterness of the event allows 
for the powerfully delusional and distorting fictionalising rather than documenting self-
image of the perpetrators. While The Act of Killing thus moves further and further away from 
a confrontation of the perpetrators of what it means to have killed uncountable masses of 
people, this central question is more directly tackled through The Look of Silence. Through 
the intrusion of the relative of a dead victim as the trigger of dialogue, the perpetrators 
construct an image of themselves in the present moment by responding to an otherwise 
ignored force. The viewer here is facing the situation of impunity in which the perpetrators 
of injustice verbally portrait themselves as successors yet confess to cruelty and barbarism. 
While The Act of Killing centrally positions acting out as a technique of the self, The Look of 
Silence uses a technique of confrontation via dialogue, or “thinking out”. This means that 
the structure of re-enactment as a repetition of action is exchanged here with the use of the 
repetition of thought, or rather the inception to think for the first time about the ethics of 
barbarism. The concrete practice of portraiture here thus evolves through the display of 
thought, reflection and articulation as a means of presenting consciousness.  
 The Look of Silence follows Adi, the brother of a victim, to question and disrupt the 
silence that prevails concerning the genocide through the confrontation of mass murderers. 
Enabled through the popularity and success of The Act of Killing that gave the filmmaking 
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team informal immunity within Indonesia, the cinematic recording of a confrontation of 
perpetrators who are still in power is unprecedented in the history of the moving image (cf 
Oppenheimer in Moore 2016b: 495). However, the film distinctively achieves more than 
just the recording of an unprecedented confrontation, it also consists of a powerfully 
personal story within the universal sense of longing for justice it aspires to satisfy. While at 
the outset the film can be seen as rather conventional talking heads documentary film, the 
practice of portraiture of framing perpetrators of violence is focused on a multi-layered 
construction of the performance of remembrance. There is the structure of the diptych that 
takes shape through an intricate relationship to the Act of Killing by the inclusion of short 
video bits of, for instance, the Snake River sequence from The Act of Killing in The Look of 
Silence. In the Snake River sequence in The Act of Killing, a spectacular and aggrandising re-
enactment of mass murder is being performed, reminiscent of the aesthetics of jungle 
murder scenes of Vietnam war films like Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979) or 
Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986). Within The Look of Silence itself, these horrific images 
punctuate Adi’s promenade along the riverbank.  
 The Look of Silence uses layers of remembrance and forgetting, and visibility and 
blindness within the narrative exposure of the film to thematise sensual relationships as 
main force of the presentation of selfhood. This means that the multi-layered exposition of 
those forces inform the perception of the viewer concerning how the perpetrators sense of 
self is directed by the use and abuse of those forces. As Adi is shown in his profession as an 
optician, the social authority of the optometrist allows the relative of the victim to create a 
confrontation free of associations to the genocide. The use of the professional conversation 
as a pretense to verbally investigate the personal roots of the person looking for a clearer 
view is an ingenious storytelling tool for the breaking of silence. Not only does this create 
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the respect to be able to speak and be responded to at arm’s length, the optometrist’s 
procedure also strongly evokes the need of the other in the sculpting of consciousness and 
self-consciousness. Nevertheless, unlike the respect and authority that is displayed for the 
profession of the optician, the position of Adi as the inquisitive seeker of understanding is 
reacted to critically. This means that with the verbal confrontation and attempted 
renegotiation of the memory of the past that happens through the film, an act of mediation 
occurs which is characterised by an immense fragility, which reflects the overall real 




















Figure 19. Still from The Look of Silence.  
 
 
 At the forefront of The Look of Silence is the systematic questioning and disrupting of 
the silence regarding the genocide through scenes of confrontation. One of the most 
powerful scenes of confrontation is the one illustrated by Figure 19 between Adi and Inong, 
who allegedly and reportedly killed Adi’s brother Ramli. Inong mutilated and killed Ramli 
together with an accomplice named Amir, and threw the corpse into the Snake River. As 
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seen in Figure 19, the confrontation takes place through a dialogue setting in which the 
optometric examination overlaps with a conversation. ‘Those are scenes and they’re 
confrontations; they’re not interviews’ as Oppenheimer insists, meaning that the encounters 
mutually inform the expression, exposure, and performance of selfhood (in Moore 2016b: 
492). The verbal as the means of communication in those scenes is the medium of 
communication, however, the scene as such is structured by the corporeal encounter, which 
due to its unprecedented nature already inhabits communicative meaning. The opening, 
listening and responding of Inong to the questions of Adi allows for an excavation of 
remembrance concerning the mass killings to occur. The excavation of memories is the 
basis for the formation of resonance between the perpetrator and relative of the victim. 
This remains unaccomplished, and instead the confrontation re-asserts the ‘cognitive 
dissonance in a whole society’ echoed through the body of Inong (Oppenheimer in Moore 
2016b: 484). 
 Inong confesses to having acted out cruelties such as mutilating bodies, and to 
cannibalism, more precisely drinking the blood of victims to remain sane and not go insane 
among all the manslaughter. While Adi attempts to provoke a “thinking-out” of the 
personal involvement of Inong within the larger apparatus of atrocities, Inong uses the 
verbal means of speech not to confess to moral wrongdoings, but to irrational and 
narratively mystifying acts. Through the interventionist tactics of the dialogue paired with 
the authority of the optometric instructions, such as Adi’s repeated questioning ‘so, do you 
see more clearly or less clearly’, the scene evokes the possibility of change of perspective. 
Nevertheless, there is no apology, no signs of erring or doubt, as repentance appears 
unimaginable for Inong, and thereby the scene presents that facticity is neither sufficient to 
induce a different understanding of the past nor breaking down immunity. As much as the 
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verbal narrative exposes Inong’s stabilised relation to himself, his twitching face is central to 
the expression of fragility of his selfhood confronting the inconsistency of his ethical 
integrity. Although the film creates a situation of social imagination and vision, as it 
documents the so far unthinkable encounter between relatives of victims in Indonesia, the 
practice of portraiture mirrors and thus simultaneously presents the systemic architecture of 
vulnerability of the situation within the Indonesian society as a whole. While ‘the film insists 
on the presence of a claim to the right to look that is also the right to speak’, as Alexandra 
Moore puts it (2016a: 203), the perpetrators decide upon the breaking of the silence. In the 
fitting scene with Inong, this soft power of the verbal interruption immediately reminds the 
viewer of Adi’s situation: When Inong intervenes that Adi places too much emphasis on 
‘the political’, he is in charge of the narrative and the ability to silence it – inside the 
cinematic confrontation and outside of it.  
 Both The Act of Killing and the Look of Silence use the corporeal as the privileged site 
of the excavation of meaning concerning the Indonesian genocide. The presentation of 
history occurs through the exposure of selves, as the site of embodied ethical conflict 
concerning the historical narrative. It is the present moment as the site of encounter 
between the now and the then that both films offer access to. The performance of 
remembrance in this diptych is portrayed through the cinematic means of what I have 
described as acting-out in The Act of Killing and thinking-out in The Look of Silence. The filmic 
here is a space in which the recollection and dispersion of belonging are negotiated. The 
films use this practice of portraiture to construct social documentaries of imagination: on 
the one hand the re-enactment of the past, on the other hand the construction of a 
confrontation of the past. While The Act of Killing uses the powerful renegotiation of 
selfhood through the construction of a relationship of self to self, The Look of Silence 
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accomplishes the presentation of selfhood through the confrontation with the other. The 
diptych of films in turn produces a site of ethics for the viewer, in which the self of the 
perpetrator is seen through the process of fictionalisation, de-realisation, and de-
personalisation as the strategy to mask the personal history of barbarism. The filmic as the 
space of presentation of those selves achieves the dimension of a representational realm of 
a site of ethics, where the filmic is a space of encounter for the viewer of the imagination 
and selfhood of these perpetrators. The viewer is entangled in a punctuating process of 
understanding morality concerning both victims and perpetrators of the genocide within 




Chapter 14: Poetics of Precarity – Survival at Work  
 
Michael Glawogger’s late documentaries are a trilogy on the topic of globalisation. 
Excluding the posthumously finished Untitled (2017), which Glawogger himself described as 
a free form film outside his typical cinematic œuvre, the globalisation trilogy portrays 
human selves and their struggle of survival (cf Glawogger in MacDonald 2012: 49). In 
contrast to the associations and representations of a faceless globalised economic market 
evoked by the term globalisation, Glawogger’s personal cinema focuses on individuals at 
the margins of the global capitalist profit systems. ‘Glawogger’s films undermine common 
notions of fact and fiction, document and staging’ as scholar Christopher Huber notes, 
through the creation of durational visual portraits (2014: 337). The practice of portraiture in 
this cinema is the concentrated exposition of the performance of selfhood and corporeal 
labour within a struggle of survival. The three observational documentaries portray 
 213 
subjective selves and their stories of survival produced and guided by the forces of global 
capitalism within a neoliberal focus on the individual self. There is a concentration in the 
trilogy on the performance of selfhood within corporeal labour. Megacities (1998) 
concentrates on personal survival stories in four of the world’s most populated cities, while 
Workingman’s death (2005) frames five perspectives on manual labour, and Whores’ Glory 
(2011) focusses on sex workers in three different cultures and contexts. All of the three 
films present corporeal exchange relationships through the use of the body as primary 
vehicle of labour. However, the films not only present the exchange relationships of labour, 
but also enact an experience of global travel by producing borderless personal relations 
across the globe between the viewer and selves on screen. Not only is this cinematic work 
‘destabilizing and challenging the position of the spectator’, but it reconfigures the 
relationship of the viewer to the world and globalisation through this intimate relational 
practice (Binter 2013: 191).  
 The globalisation trilogy explores the phenomenon of the globalised contemporary 
capitalist society through the exposition of precarious selves across the globe. These selves 
are portrayed not in a process of motion and mobility, not precarious because of instability, 
but settled in precarity within a permanent struggle for survival seemingly without a horizon 
of hope for a better life. While on the one hand, globalisation in Glawogger’s trilogy is 
explored through the heterotopic spatial narrative construction of each individual film, it is 
embodied within the highly local non-mobile disenfranchised bodies and selves so 
dominantly sculptured by the forces of survival. This means that Glawogger’s 
documentaries de-complexify the globalisation of the world through the presentation of 
individual selves that are embedded in complex capitalist exchange relations that govern 
their lives in an embodied fashion, as their labour is exclusively corporeal. On the other 
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hand, this ‘glocal’ practice approximates the French term mondialisation or world-forming, 
meaning in Nancy’s use the globalised world according to value-driven non-abstract human 
relationality rather than mere economic relationality (cf. 2007b: 28). This means that while 
the trilogy is strictly speaking documenting globalised capitalist society, and indeed ‘each 
film is an intimate, shocking, sometimes courageous panorama of working conditions’, the 
films are particularly innovative and ground-breaking through their opening of relational 
meaning (MacDonald 2012: 40). There is thus a sense of labour of imagination in the trilogy 
in the construction of a perspective upon the world that does not confine itself in myopic 
boundaries, but achieves an opening to the world through the establishment of relationality.  
 In the globalisation trilogy an imaginative sense of relationality is produced between 
the viewer and the selves on screen. This is achieved through multi-layered, sensual and 
provocative portraits in all three films. In Megacities there is the presentation of twelve 
stories of survival across the four cities New York, Mexico City, Moscow, and Mumbai. 
The nomadic gaze across the global polis in the film creates a fragmented narrative 
perspective of atomised selves that share a universal and global subjugation to capitalist 
logic. The floating boundaries suggested through the editing style of Megacities, cutting from 
one city into another, presents the porous boundaries and relationality of a globalised 
world. While there is the experience of an exposition of collected selves in the form of 
individual ‘stories’ [Geschichten] of selves in Megacities, in Workingman’s death there is the 
presentation of shared groups in which individual selves are portrayed in ‘images’ [Bilder]. 
Each of the five durational images in Workingman’s death exposes live-threatening work 
environments in Ukraine, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and China, in which the individual 
selves endure their struggle for survival. Thus, with each distinct portrait in Workingman’s 
death a new social milieu is exposed in which the selves are rooted, and the viewer relates to. 
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Like in Whores’ Glory, where there is the presentation of three microcosms of prostitution in 
Thailand, Bangladesh, and Mexico, the presentation of individual selves in those specific 
environments testifies to the stability of precarity that those selves experience. However, 
differently than in Megacities and Workingman’s death, each of the three individual durational 
bits of Whores’ Glory is not only an epistemic scene, but stands in direct relation to one 
another in the form of a triptych. This means that Whores’ Glory’s panoramic and episodic 
form of storytelling builds, like Megacities, and Workingman’s death, relationality from one 
story or image to another, while, however, there is also a form of excess of this compound 
meaning through the composition of the film as non-separable holistic relational piece held 
together by its parts. 
 Across the trilogy, there is the establishing of global relationality to the selves on 
screen combined with a sense of astonishment, romanticism or magic that permeates the 
films. While the editing of the films of the trilogy produces the episodic and panoramic 
relation and formation to the world, there is also the production of a highly subjective and 
impressionist storytelling. The perspectives and frames of the films destabilise an 
authoritative objectivizing gaze in favor of an essayistic travelogue perspective. However, 
this technique is paired with an overwhelming sense of visual romanticism in the films that 
privileges powerful colours and majestic compositions. Further to the visual extravagance, 
the films’ storytelling juxtaposes the beautiful frames with the shocking confessions and 
practices of the lives of the portrayed selves. This experience of epistemic contrast of 
beauty/horror, the merging of shock and awe is what Glawogger describes as the viewerly 
experience of the ‘knot in the head’ (in MacDonald 2012: 42). Intended as a direct relational 
response to the storytelling, the experience of the knot in the head is the conceptualisation 
of the puncture created by this practice of portraiture, what MacDonald describes as 
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‘complex layerings of shock, beauty, thoughtfulness, empathy’ (2012: 40). This is achieved 
through the use of beauty in the cinematography that frames the selves on screen with a 
form of grace. It is not only that the camera captures ‘grace where others could only see 
horror’, as film critic Grissemann describes, but it produces a confrontation of relationality 
that appears as inherently complex or in tension with itself (2015: 13). Rather than mere 
stylisation, the particular sense of beauty is enacted through the contrast to the gravity of 
the deeper meaning of the frames, the shock inherent in the affective and relational 
comprehension.  
 In Megacities the viewer experiences an overwhelming tour de force across the globe 
and the reconfiguration of a relation towards precarious living conditions. In its first 
seconds the film introduces its underlying premise concerning the status of selfhood that 
informs the viewer’s perspective towards the film to come. The quotation ‘[a]nd perhaps in 
the abodes of poverty, where health, learning, shelter and security are not birthrights, the 
soul is not a birthright either’ of William T. Vollman, sets a contextual frame of 
understanding for the viewer. While the implicit question is posed whether or not the bare 
life of poverty includes the soul as harbour of selfhood, the viewer here is immediately 
placed in the discursive and relational context of the struggle for survival. Besides this 
context, the quotation also provides a connotative relation to the melancholic image on 
which it is displayed: a shot out of a train compartment’s door into a sunset in front of 
which a family sits on the ground playing music on keyboards. This overall image of 
movement and mobility, transportation and the passage of time introduces the essayistic 
and voyage-like style of the film, which works to capture the deeply human aspects of ‘12 
stories of survival’. The compartmentalised train-like episodic structure of the film thereby 
orbits the world while fixating the selves in relation to their immediate surrounding, their 
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milieu of life. Megacities portrays pimps, sex workers, thieves, hustlers, musicians – selves 
that are defined and define themselves through their corporeal labour, their immediate 
relationship to work and the precarity of both their labour and their overall existence. The 
relational practice of the film across New York, Mexico City, Moscow, and Mumbai is 
bound together through a unique visual style and rhythm of a nomadic and wandering gaze 




















Figure 20. Still from Megacities.  
 
 Megacities frames ritualised practices of labour of selves at the margins of their 
societies. Every one of the twelve stories in the chosen metropolitan areas introduces the 
selves through their personalised contexts in which their everyday life unfolds. This means 
that there is a microscopic concentration on an extremely local level in the film, which is 
interchanging throughout the film through the successive changes of spaces. Within 
seconds the viewer moves back and forth between New York, Mexico City, Moscow, and 
Mumbai in an encircling rather than linear voyage across the globe. This interconnected 
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assemblage technique strongly evokes the glocal overall atmosphere of the film. While 
through the editing those stories as epistemic scenes orbit each other across the globe 
forming a global journey that creates a sense of decentred placelessness, the intimate 
personal scenes provide visually striking panoramas of the immediate milieus of the 
presented selves. One particularly striking example of the practice of portraiture of the film 
is the sequence entitled ‘Workers’ in Mumbai with the dye sifter Akhbar Ali. As seen in 
Figure 20, this scene works with colours on two levels, as the medium of labour and product 
of exchange, while also exposing itself in immediacy as colour, thus visually dominating the 
landscape of the shot. The scene demonstrates on a visual level the complete 
embeddedness and immersion of the self in labour through the dominance of the process 
of labour marking both the body and the immediate environment. The social milieu in 
which the labour is performed, on the other hand instantly reveals itself visually as a slum 
suggesting dire poverty and precarious living conditions.  
 The dye-sifting scene in Megacities examplifies the practice of portaiture constructing 
affective landscapes of selves. In this practice the working body in ritualised labour is 
framed in synergetic relationship with the respective environment. The foreground and 
background of the image amalgamate to an overall impressionistic image in which the body 
and society appear interconnected. Like in the other scenes, the sensual realm of the image 
is very distinctively framed and composed as picturesque, while the sound emphasises the 
experience and practice of the labour. The scene of Akhbar Ali is introduced through the 
metallic banging sounds of metalworkers who smoothe out dents across pieces of metals 
such as barrels, and the pulsating sound then merges into the rhythmically counterpointing 
stable swoosh of sifting. The sound of this labour provides a very intuitive signal of 
enduring routine, suggesting the core characteristic of the machine-like repetition of the 
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work. After establishing this atmosphere through the sound, the camera then displays 
Akhbar in a close up-shot through a tilt movement from the roof of the shack. The work 
environment in this shot is displayed as cocoon-like shack consisting of interconnected 
plastic bags that form a tent-like environment offering some protection from the sun. The 
scene continues by framing the work environment in different shots displaying the 
shantytown structure that is surrounded by trains.  
 The voice-over of Akhbar gives an account during the scene of himself confessing 
to the nature of his work and life. While the exposure of selfhood through the ritualised 
and repetitive work explains itself in the visual presentation through the simplicity and 
immediacy of the labour, the voice-over narration speaks out to give voice to the soul. The 
portrait thus works on the viewer’s sense of relationality in a threefold manner through the 
image, sound, and voice-over. As in the scene the colours of the sifting change blue, to 
green, to red, and ultimately yellow, the viewer is confronted by the voice-over saying ‘I 
have no choice, so I work here...I’m unhappy...What should I do?’. The voice-over is a 
medium here to overlay the visual image with poetic depth and an authority over one’s 
account of oneself in an address to the viewer. The voice-over is confessional and 
improvisational, yet intentionally constructed for the viewer to affect their understanding of 
the portrayed life in the moment of its unfolding for the viewer. There is a strong sense in 
which this testimonial practice gives the portrait an aura of self-portraiture or immediacy, 
while the words extend the consciousness that is limited to the frame and immediate milieu 
to the horizon of the lifeworld the confession constructs. Also, the speaking voice here 
constructs a moment of dialogical intimacy through the questions posed, which resonate in 
the viewer’s mind. The hopelessness in which the voice-over speaks gives testament to the 
struggle of survival presented throughout the film without a horizon of emancipation into a 
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better life in sight.  Like most confessional confrontations of labour in the film, the scene 
collects the exposition of selfhood in Megacities as affective landscape bound within the 
precarious margins of coporeal exchange relationships.  
 In contrast to Megacities, Workingman’s death provides a more enduring exposition of 
selfhood through the concentrated observation onto five scenes over a longer duration of 
time. The swift, nomadic and accelerated orbiting of the metropolitan areas and resulting 
flow of travel of Megacities is decelerated to the exposition of milieus in more narrative 
depth. Playing on the double meaning of the title on the film, the leading question posed in 
the beginning sequence of Workingman’s death is whether corporeal labour has disappeared 
or whether it has been made invisible. This question is answered in the film through what 
reviewer Forsythe calls a ‘global sweep across a metaphoric circuit of capitalist production’, 
the presentation of the most extreme labour in the most extreme conditions (2006:68). 
While in industrialised societies corporeal labour may have mostly disappeared from 
quotidian sight, this presupposition is contrasted through the presentation of working 
selves embedded within the circuits of global exchange relationships. The five images or 
epistemic scenes of Workingman’s death present heavy corporeal and life-threatening labour 
across the globe within precarious living conditions. These five indeed ‘elegiac and 
revelatory’ stories, as critic Sandhu remarks, form an overall episodic film that is concluded 
with an epilogue in Germany displaying children touring a post-industrial coal mine 
transformed into a recreational park (2005). While this post-industrial coda of the film 
exemplifies the transformation of labour and society, the five principal images testify to 
enduring remains of labour-intensive and indisputably life-threatening labour performed 






















Figure 21. Still from Workingman's death.  
 
 The practice of portraiture in Workingman’s death privileges the heavy burden the 
labour imposes on the body and the life-threatening character of the work. At the core of 
the film is the struggle for survival of the labouring selves within an environment that 
imposes a high risk of accidental or circumstantial death. In addition to that, the fruits of 
one’s labour barely help one to sustain oneself condemning the selves of the film to 
precarious poverty. All of the jobs demand corporeal immersion in hazardous actions and 
working and living in proximity to unsafe natural environments. In order of appearance, 
there is the presentation of Ukrainian colliers working in an abandoned and claustrophobic 
coalmine, entitled ‘Heroes’. As seen in Figure 21, the second scene is of Indonesian 
labourers excavating sulphur at the edge of an active volcano with the title ‘Ghosts’. 
Thirdly, there are Nigerian workers slaughtering animals open-air in public in a scene 
entitled ‘Lions’, while fourthly Pakistani labourers dismantling huge ships and deep-sea 
vessels are displayed in ‘Brothers’. Lastly, there is the fifth scene entitled ‘The Future’ with 
Chinese steel mill workers that leads into the epilogue in Germany concluding the film. All 
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of the chapters provide a concrete immersive relational experience of the performance of 
labour through the display thereof in ritualistic detail. The scenes, however, also emphasise 
through monologues of the workers their experience of selfhood within their environment 
and their understanding of themselves within the global world.  
 In the scene of the still of Figure 21, like in the other four scenes, a miniscule activity 
within a global industry is presented that relies on heavy corporeal labour. In the case of the 
scene ‘Ghosts’, there is the presentation of sulphur mining at the edge of the active 
Indonesian volcano Kawa Ijen. The scene testifies to the visual sensitivity of Glawogger’s 
cinema, while it also dramatically displays the monstrosity of this labour at the edges of 
slipping into death. In the scene, cinematographer Wolfgang Thaler follows the labouring 
process with a steadicam, and by mirroring the movements up and down the volcano 
thereby documenting the corporeal action. The labour consists of repeated cycles of 
excavating the sulphur and carrying it up the edgy roads alongside the volcano to the 
weighing station. The shiny sulphur is carried on the workers shoulders through a tool 
consisting of two interconnected wooden baskets that is balanced on the rocky path. The 
majestic landscape here provokes associations to the sublime by the grandeur of the abyss 
that the volcano consists of, paired with the role of an interacting protagonist through the 
fog and haze it produces. There is an unbelievable knot-in-the-head-like experience for the 
viewer of the contrast between the gravity of beauty of the landscape, and the precarity of 
the performed labour at the site. The scene mirrors the ritual of work through the pacing of 
speed following performance of work, and the display of pauses, in which confessions of 
hopes, aspirations, and desires are articulated. While the excavation of sulphur is part of a 
global invisible network of exchange relationships, the workers directly confront Western 
tourists who visit the volcano site and photograph them. This confrontation in the scene 
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provides the most immediate and ‘startling frisson of contemporary contradictions, of 
combined and uneven development in the most vicious sense’, as critic Forsythe notes 
(2006:68, original emphasis).  
 The third film of the globalisation trilogy, Whores’ Glory, presents three 
environments of sex work across the globe in a triptych structure. While Workingman’s death 
primarily exposes the male worker, Whores’ Glory concerns itself with dominantly female 
labour in local prostitution industries. In contrast to Workingman’s death however, the 
practice of portraiture here does not concentrate on the exposition of the ritualistic and 
isolated aspects of the labour itself. Unlike the production of goods for exchange, the sex 
labour is client-based work that relies exclusively on the instrumentalisation and 
objectification of the workers body for the pleasure and consumption of the client. The sex 
work itself is not presented as such in Whores’ Glory, but rather auxiliary aspects of the 
instrumental labour within the three vastly divergent social microcosms, such as the 
emotional and physical burden of the labour. The film has a distinctive non-judgemental 
observational perspective and provides a perspective on different dimensions of the labour. 
The practice of portraiture here is the sensitive and relational exposition of the performance 
of selfhood to sell one’s body and its consequences. The three parts of the triptych encircle 
the work environment to provide a panoramic perspective upon the work involving the 
architectural space and social relations to clients, pimps, and people in the outside world. 
Ultimately, Whores’ Glory as a film displays articulations of the workers and the ways the 
labour shapes their life. As the film is indeed, as Glawogger suggests, ‘a composition and 
interpretation of reality’, the triptych relates the practices in Thailand, Bangladesh, and 
Mexico to one another to emphasise the aspects of difference in the performance of 
selfhood and labour. Nevertheless, the film is intended as a unified piece and Glawogger’s 
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insistence that ‘it should be like a Hieronymus Bosch painting, it should be like an altar’, 
means that the film collects the differences of depiction and perspective on the labour (in 



















Figure 22. Still from Whores’ Glory.  
 
 In Whores’ Glory the three epistemic scenes present the everyday labour conditions 
of the local prostitution industry through an observational storytelling. This means that 
there is a focus on the exposition of the work environment paired with confessional 
monologues of the prostitutes, as seen in Figure 22, that are also augmented with some 
verbal statements of customers. Through this practice the relational aspects of the corporeal 
work are being emphasised and the film displays how the relationship towards the world is 
informed by the routine instrumentalisation of one’s body. In all of the three environments 
the work is shown through the power relations that define the experience of labour: the 
corporeal performance of sexuality for the other – the customer. This display of the market 
as the primary force deciding over one’s livelihood is vividly displayed in the first part of 
the film in Bangkok, in the ‘fish tank’ sequence, where numbered prostitutes are sitting on 
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one side of a glass wall and are being ordered by clients from this aquarium-like space. 
Figure 22, taken from the second part of the film in Bangladesh, on the other hand, is one of 
the most powerful direct addresses towards the viewer of the film. The monologue by one 
of the presumably underage teenage prostitutes most powerfully describes the desperate 
working conditions and the hopelessness engrained in her precarious life.    
 The direct addresses towards the viewer in Whores’ Glory present the performance of 
labour from the self-reflective perspective of the sex workers. In the scene of Figure 22, like 
in numerous other sequences in Thailand or Mexico, there is the visual presentation of the 
immediate work environment that frames the address. Before the direct address, the 
labyrinthine structures of the neighbourhood are shown, together with other workers, and 
the madams who run the brothels to present the structures of enslavement. The room that 
is shown here is the bleak main living and working environment, with a window including 
iron-bars.  As it is revealed in the direct address, there appears to be no direct or physical 
force holding the women inside the ‘prison without closed doors’, as Glawogger 
summarises the environment (in Kasman 2012). It appears that the workers are trapped in a 
system of exploitation out of which there is no escape. The precarity and hopelessness is 
summarised through the questions of the woman in Figure 22 towards herself and the 
viewer, ‘Why do women have to suffer this much? Isn’t there another path for us?’ – which 
is left unanswered. The acutely shocking words punctuate the viewer’s sense of relational 
world-forming, and inspire a sustained reflection concerning the structural inequality that 
defines those living conditions. This deeply emotional address excavates the longing and the 
desire for justice and the need to be able feel a sense of relation to this world.  
 In all three films of the globalisation trilogy, the practice of portraiture of 
Glawogger’s cinema produces a sense of relational orientation for the viewer.  While in 
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Megacities this orientation towards the world is produced through the flow of the 
interconnected scenes and the multitude of selves exposing their struggle for survival in 
succession, Workingman’s death and Whores’ Glory provide more concentrated expositions of 
precarious labour across the globe. The performance of the body in all films is portrayed 
through the performance of labour, which in turn defines the selfhood through the force of 
survival that dominates the content of the portrayed lives. There is an intimate relationality 
produced through this practice of portraiture that confronts the viewer with direct 
immediacy of social milieus. The films use the production of presence of direct scenes of 
portraiture to establish a relationship of exposition of selfhood to the negotiation of the 
present moment. The structure of experience of life is exposed through the lens of 
corporeal work, and labour is displayed here as a perpetuation and eternalisation of 
presence, and thus as the most powerful force that sculpts the selves in their lives. This 
human endeavour confronts the viewer with a perspective onto globalisation that is world-
forming through the presentation of the role of precarious labour and lives within the chain 
of global exchange relationships. The trilogy documents the direct personal involvements in 
precarious conditions that are invisible within the global economic order’s representation. 
By privileging the personal realm of the self of a global marginalised population within 
cinematic techniques, the role of labour within the constitution of selfhood and the 
formation of relationality towards the viewer and the world is intensified: the complicitiy of 








Chapter 15: Politics of Intimacy – Relationality, 
Exchange, and Love 
 
 
Yorgos Lanthimos is a contemporary filmmaker working with a radical practice of 
storytelling analogously to Michael Haneke and Lars von Trier. Together with his main 
collaborator Athina Rachel Tsangari, for whom he produced for instance Attenberg (2010), 
or Chevalier (2015), his œuvre is tagged by critics as ‘Greek Weird Wave’ to describe a realist 
cinema preoccupied with human relations and its discontents (Rose 2011, Psaras 2016). In 
what I would term aesthetics of austerity this is a minimalist cinema using a presentational 
and exhibitionist paradigm of acting-out scenes of ensembles of selves. Lanthimos’ feature 
length films stage humans in a world that serves as a theatrical set to portray physicality and 
the performativity of human identity. As a deconstructive form of social examination, the 
films create a representational system that is explorative and experimental and unearths 
human practices, ritual, and convention. The practice of portraiture in Lanthimos’ cinema is 
the presentation of the contemporary human condition as a lost intuition of relationality 
epitomised in the pursuit of love. Excluding the début Kinetta (2005) that uses techniques of 
re-enactment already paid attention to in Oppenheimer’s œuvre, I analyse Lanthimos’ three 
main feature films to date, Dogtooth (2009), Alps (2011), and The Lobster (2015), with respect 
to their construction of relationality. All of the three films problematise the boundaries and 
the relationship of self and other, and inside and outside, through a focus on the family as 
ensemble of intimate social relation and interaction. While Dogtooth presents the 
development of selfhood through the portrayal of siblings confined in a family home with 
no relationship to the outside world, Alps exhibits a group of surrogates replacing the 
absent and deceased selves of loved ones. The Lobster displays the forced necessity of post-
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romantic matching and the abandonment of loneliness that replaces amorous love and 
relationality in a fictitious society. In all of the three films love as governing force exposes 
the social construction of human relationality, intimacy, and sexuality to underscore the 
performance of selfhood as a practice of relation to self and other.  
 The films of Lanthimos explore the contemporary neoliberal society and the 
structures of its human relationships through an exhibitionist and presentational paradigm 
of storytelling. The films consist of reconstructions and deconstructions of reality through 
the hyphenated and accentuated presentation of parallel social microcosms. This means that 
Lanthimos’ films portray plausible and relatable worlds through this technique of 
hyperfictionalisation, which conceptually deconstructs human relationality through the 
reconstruction thereof through a mechanism of othering. This means that fictionalisation 
here is truly a space of theatrical imagination in which selves operate in an environment of 
negativity and difference with respect to logos, normativity, and convention. As critic 
Pinkerton notes the studies in ‘behaviourism’ that explore the ‘permeable boundaries of 
selfhood’ renegotiate the system of rules in which humans perform their selfhood for the 
viewer (2012). The sense of weirdness within this cinema and technique of the self thus 
arises through the quasi-unnatural or queer foreignness of the performativity of identity 
within the films. The viewer here is an observer and interpreter of holistic representational 
systems through a sociological regard towards deciphering the human behaviour of the 
selves on screen. The ‘performative corporeal realism’, as critic Koutsourakis (2012:106) 
terms the performance, behaviour, and acting of the selves on screen simultaneously 
exposes what scholar Cooper terms the ‘constructed status of relationships’ (2016: 165). 
The viewing experience here strongly resembles an observational exercise of watching an 
embodied experience of imaginative mirroring, distortion, and difference of selfhood. 
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Within the films the viewer thus experiences an imaginative space, a performative utopos as  
space of reflection of the inhabited reality by the viewer that reinforces sensitivity towards 
the viewer’s relational construction of reality.  
 All three films of Lanthimos play with the precarious stability of the order of reality 
held together by human relationality. There is a paratactic, enumerative style of sequential 
bits of narrative that do not conclude in unity, but remain fragmented excerpts of broader 
dramatic chains of events. The storytelling documents the social realms and microcosms of 
the films as social laboratories that excavate overall structures and logics of social 
governance. The experience of parallel mirror worlds and societies is achieved through the 
incorporation of alterity in terms of language and social norms in the films, together with 
realist cinematography. As scholar Mark Fisher puts it ‘[t]he camera lingers impassively, 
unobtrusively, as if it is performing a merely documentary function’ (2011: 23). The 
storytelling thus engages in undermining the boundaries of theatrical and representational 
through a focus on the performative element of the physical bodies in relation to one 
another. Influenced by the Dogme 95 aesthetic, the gaze onto the bodies presents primarily 
nameless characters, performers that are acting out selves in their social roles as humans. 
There is a layer-like intrusion of a meta-narrative dimension in the films, rather than 
however exposing the filmic medium, this meta-narrative dimension exposes the artifice of 
human relationality and its codes as trained and cultured. This deconstructive style of the 
filmmaking stages human relations on screen in performances of selfhood that also displays 
the social realm as rule-driven normative system. The idiosyncratic style of the films is thus 
the exposure of ideology, and in particular the neoliberal ideology of self-realisation of 
identity in social roles within the frame of the nuclear family.  
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 Dogtooth begins with a groundbreaking scene in which a hand inserts a tape into a 
vintage cassette player. Upon playing the tape, the viewer hears a diktat as a language 
instruction: ‘“Highway” is a very strong wind’. The viewer here witnesses the construction 
of a simulated otherly world through the privatisation of language. The female voice of the 
speaker produces and crafts the non-sensical and illusionary realm of the children’s 
existence through their dictated private language, their mother tongue. This opening 
sequence of the film presents the one of the main themes of the film: narrative and naming 
as an instrument of domination. However, Dogtooth presents the construction of a social 
system rather than just consists of a portrayal of ‘family wrongness’ (Rose 2011). In the 
film, a younger (Mary Tsoni) and an older adult girl (Angeliki Papoulia), and an adult boy 
(Hristos Passalis) are shown living a home-schooled life in an affluent home in some Greek 
suburban area. The infantilised siblings receive their understanding of the world completely 
through their parents, who confine their nuclear family life to the interiority of their 
property. The father (Christos Stergioglou) leaves the microcosm of the house and pool-
featured garden every workday to work as a manager in a factory, while the mother 
(Michele Valley) takes care of the house, and the couple thereby enacts a traditional role-
play of the nuclear family. The children have no immediate contact to the outside world, as 
for that they have to wait until their dogtooth falls out – so goes the parental myth 
implanted into their heads. Rather than violently abusive, the relation of the parents to their 
children in Dogtooth appears to have developed from parental love into pathological and 
totalitarian control of their autonomy and freedom.  
 Dogtooth presents parental authority over the formation of selfhood and 
consciousness in a most extreme state. The film consists of the display of events and rituals 
of the adult children, a ‘collection of happenings’ as Koutsourakis correctly calls the family-
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album like structure of short snippets of video-like bits (2012: 98). The film displays the 
oikos, the family, the family’s property, the house in which life is lived, and the universe in 
which the adult children exist. Due to the bewildering and estranging use of language 
outside of mimetic and representational meaning, and the intellectually infantilised and 
alienated behaviour of the selves, the film constructs what Koutsourakis calls a ‘meta-
performative space’ (2012: 100). In the film, the viewer notes the alienation, the othering, 
the alterity, the non-development of selfhood of the children through what Fisher calls a 
‘disturbing discrepancy between physical and behavioural maturity’ (2011: 22). This means 
that these bodies display the construction, the formation and deformation of selfhood 
through the loss of autonomy and freedom over their own identities. The forced 
confinement and the desolate mystifications of the outside world excavate the force of 
relationality, and Dogtooth displays indeed, as scholar Psaras notes the ‘specific normative 
structures that regulate the production of particular subjectivities and forms of identity’ 
(2016: 75). Through the enigmatic decoding of the private language, and the strange and 
awkward behavioural patterns of the selves on screen, the viewer stitches the logics of 
the universe together for the purpose of orientation within these relationalities. Through 
the mechanism of othering the selves, as Psaras notes, the force of relationality as such is 
excavated, as ‘in Dogtooth the family in the narrative exposes family as a narrative, indeed a 



























Figure 23. Still from Dogtooth.  
 
 
 Figure 23 displays the family as an ensemble mourning over the staged death of the 
missing brother that most probably is a narrative construction of the parents and never 
existed. The shot of Figure 23 is one of the few shots of Dogtooth that displays the family as 
ensemble, and here the mourning performance is both indicative of, and part of the falling 
apart of the precarious structure of reality that the parents constructed. The viewer 
confronts multiple narrative layers in this scene providing an excess of relationalities, 
constructed, imagined, simulated and vanishing. The scene testifies to the aspect of 
simulation within the distorted reality that the children inhabit. Here, the family together 
mourns the fake death of the missing brother, who never existed, yet allegedly escaped the 
house, and who was killed by a cat – in the film’s representational universe ‘the most 
dangerous animal there is’, as the father declares. The family stands at the tall hedge and 
fence that separates them with the outside world, and the children are dressed up for the 
funeral-like ritual to throw flowers over the fence. The viewer confronts here a distilled 
image of the relationalities of the film: the family separated into couples of the parents and 
the sisters, with the lonely brother who in his mind lost a brother (that never existed), and 
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they all stand on one side of a fence that confines their existence and defines their 
microcosm. While on the one hand, this scene portrays the ‘controversial meaninglessness’, 
to use Psaras formulation of this confined world and their gestures, beyond the dadaistic 
aspect there is the presentational aspect of an exposition of selves and their relations 
through the regulation in which relationality is displayed. As Koutsourakis puts it: ‘[t]he 
actor’s bodies are not simply the carriers of dramatic agon, but the medium through which 
the filmmaker captures the most ordinary aspects of human behaviour, so as to dissect 
them and analyse them’ (2012: 96, original emphasis). This means that the scene displays 
the acting of the bodies as relational human selves that provoke the viewer to confront the 
performative elements of love and the construction thereof in actions and gestures, such as 
mourning, in excess of the filmic space.  
 Dogtooth engages in the presentation of the manipulation of experience through the 
force of relationality. The confinement of the children and the creation of a private 
language is a hermeneutic system that constructs a hermetic world. The patriarchal figure of 
the father controls this anxiety and fear-driven environment through the mantra ‘[a]s long 
as you are inside you are not in danger. You are protected.’ The parents construct an 
environment that consists of a lot of warnings about the outside world and is thus ‘literally 
xenophobic, terrified of everything’, as Fisher points out (2011: 27). The feeling of a self-
enclosed world for the viewer is epitomised in a scene in which the family watches a video 
of themselves as a form of entertainment. The television device as a connector to the 
outside world is disabled in its function, and instead becomes a mirroring microscope of 
time, offering the bleak recollection of the family’s past togetherness as the family is 
watching themselves. Throughout the film, the children are held captive as functionally 
illiterate in this corporeal and representational system that stabilises itself through circular 
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feedback loops. While the relationship of inside to outside is disrupted, and the children are 
completely under-stimulated and in a state of hypnotic idleness, there is an odd sense of 
wellbeing in their insular existence. The force of relationality of the parents in Dogtooth is 
exposed as what Psaras terms ‘affective ambivalence’, which is both ‘caring and abusive’ 
(2016: 72, 76). Nevertheless, as the director points out, the film is the ‘story of a person 
who tries to escape a fictitious world’ – namely the older daughter (Lanthimos in La Porta 
2011). To satisfy the brother’s sexual needs, the father occasionally brings Christina (Anna 
Kalaitzidou) home, who is a security worker from the factory. The regular visits of Christina 
come to a close, however, for security reasons, and the parents put the chore onto the older 
sister. This marks an incestuous involution of the film, which leads to a series of events in 
which the older sister violently removes her dogtooth, and in the ending of the film her 
escape through the trunk of the father’s Mercedes is visually suggested.  
 In contrast to Dogtooth, which problematises the development of selfhood as a 
relational activity to the world in control by the other, Alps displays the assumption of a self 
for the sake of the satisfaction of the other. Similarly to Dogtooth, the film displays the 
formation of selfhood within a relational configuration, as it portrays an ensemble of a 
group of amateur business partners who provide surrogate services to others. In the film, 
there is display of the construction of identities by force of impersonation of others, for the 
sake of the satisfaction of paying customers. The film also displays the tensions of the 
group of the ‘Alps’, which meets in a gymnasium consisting of a paramedic (Aris Servetalis) 
as a leader, a gymnastic coach (Johnny Vekris), and a nurse (Angeliki Papoulia). With the 
authoritarian group lead by Mont Blanc, the ‘Alps’ attempt to collectivise their efforts of the 
performance of other identities as a side job. While the film displays scenes of the group as 
a whole, and individual short snippets of impersonations, it focuses on the portrayal of the 
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nurse Monte Rosa, and her all-consuming life as care-taker in the hospital, at home taking 
care of her father, as ‘Alps’ member, and taking care of her ‘Alps’ customers. There is also a 
prologue and epilogue of a gymnast (Ariane Labed) consisting of two acrobatic exercises 
and performances that frame the film and the theme of performing for the gaze of the 
other. The film thus juxtaposes multiple layers of construction of selfhood through the 
portrayal of individuals, chiefly the nurse, as private individuals, in their professions, as 
group-members, and as performers of surrogate services. Like in Dogtooth, however, the 
effect of hyperfictionalisation of performativity within the film underscores the force of 
construction of selfhood as a relational activity. This is presented in Alps through the 
situations in which the surrogate identities are impersonated for the customers in role-play 
like recollections of vanished or deceased loved ones. The film thus produces scenes of 
acting out the selves of others and thereby the viewer is confronted with what Psaras calls 
‘resubjectivations’ (2016: 166).  
 In Alps the performance of selfhood is shown as a relational exercise for the other. 
The impersonations occur through the theatrical enactment of events chosen by the 
customers, in which the impersonator satisfies or re-satisfies the customer’s demands of the 
assumed self and subjectivity. In the film, the ‘Alps’ group members, such as the nurse, 
recruit customers through their professional work at the hospital. The commercial promise 
of surrogating is that it facilitates the mourning process through what Psaras terms the 
‘spectral presence’ of an ‘Alps’ member replacing the vanished person (2016: 28). As Monte 
Rosa puts it recruiting a couple after their teenage daughter dies in the hospital she works 
in: ‘It will help ease your grief, until after a while, it disappears completely.’ The viewer 
witnesses this catchy pitch scene that is not responded to by the devastated couple, but as 
the film later reveals in a sequence at their home they give it a try, and let Monte Rosa re-
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enact their daughter. In the first substitution sequence Monte Rosa tries on the tennis shoes 
of the dead daughter, puts on the perfume “Eternity”, and sits in the living room and 
speaks about a tennis match that never happened. Monte Rosa here assumes a teenage 
identity through the gestures, language, and behavioral traits she displays, exposing a 
recollection of selfhood for the parents and the viewer. The impersonation occurs thus as a 
post-mortem event through the assumption of the body, personality, and character of the 
recently deceased by Monte Rosa who thereby performs a simulated enactment of selfhood. 
The display of selfhood is thus both performative and spectral, while the cinematic 
presentation of the enactment further thematises the construction of selfhood as a form of 
acting.   
 The viewer encounters through Alps and the portrayal of the nurse/Monte Rosa a 
representational stage of the performance of selfhood. As Psaras points out, ‘the space in 
the film and the space of the film resonate sublimely in the way they 
accommodate/foreground the actor as always an actor and never a subject’ (Psaras 2016: 
158, original emphasis). In other words, this means that there is the constant visibility and 
interplay of different forms of enactment and role-play as the film displays the functional 
regimentation of the articulation of personality and character. The film displays the 
performance of selfhood as a process of acting out a reality, of fitting into a narrative, 
whether as daughter, as nurse, or as impersonator of an English lover, or as a teenager. The 
viewer is situated as a witness of the process of recollection of selfhood through the 
illusionistic staging of interactions with customers of the substitution service. These 
interactions appear strange and odd for the viewer, at times bizarre and grotesque, as the 
constructed artificiality of the impersonation resurfaces within the staged interactions that 
occur for the gaze of the other that receives them. However, there is not only the force of 
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love of the other that works on the presentation of acting-out assumed selves by providing 
financial compensation for the effort. As Lanthimos explains, Alps is about ‘people who 
pretend to be other people to escape their own life’ (in La Porta 2011). The escape out of 
an own sense of self and the slip into another sense of self is performed out of pleasure 
more than for the financial remuneration. As the sequences of the nurse/Monte Rosa 
display, enacting another self and slipping into the assumed self to continuously live out the 

















Figure 24. Still from Alps.  
 
 
 Figure 24 displays the ending shot of the filmic presentation of Monte Rosa’s 
substitute performance as teenage daughter, and overall ending of the main body of the 
film. In this long shot Monte Rosa stands on the garden terrace, almost leaning towards the 
roller shutters and looks at them as if through them, while the shutters as a screen display 
her shadow image. The concluding shot of Alps is this image of projection of selfhood, 
found in the play of the shadow on the shutters in this scene, as Monte Rosa moves her 
body. Previously in the scene, Monte Rosa shows up uninvited at the house of the 
teenager’s parents, and as ringing the doorbell is left unanswered, she breaks into the house 
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by throwing one of the outside chairs at the window, which smashes it. As the alarm of the 
house signals the break-in, she descends into the children’s room and lies in the daughter’s 
bed. The father runs down the stairs and forcefully removes her from the bedroom, and 
drags her out of the front door, while Monte Rosa manically speaks out typical statements 
of her impersonation in a disconnected and frantic manner. Being thrown out of the house, 
she encircles the property in panic to the terrace as she tries to regain access inside again. 
Arriving at the glass window front she watches the declining shutters, which the father 
operates from inside, and standing at the threshold she says: ‘Dad? I’m home.’ The scene 
here comes to a full circle and the physical loop from outside to inside to outside also 
manifests her personal breakdown as excluded from any sense of relationality. Figure 24 
thus displays the transgression of the boundaries of self and other, through the relationship 
of inside and outside of the house, and the emotional and mental breakdown of Monte 
Rosa in a single shot.  
 The portrait of Monte Rosa as substitute problematises the relationality to oneself 
lost in the excess of a presentation and performance of otherhood.  Monte Rosa dissolves 
in the role of the teenager in the immersion and desire to not only perform and 
impersonate, but to become and be this self. The pleasure of performing for the other is 
not what drives her, but the assumption of the teenager’s life. The precarious and 
unsustainable situation of this impersonation cannot provide a meaningful relationality and 
sense of belonging. Not only does Monte Rosa also violate the rules of the Alps group by 
taking on the family as a client by herself rather than as a collective, for which she is 
punished by Mont Blanc, she further transgresses the performance of impersonation by 
inviting the former boyfriend of the teenager to her house to have sex with him in her own 
self-interest. The film displays and problematises the recollection of selfhood through 
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impersonation, through the failed attempt to ameliorate suffering and loss through the 
performance of selfhood for the other through Monte Rosa. This means that Alps is not, as 
Landon Palmer writes, ‘the ensemble piece it seems to be at first, but a portrait of a woman 
who lives entirely without identity’ (2012). Ultimately the decay of Monte Rosa occurs 
through the lack of a practice of self-love and self-care for her own constitution and 
development of selfhood, and the projection into the narratives and reality of others. Alps is 
thereby a film that displays the force of othering and the emotional and existential burden 
as a ‘search for identity and belonging’, as Psaras puts it, and the desire of recollection of 
youth (2016: 157). The practice of othering leads Monte Rosa into the transgressive 
immersion of the dead teenager’s life, and the problematic identification with the role-play 
as integral part of her self-experience, rather than the re-enactment of a role.  
 Both Dogtooth and Alps highlight the relational performance of selfhood within the 
construction of social situations that are produced by the force of love. The two films 
display othering through the use and abuse of parental love and self-love. In The Lobster, the 
display of processes of othering is presented through the context of romantic love. The 
Lobster displays the forced necessity of post-romantic matching and the abandonment of 
loneliness that replaces amorous love and relationality in a fictitious dystopian society. The 
film portrays David (Colin Farrell) who has been left by his wife, and therefore finds 
himself at The Hotel, a luxury seaside resort where according to the laws of The City single 
people are kept for matchmaking. The Lobster complements the construction of a relational 
performance of selfhood in Lanthimos’s cinema through the construction of a relationally 
motivated situation in the film: single people have forty-five days to find a romantic partner 
or otherwise are transformed into animals of their choice. This somewhat absurd claim 
motivates the narrative as a fable and constructs the stage for the performance of selfhood. 
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While there is the use of games as ritual in Alps and Dogtooth such as tennis and swimming, 
The Lobster displays the practice and pursuit of love as a game-like situation and ritual. The 
film uses the ideology of coupledom and the nuclear family and enforces societal 
reproduction as an existential condition for the survival as a human being. Through the 
extreme enforcement of this ideology as an instrument of hyperfictionalisation, The Lobster 
creates a narrative of ‘unnatural situations to question what's natural’, as critic Tasha 
Robinson points out (2016). 
 The Lobster is a farcical tale about the neoliberal dynamics of choice and the 
necessity of choice explored within the economic logics of a market in which participation 
is obligatory. The society presented in The Lobster institutionalises that being single equals 
being unloved and dysfunctional, and thus subversive qua existence as a human body. The 
unnamed society in The Lobster that consists of nuclear families is thereby harmonious and 
without outliers, as it is stable through the nuptial love. Thereby, the society inflicts 
ontological insecurity and precarity to the self: singledom is an existential crisis that leads to 
the end of existence as a human. The pathologisation of the single in the society is thus 
paired with the rule enforcement of through the state enforcement of coupledom and the 
related features of monogamy and heterosexual reproduction. This means that the film 
offers a social examination of a fantasy and disciplinary society through the theatrical focus 
on The Hotel and the social practice therein of what scholar Sarah Cooper calls ‘logic of 
compatibility’ (2016: 163). The Lobster focuses on scenes within The Hotel that closely 
follow David’s experience through the experience that resembles a stay in a spa resort, 
disciplinary camp, and an assessment center training. For example, the disciplinary exercise 
upon arrival, besides the wearing of provided clothes, is to be handcuffed for a day so that 
only one hand can be used to allow for an embodied experience of the advantages of pairs 
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of two. The hotel staff further educates and disciplines the participants in middle-class 
conservative, conventional and pedantic values and behaviour to maximise their 
compatibility with the other gender. By emphasising distinct individual characteristics, such 
as the self-presentation in front of the hotel assembly and including the mention of a 
‘defining characteristic’, the logic of matching is exposed as post-romantic 
disenchanted instrumental encounter.  
 The Lobster displays the loss of meaningful relationality to one another in the context 
of love through the portrayal of David and his forced participation and performance in the 
prescribed dating. The loss manifests in The Lobster through the display of shared sense of 
loneliness and alienation by the inhabitants of The Hotel even when they are technically 
together as a group or in a dating setup. The urgency and the need to find the significant 
other in The Hotel further lead to a loss of play and playfulness within the social 
interactions, as the performance of selfhood is so forcefully sculpted through the desire of 
survival as a human. The provision of state-induced quality time thereby leads to a pursuit 
of unhappiness in seeking alikeness to one another as the chief relational and matchmaking 
characteristic. The performance of selfhood here occurs for the normative gaze of the state 
as agent of othering, enforcing the normative order of the dystopia onto its citizens. This 
normativity is presented in The Lobster through Buñuel-like surreal moments of bourgeois 
ideology and its underlying discontent, while also achieving an Orwellian undercurrent in 
the use of nomenclature. The naming of people according to their defining characteristic, 
such as ‘Lisping Man’ (John C. Reilly) or ‘Nosebleed Woman’ (Jessica Barden) display the 
























Figure 25. Still from The Lobster.  
 
 The Lobster consists in the first half of the film’s duration of scenes in The Hotel, 
while the second half portray David’s escape out of The Hotel into The Woods. The 
representational system of the film includes the renegade or resistance movement called 
Loners that consists of a group surrounding the Loner Leader (Léa Seydoux). The Loners 
occupy the forests and live excluded from the City as guerrilla movement according to a set 
of rules that forbid coupling and the display of affection to group members. Figure 25 
displays David and Shortsighted Woman (Rachel Weisz) in the scene of their discovery of a 
common characteristic trait of shortsightedness as indication of belonging together. This 
discovery displays their revelation of quasi-authentic love for one another, as they plan to 
attempt to leave the resistance movement that subjugates them to the force of the leader. 
The forced loneliness proves not to be a liveable form of togetherness for both of them, 
and they subvert the rules of the group by not participating in shared group activities in 
loneliness but creating a relational and intimate experience of togetherness by gestural 
communication. Further, the life in The Woods allows for the encounter with animals that 
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are transformed human selves thereby as memento mori further sparking a survival instinct. 
The coded exchange of gestures as love language developed by David and the Shortsighted 
Woman presents their resistance towards the resistance group anticipating the escape of the 
loners and the attempted reintegration into mainstream society.  With the self-inflicted 
attack on the eyes of David in the mirror scene at the end of the film, The Lobster fades out 
with an attack on the dominance of sight as the establishing force of relationality towards 
oneself, the other, and the world. The practice of portraiture of the film in this ending 
sequence produces through the mirror scene an iconic image of the neoliberal self, as a 








 ‘Nowadays, humans do not live in the real world. [...] They rather live in their own images, 
 the images they made of the world, themselves and others, and from images that have been 




Throughout this dissertation I developed an argument for the encounter with art as a form 
of negotiation of selfhood. Thinking of the statement above as an indication for the role of 
imagery in the constitution of a self, a world, and a relationality of the subject to both, I 
have tried to shed light on the ways in which an articulation of selfhood takes place through 
the encounter with works of art. Art in my study is deconstructively understood as a 
mediation of reality, a reality in and of itself, and at the same time a form of situation and 
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encounter which through repeatability and interpretation thereof becomes more meaningful 
than the pure vanishing instantaneousness of the unmediated real now. Thereby I have 
privileged attention on the specific forms in which this form of selfhood comes into being, 
through concentrating on individual works that above all form an ellipsis or cycle of 
representation. As an aesthetic-ontological condition, the self navigates the spheres of 
reality as a form of constant, consistent and endless mediation. As I have shown 
throughout this dissertation, encounters with artworks that enable and produce a cycle, a 
loop, and an infrastructure of representation allow for an enactment of selfhood to take 
place.  
 In this study the interpretative emphasis has been on the constitution of selfhood 
ranging from stilled to moving imagery and durational environments. I gave attention to 
three forms of engagement reflected in the methodology and threefold structure of the 
study. First, I analysed the construction of selfhood of the viewer and the self on screen in 
stilled forms of imagery; second, I interpreted the role time and space play in the 
constitution of selfhood, and third I explored the possibilities of forms of exposition of 
selfhood. By focusing the critical engagement on the construction of selfhood in all parts of 
the study, I have argued for the self as the locus of the encounter of the work of art and the 
participant, observer, witness, or simply viewer. Throughout the analysis the works of art 
have thus been environments of interaction and intimacy, rather than objects of 
contemplation and distance. I understood the aesthetic experience in this study as the 
constitution of a self through a representational closure of the work of art with the viewer 
and the engagement with this closure over time and space. Further to this overarching 
assertion I have demonstrated the manifold experience of selfhood that comes into being 
through the particularities of the cinematic mode of engagement. 
 245 
 The cinematic is comprehended and argued for throughout this dissertation as 
means of engagement rather than genre of art. Ranging from visual media, such as 
photography, painting, and film, one of my attempts here was to build a bridge towards 
other forms of non-conventional audio-visual artworks, such as the perfume concert, or the 
hybrid animation and live-action film, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
modes of encounter with art. Naturally, the distinctions between different forms of art exist 
for reasons related to their form and the engagement with the senses of the human 
interacting with them. Culturally, however, as I have argued in this study, the encounter 
takes place in a presentational setting not primarily determined by the media, but by the 
expositional force of the work of art and the mode of engagement with the viewer and 
participant. The cinematic is thus understood as a durational engagement with an 
overarching stimulating environment that produces a contact and renegotiation of selfhood 
for the viewer.  
 In the first section of the thesis Towards a Theory of the Cinematic Self I introduced my 
argument through the deconstructive analysis of selfhood. In my analysis, I established 
selfhood as aesthetic-ontological relation and construction based on specific techniques of 
the self. Conceptualizing the relationship of the self and the other, life and death, and 
absence and presence I analyzed the possibilities for an expression and thus constitution of 
selfhood in photography through the interpretation of Self in the Mirror. In the construction 
of Self in the Mirror the photographic act is understood in dialogue with Derrida, Richter, 
Nancy, Foucault and Barthes as articulation of selfhood through the establishment of a 
cycle of representation with and through the viewer in an epistemic scene. In Las Meninas, I 
turned from photography to painting and from the establishment of contact across the 
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work of art to the viewer themselves, whose selfhood is constituted through the closure of 
the representational loop in the epistemic scene of the painting.  
 Moving from the stilled image to the moving image in my interpretation of video 
after Krauss, I argued for an immersion of the viewer into the dynamics and the cycle of 
presentation of selfhood as a form of technique of durational work. By interpreting Cornered 
accordingly, durational works of art such as video present a relationship of immersion, 
confrontation, and collection of the self on screen and viewerly selfhood. In the first part of 
the dissertation, I argued for a presentational rather than representational perspective 
concerning selfhood by translating Self in the Mirror, Las Meninas, and Cornered, into my 
conception of a cinematic theory of selfhood. Based on the presentation of selfhood in 
those works, the viewer establishes a cinematic relation to the visual self that extends and 
transgresses the boundaries of inside and outside, presence and absence, and here and 
there.  
 In The Cinematic Self: Selfhood as Collection and Dispersion, the second section of the 
dissertation, I turned attention to the role of time and space within the durational 
constitution of techniques of the self. While the first section interpreted the constitution of 
selfhood first in the moment (in photography and painting) and then over a moment in 
time (in video), the second section interpreted the durational collection and spatial 
dispersion of selfhood within feature-length films. In the second part, I thus interpreted 
epistemic scenes of cinematic works as durational scenes in which selfhood is exposed with 
respect to the forces of time and space. The aim of the second part of the dissertation is to 
derive the principles of collection and dispersion as the principal force of viewerly 
reconfiguration of selfhood within the cinematic encounter.  
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 I established the principle of what I termed collection of selfhood through the 
analysis of The Congress and Boyhood and my interpretation of Bazin and realism. My close 
readings of epistemic scenes of the The Congress and Boyhood propose that here cinema is a 
philosophical mirror collecting loss of selfhood over time for the viewer. While collection 
over time is one force in which the cinematic self is articulated, the cinematic cycle of 
representation is also capable of creating an immersion in space for the viewer. I have thus 
argued that the cinematic concert A Trip to Japan in Sixteen Minutes, Revisited and the hyper-
film Cool World disperse a spatial sense of selfhood for the viewer. The principle termed 
dispersion derived from the viewerly experience of selfhood in A Trip to Japan in Sixteen 
Minutes, Revisited and Cool World describes the constant negotiation and reconfiguration of 
exchange of space. In contrast to collection, dispersion is shaped by the impossibility of the 
viewer being able to encompass a technique of the self that endures a sense of ontological 
stability over time. The cinematic experience of the epistemic scenes the works provide 
equals a constant reconfiguration of mirroring, and looping in space, and consequently the 
experience of continuous loss and the impossibility of the establishment of a cycle of 
representation for the viewer.  
 In the third section Moments of Selfhood: Neoliberal Practices of Portraiture of Selves I 
applied the theoretical analysis of the earlier two sections to contemporary cinematic 
practice. By displaying three topical cinematic œuvres of three international filmmakers I 
presented practices of neoliberal portraiture that display a relationship to the constitution of 
selfhood, its collection in time and its dispersion in space. Ranging from death in 
Oppenheimer to labour in Glawogger, and love in Lanthimos, these cinematic works 
expose the primary conditions in which selfhood is enacted and negotiated in the 21st 
century contemporary culture. I interpreted the force of death in The Act of Killing, and The 
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Look of Silence within the portrait of perpetrators, the force of labour in the portraits of 
corporeal workers in Megacities, Workingman’s death, and Whores’ Glory, and the force of love 
in Dogtooth, Alps, and The Lobster. This section thus presented a study of three forces in 
which selfhood is exposed in hybrid documentary and fiction filmmaking that uses 
imaginative presentational techniques.  
 This dissertation and study finds both its limitations and its implications at the 
intersections of its project. The method of the deconstructive approach and analysis of 
specific corpus of French and continental theory positions this project between film studies, 
film philosophy, and critical theory. While the cultural paradigm of the neoliberal is still in 
the midst of its unfolding, the analysis contributes to the current and emergent discourses 
on hypermodernity, transhumanism, dataism, and the reconfigurations of the individual 
amidst the fourth industrial revolution and its social consequences. Focusing on both a 
breadth of thought and limited exemplary material there is certainly a vast range of 
applicability and extension of the framework presented here. The fruitfulness of this 
project, however, so I hope, is at its intersections, for instance the creative possibilities and 
adaptabilities of the use of collection and dispersion as primary forces of the cinematic self 
in many other contexts – whether cinematic or other. Techniques of the self and epistemic 
scenes remain two of the main methodological propositions for the analysis and 
interpretation of cinema and visual culture more broadly, whose usefulness could be 
assessed in various settings outside the scope of this study. Needless to enumerate, the 
confrontational, confessional and performative approaches of the filmmakers and the 
works of the third section are innovative and fresh approaches to filmmaking which surely 
will inspire an array of yet to be made and critically understood art. The renegotiation of 
selfhood remains a topic of thought of unprecedented interest in the scholarly community, 
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and the cultural and societal paradigm in which the academy operates finds itself occupied 
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